

81

treatises and
documents

Journal of Ethnic Studies

razprave in
gradivo

Revija za narodnostna vprašanja

December 2018

Treatises and Documents, Journal of Ethnic Studies

Razprave in gradivo, Revija za narodnostna vprašanja

UDC-UDK 323.15.342.4 (058) ISSN 0354-0286 (Print / Tiskana izdaja) ISSN 1854-5181 (On-line edition / Elektronska izdaja)

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Published by / Založil in izdal

Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja / *Institute for Ethnic Studies*
SI, 1000 Ljubljana, Erjavčeva 26, tel.: +386 (0)1 20 01 87 0, fax +386 (0)1 25 10 964, <http://www.inv.si>, e-mail: inv@inv.si
Legal representative / Predstavniki: **Sonja Novak-Lukanovič**
Co-financed by the Slovenian Research Agency / *Revijo sofinancira Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost RS.*

Abstracting and indexing services / Vključitev v baze podatkov

The journal is currently noted in the following / *Revija je vključena v:*
CSA Sociological Abstracts, CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstract, International Political Science Abstracts (IPSA), FRANCIS, IBZ, IBSS, SCOPUS.

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Editorial correspondence should be addressed to / *Pošto za uredništvo revije naslovite na:*
Institute for Ethnic Studies / *Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja*, Erjavčeva 26, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia,
e-mail: editordt@guest.arnes.si

Ordering information / *Naročila: Sonja Kurinčič Mikuž*, Institute for Ethnic Studies / *Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja*, Erjavčeva 26, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia, e-mail: sonja.kurinacic@guest.arnes.si

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The published articles express authors' viewpoints. / *Objavljeni prispevki izražajo stališča avtorjev.*

The Journal was published as follows / *Revijo smo izdajali:*

1960-1986: Razprave in gradivo (Treatises and Documents) ISSN 0034-0251;

1987-1989: Revija za narodnostna vprašanja – Razprave in gradivo
(Journal of Ethnic Studies - Treatises and Documents) ISSN 0353-2720;


1990-2018: Razprave in gradivo: Revija za narodnostna vprašanja
(Treatises and Documents: Journal of Ethnic Studies) ISSN 0354-0286.

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Mitja Žagar

Autonomy as Mode of Inclusion and Participation of Distinct Communities and Persons Belonging to them

The article as introduction to the following articles on (minority) autonomies suggests autonomies might be tools of diversity management that can contribute to peace and stability in contemporary societies, to inclusion, integration and participation of ethnic, national and other minorities as well as persons belonging to them. The case of Catalonia in Spain serves as context for discussion on socially relevant diversities and divisions in contemporary societies, approaches to, concepts and strategies of regulation and management of diversities and autonomy; it pays special attention to ethnic, cultural and linguistic pluralities, diversities and divisions. Articles that constitute a thematic section of the Journal discuss autonomies as specific approaches, concepts, forms, models, policies and practices for development and implementation of holistic and sustainable strategies for regulation and management of socially relevant diversities in contemporary societies.

Keywords: autonomy, socially relevant diversities, diversity management, nation-state, minority protection.

Avtonomija kot način vključevanja in participacije specifičnih skupnosti in njihovih pripadnikov

Članek – kot uvod ostalim člankom o avtonomijah – ugotavlja, da (manjšinske) avtonomije predstavljajo orodja upravljanja različnosti, ki prispevajo k miru in stabilnosti sodobnih pluralnih in raznolikih družb ter k boljšemu vključevanju, integraciji in participaciji etničnih, narodnih, jezikovnih in drugih manjšin in njihovih pripadnikov. Primer Katalonije v Španiji služi kot izhodišče razprave o družbeno relevantnih pluralnostih, različnosti in delitvah v sodobnih družbah; članek obravnava pristope, koncepte in strategije urejanja in upravljanja različnosti in avtonomij ter njihove etnične, kulturne in jezikovne dimenzije. Članki tematskega segmenta o predstavljajo avtonomije kot pristope, koncepte, oblike, modele politike in prakse za oblikovanje in implementacijo celovitih in trajnostnih strategij za urejanje in upravljanje družbeno relevantnih različnosti.

Ključne besede: avtonomija, družbeno relevantne raznolikosti, urejanje in upravljanje različnosti, nacionalna država, varstvo manjšin.

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1. Introduction

The article¹ written as an introduction to a series of articles on autonomy and, particularly, on minority autonomy is a logical continuation of the scholarly discussions presented in the special thematic issue of this journal on inclusion, participation and self-governance published in 2017. This thematic issue explored several issues connected to inclusion, integration, social and political participation of individuals and distinct collective entities in contemporary plural and diverse societies (Žagar 2017). The majority of authors focused on political participation and self-governance of (national and ethnic) minorities in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe presented as case studies (Alber 2017; Bešter et al. 2017; Galičić 2017; Matichescu & Totoreanu 2017; Vidau 2017; Wutti 2017). In this context, one could consider autonomy (as a concept and possible model) and different autonomous arrangements available options and tools that can ensure and contribute to better inclusion, participation and self-governance of diverse distinct communities and persons belonging to them in contemporary plural and diverse societies.

The first initiative within the editorial board of the Journal to address the issue of autonomy and particularly minority autonomies appeared more than two years ago, stimulated by media reports and particularly political and scholarly discussions on the contemporary developments in Catalonia and Spain. Other cases – such as autonomy of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales in the UK, the position of Quebec in Canada, discussions of federalization and/or regionalization of Belgium and Italy, discussions on minority and cultural autonomy in different European countries and world-wide – were discussed as well. When presented the idea, a number of scholars expressed their interest to write on the topic and sent their contributions. The first ones are published in this issue of the Journal, while some are in different phases of the review process. Consequently, we hope that scholarly discussions on autonomies and particularly on minority autonomy will continue in the Journal in the future.

In 2017, we observed the escalating conflict between Barcelona and Madrid, more precisely between the central Spanish authorities and government of then Prime Minister Rachoy and the Catalan autonomous authorities. Analyzing developments and processes, we discussed possible outcomes and their impact on regional, national and global developments. Particularly, we considered possible consequences of those developments in specific environments, usually described as divided societies. When the editorial board asked me write to some scholars studying autonomies and invite them to consider writing on minority autonomies for the Journal, our basic intention was to describe, discuss, analyze and evaluate different concepts and practices of autonomy, particularly good practices and experiences of autonomies in diverse environments. Additionally, the goal was to develop alternative approaches to, types and models of autonomy in diverse and plural societies, considering specific environments

and spheres of life, specific historic (past) and current experiences, situations and processes as well as trends of development and public discourses on the future. Being aware of limitations in applicability and impacts of scholarly findings, results and initiatives in contemporary political world, still, we hoped that findings and recommendations regarding autonomy could be helpful in the search of alternative, peaceful and democratic approaches to and solutions of escalating crises and conflicts in diverse societies, particularly in divided ones. In this context, it was decided to study, analyze and elaborate diverse types, forms, contents and practices/experiences of autonomy as well as their consequences. At the time of the publication of this issue of the journal on (minority) autonomy, in the relations between the (current) new Catalan and Spanish authorities, more precisely the socialist (minority) government the collision course continues. Simultaneously, nationalistic discourses in Catalonia, by both supporters of strengthened autonomy and independence (whose share is slightly increasing according to polls) as well as opponents of autonomy and independence continue and intensify; the same is true in other parts of Spain, particularly among Spanish/Castilian nationalists and other opponents of the Catalan increased autonomy and/or independence. Consequently, tensions in Spain in general as well as in Catalonia increase and it is difficult, if not impossible to predict the outcome. However, these developments confirm that discussing (the topic of) autonomy continues to be relevant and timely. Consequently, searching for and developing alternative solutions to ethnic and regional tensions and conflicts, including new and alternative concepts and models of autonomy is becoming even more important and necessary for the future existence and development of individual states, broader (trans-border) regions, Europe and the world. In other words, this article tests the hypothesis that autonomy should be considered one of the possible tools for effective and peaceful regulation and management of all socially relevant diversities that exist in contemporary societies, including ethnic ones.

2. The Broader (Theoretical and Geographic) Context and the Case of Catalonia

Wherever on the Globe we might be and whenever we look around, it should be obvious to each of us that our realities and contemporary societies, in which we live, are plural, diverse, asymmetrical, complex and dynamic (internally). Simultaneously, we should recognize that all contemporary societies are diverse and specific in comparison with other societies. These diversities are logical, considering that every individual and every distinct collective entity are unique, at least in some characteristics different from every other individual or group. Consequently, diversities, including those that are or can become socially relevant (such as ethnic ones) are normal phenomena and state of affairs; these

pluralities and diversities are numerous, one could say countless and multi-dimensional.

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However, we often fail to realize and recognize these diversities. Nation states and their institutions are eager to promote their prevailing (political) ideologies and the concept of (single) nation-states as ethnically homogenous states of titular (ethnic) nations. Socialized in (public and/or private) educational institutions and systems shaped and dominated by respective nation states and exposed to public discourses and (mass) media that promote such (exclusive) concepts usually individuals and the public tend to accept such views. Consequently, our perceptions might miss the very existence of diversities, their content and essence, dimensions and interactions as well as their social relevance and value. Believing in and promoting ideologies and political slogans that declare unity and homogeneity desired ideals that societies should follow and realize individuals and the public often consider existing pluralities and diversities problems. Furthermore, diversities can be declared undesired obstacles that complicate lives, effective decision-making and execution of decisions, thereby reducing efficacy of respective states. Politicians often declare that pluralities and diversities make the functioning of societies and states more expensive; possibly, they claim diversities can endanger the very existence of our societies and states by undermining and endangering the desired national homogeneity and unity. These exclusive, divisive and often hegemonic political ideals and ideologies, usually created, dominated and promoted by respective nationalistic political leaders, elites, parties and movements as well as uncritical acceptance of the concept of (single) nation-states might blur our perceptions of reality.

Not only have been and are pluralities and diversities facts or our lives and societies, they have made and make our living environment more interesting, richer and better. Just imagine how the quality and richness of our lives would be reduced, if we could not enjoy the richness and choice of dishes, cuisines, produce, products and services, information, literature, music and art in general from different parts and environments of the world. In reality, we all benefit from diversities. Consequently, we should present and promote diversities in our societies as the facts and desired reality stressing their contribution to the richness and wellbeing of our societies and all individuals that live in them. Everybody should realize that rather than problems and obstacles pluralities and diversities are added value, comparative advantages and opportunities of specific environments. However, I would stress that (socially relevant) diversities in our societies need to be regulated properly (by law), governed and managed to ensure their coexistence, inclusive and productive cooperation, social stability, security and predictability as preconditions for successful sustainable development that is in the interest of all individuals, groups and communities.²

The concepts and ideologies of (single) nation-state that promote the idea of ethnic homogeneity of a respective state have always contradicted reality.

However, politicians, particularly nationalist presented and understood those concepts and ideologies as the ultimate tools for the realization of national interests of titular (ethnic) nations. Scholars need to explain that the concepts of ethnically homogenous (single) nation-states are and have been myths that, however, utilized and promoted in different social contexts in the past two or three centuries, have impacted and continue to impact respective societies and their development. The actual consequences of the concepts and policies of (single)nation state conceived, presented and promoted as a possibly neutral theoretical model of the organization and internal cohesion of a respective society by politicians and some scholars revealed the exclusive, divisive and often hegemonic nature of such concepts and policies. Usually political and social leaders, particularly nationalists, nationalist movements and parties that follow and are built upon nationalistic ideologies, strategies, policies and practices proclaim and defend ethnic homogeneity, unity and the dominant role of titular nations within (single) nation-states as the desired goals and state of affairs in contemporary societies.

In practice, such concepts, (nationalist) ideologies and policies by proclaiming different social diversities problems and undesired obstacles that prevent desired social homogeneity and reduce efficiency of nation-states, promote domination of the titular (ethnic) nations in respective nation-states and result in marginalization and exclusion of others, particularly minorities. Those who are or feel marginalized and excluded are likely to become dissatisfied with their status and position, the current divisions, social arrangements and nation states. Their dissatisfaction might translate into the opposition to and/or rebellion against the existing nation states as well as their requests for alternative social and administrative arrangements, including (increased) autonomy and/or new nation-states, thereby deepening (social) divisions and possibly escalating tensions and conflicts within the existing nation-states. Consequently, I would claim that the actual problems are not the past, existing and future pluralities and diversities that can be found in all societies, but rather exclusive concepts, ideologies and policies of nation-states as well as their institutions that are unable to deal peacefully, democratically and inclusively with pluralities, diversities, crises and conflicts. All too often, nation-states with their institutions and particularly their (nationalism driven) policies and politics fail to address the needs as well as are unable to realize interests and expectations of all diverse individuals, distinct groups and communities. Consequently, these states do not succeed to stimulate, promote, ensure and enable their voluntary, equal and full (social) inclusion and integration. This way, rather than developing creative potentials of all individuals, distinct groups and communities as well as stimulating their inclusion, integration and contributions to the societies in which they live (thereby contributing to and maximizing wellbeing in those societies), states can create and increase their dissatisfaction that can result in

resentment. As consequence, with their exclusive ideologies, policies and actions (single) nation-states might contribute to the escalation of crises and conflicts (Žagar 2015).

The concept of (single) nation-state as well as nationalistic exclusive, homogenizing and potentially hegemonic ideologies and policies of nation-states frequently accompanied and characterized by coercion and repression that attempt to reduce or in some cases eliminate the existing pluralism and diversities are not viable solutions and alternatives for stable democratic development of diverse contemporary societies. Rather, such policies and exclusive concepts of (single) nation-states can be considered problems and potential sources of conflicts that in long term can reduce stability and efficiency of our societies and states as they provoke and escalate the dissatisfaction and resentment of minorities and other marginalized individuals, groups and communities. In such cases, minorities, marginalized individuals and communities can feel that the existing nation-states do not recognize, at least not adequately, their identities, statuses, needs and interests as well as that they treat them inadequately, unequally and discriminate against them. Consequently, the dissatisfaction of minorities, distinct communities and/or regions might provoke and/or strengthen their secessionist desires, claims and movements. Ironically, in the absence of viable alternatives and concepts, such as truly multiethnic, decentralized and inclusive states that not only recognize but also stimulate and integrate different autonomies, dissatisfied national minorities and other distinct communities as well as marginalized regions within the existing states often demand their independence and establishment of their independent nation-state. Minorities and distinct communities expect that such a development would establish them as new titular nations in newly established states. (e.g. Guibernau & Rex 2010; Keating & McGarry 2001)

Recent developments in Spain in Catalonia in 2017 and 2018 as well as preceding processes and historic developments in this context in the past decades, even centuries might serve as cases in point. The Catalans, one of Europe's historic stateless (ethnic) nations,³ have often faced rejection, exclusion and repression by the Spanish (Castilian) state upon the inclusion (that some interpret as annexation) of Catalonia in Spain. During the Franco's (dictatorial and fascist) regime in the past century, the very existence of the Catalan nation and their culture were denied and threatened, while the Catalan language was prohibited. Their hopes and expectations that the Spanish state in the process of democratization would apologize for the past wrongdoings and try to undo them also by granting the distinct region and (stateless) nation adequate autonomy and self-rule have not realized to the desired extent. There have been some successes, but many failures (*Catalonia Calling: What the World has to Know* 2013). The tensions were growing and they culminated in 2017. The rejection of proposals for the increased autonomy and self-rule of Catalonia in the past

decades as well as exclusive, ignoring and homogenizing policies of Spanish government of then Prime Minister Rajoy regarding Catalonia, particularly its repressive reactions to initiatives, policies and actions of the provincial government pushed the Catalan authorities to radicalize their demands for increased autonomy and independence. In this context, the government of Spain utilized the rulings of the supreme and constitutional courts, particularly the ones that declared unconstitutional and annulled certain provisions of the autonomous statute as well as decisions, documents and actions of Catalan authorities, including the referendum and declaration of independence thereby criminalizing also corresponding activities of the people of Catalonia that supported them. Regardless of our view of the legality and legitimacy of those decisions and activities of Catalan authorities and people supporting them, we should recognize (and admire) the democratic and peaceful nature of these political processes as well as reactions to the repressive policy of the Spanish government. Then Prime Minister Rajoy and those supporting his policy and reactions might have believed that the described policies of his government and the imprisonment of some Catalan political activists, politicians and members of the provincial authorities would resolve the problem. They hoped to ensure the victory of their vision of Spain, strengthen their position, authority and power as well as reestablish the rule of law, thereby reaffirming the existing constitution and the unity of the Spanish state. However, the results of the early provincial elections and developments in 2018 showed that this was not the case; Catalonia remains divided, dissatisfaction of those who oppose the current arrangements and policies increases; tensions and conflicts continue to exist and occasionally escalate. Social and political developments and their outcomes are uncertain, their impact on democratic political process in Catalonia and in Spain unknown and their consequences impossible to predict.⁴ Considering the recent developments, we might guess the reactions and policies of the current and future Madrid governments as well as pro-independence Catalan authorities. However, nobody really knows what might happen in Catalonia and Spain in a longer run – regardless of who wins at any particular moment. We can just hope that developments will be peaceful and democratic, that the uncontrolled escalation of conflicts can be prevented and there will be no violence.

I would suggest that nonconflictual, dialogue-based and democratic approaches to addressing such problems and claims for autonomy and/or independence can be more successful and productive strategies and policies, particularly in the longer term. The experiences and results of the Scottish referendum in the United Kingdom, as well as their handling of demands for devolution and stronger autonomy, Canadian government's attitude to demands of Quebec, including the referendum, constant negotiations in Belgium and federalization of the Belgian state, for example, confirm such a position. On the other hand, I would argue that repressive and exclusive policies, particularly

brutal and violent responses of authorities to peaceful democratic actions that people consider legitimate can hurt undermine/endanger and, possibly, destroy democratic processes and the very existence of democracy in a respective society. Although the respective government and authorities consider and declare such peaceful and democratic actions and policies unacceptable and illegal, they should be confronted by democratic and peaceful reactions, counteractions and policies of institutions of the state. I would consider repressive and violent responses of authorities, particularly asymmetric and excessive use of force in specific situations in which they utilize repressive mechanisms (e.g. police, military, in some cases paramilitary formations) of states unacceptable systemic violations of human rights and liberties.

I believe that the international community and organizations, institutions of other states and the critical public should record and condemn such actions and violations of human rights. Additionally, the international human rights institutions and (criminal) courts should consider prosecuting such violations adequately. However, repeatedly, as a scholar and human rights activist, I am surprised and disappointed by the lukewarm reactions of the international public, media, political and public leaders to such cases, particularly in the countries considered democratic. It seems that we are not aware of the fact that such developments are possible in all environments and, potentially, can hurt democracy in our countries as well as our (own) human rights, status and situation.

Pluralism and diversities, including plurality and diversity of interests that can result in conflicts that, possibly, can escalate and transform into violent conflicts are normal phenomena and state of affairs in all complex contemporary societies. I would argue that in order to ensure the necessary social stability, prosperity and development of diverse societies, socially relevant diversities need to be regulated and managed, hopefully in a democratic and peaceful way. My research in the past decades and a substantive volume of scholarly, particularly analytical literature that addresses and studies pluralism, diversities, social relations, strictures and divisions, regulation and management of (socially relevant) diversities, ethnicity, peace, crises and conflicts in contemporary societies confirm such a conclusion. Particularly relevant are analyses on relations, divisions, cleavages, peace, crises and conflicts in divided societies, thorn apart along diverse politicized ethnic and other division lines that indicate the need for successful diversity management that should include prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts. (see e.g. Burton 1996; Byrne et al. 2019; Freire 2001; Galtung, 1996, 2000, 2001; Galtung et al. 2002; Graf & Brousek 2014; Lederach 2004; Máiz & Requejo 2005; Sandole et al. 2009; Senehi et al. 2010; Žagar 2010)

3. Approaches to Studying Complex Societies, Socially Relevant Diversities, Strategies of the Regulation and Management of Diversities and Autonomy as an Important Component of Diversity Management

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As indicated, there is a substantive volume of analytical literature, studies and sources on socially relevant diversities in contemporary societies, regulation and management of social relations, divisions and cleavages, peace and conflict(s) as well as diversity management and the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts. They present and analytically discuss specific cases and/or their segments as well as some comparative and global contexts. With their analytical approaches, such case and comparative studies, usually in a form of focused comparisons can provide more or less detailed analyses that can describe, analyze and, to a certain extent, interpret studied phenomena, particularly their segments. They can detect and determine specific problems and segments of complex social phenomena, to a certain extent broader frameworks. They can and do provide important information and knowledge considered the necessary basis and building blocks for synthetic approaches and syntheses that can contribute to the formulation and development of longer-term strategies, particularly strategies of sustainable development that need to take into account and integrate all spheres and dimensions of life and societies. However, such approaches do not show and explain the whole picture that is important for the holistic understanding of the broader context and complexity of contemporary societies. In other words, we lack the adequate synthesis. Although necessary for any synthesis, without adequate syntheses analytical approaches alone cannot produce an adequate and necessary basis for holistic discussions on socially relevant diversities as well as for the elaboration and development of strategies for the regulation and management of diversities.

Considering the current situation(s) in different societies and countries as well as globally, detected problems and crises, particularly their environmental, climate, political and other social aspects, one could argue that the world urgently needs adequate integrated and holistic strategies of sustainable development. Such strategies of sustainable development that include strategies for the regulation and management of socially relevant diversities as well as measures and plans of actions deriving from these strategies require adequate and socially engaged research and science. One could claim that only research and science – with their approaches and methodologies – can provide the necessary foundations, framework, concepts, yardsticks and tools needed to address different socially relevant issues and develop adequate development strategies and policies. Research and scientific approaches, methodologies and methods were

developed to objectivize research and science. However, we should stress that regardless of the used research approaches, methodologies and methods research and science(s) cannot be absolutely objective, socially neutral and non-ideological or ideology free. Science(s) in general as well as research approaches, methodologies and methods are products of specific environments, societies and time. In other words, research and science, researchers as individuals, research institutions and systems, every research project and program as well as research policies and strategies at all levels are socially conditioned and determined.⁵ Consequently, I argue that scientists and science(s) need to be ethical and socially engaged; we should follow, strive for and promote common good, particularly basic common values and principles agreed upon in specific historic contexts and environments. In this context, we could speak of ethical science. At present, in studying social phenomena and particularly regulation and management of socially relevant diversities such consensual basic common values and principles are, for example, human rights and freedoms including minority rights and protection, equal rights and equality, justice, recognition and respect of diversities, tolerance, inclusion and integration, solidarity, democracy, peace and stability, “green” sustainable and balanced long-term development, etc. (see e.g. Piciga et al. 2016). Ethical science requires that researchers and scholars in their texts and publications, scholarly ones as well as popular ones directed to the broadest public clearly state and carefully explain all methodological and other limitations and uncertainties of their research, research results and interpretations. Particularly in social sciences and humanities, but also in other sciences they should present their values, principles and goals as well as their value and ideological background and orientation that could affect their interpretations and conclusions. I would suggest that ethical scholars and researchers should do their best to promote the basic commonly agreed principles and values, such as the ones mentioned above.

This applies also to studying and discussing autonomies as complex social phenomena, concepts, models and (social) tools that can contribute to the development of strategies, policies and practices of diversity management, particularly to successful regulation and management of socially relevant diversities in contemporary societies. Methodologically, studying complex social phenomena and concepts requires multi-, trans- and interdisciplinary approaches and research methods developed in social sciences and humanities as well as in other sciences, when relevant and applicable. As an optimal approach to studying ethnicity, diversities, diversity management, autonomies and other social phenomena, I would suggest to follow and develop the practice, approaches, methods and apparatus of methodological pluralism.⁶ I utilize this approach in my research of ethnicity, nationalism, ethnic relations, (socially relevant) diversities as well as their regulation and management. My research has focused on the rights and protection of minorities, regionalism and federalism, autonomies,

prevention, management and/or resolution of crises and conflicts in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and globally. I have done theoretical, qualitative and quantitative research, specific case and comparative studies and comparisons. In my research, I have consulted a considerable volume of scholarly literature, research reports, data-bases and statistics, reports of diverse institutions and organizations/associations, political and legal documents, policies, programs and measures, media reports, etc.⁷

From different perspectives and considering specific cases, articles in this issue of the Journal examine autonomy, more specifically different concepts, approaches, types and models as well as practices of autonomy as possible tools and segments of diversity management that can contribute to successful regulation and management of socially relevant diversities in different environments. As the common basis and framework, the following paragraphs briefly present and define those terms and concepts.

Socially relevant diversities are all those social pluralities and diversities that exist in contemporary societies and that individuals and distinct communities in these societies – from their respective perspectives and considering their specific needs and interests – consider relevant and important. This applies particularly to all diversities that can be socially and political mobilized. In other words, we refer to diversities that can be (mis)used and politicized to attract the attention of people and/or distinct communities with the intention to mobilize them (socially and politically); among those diversities – in the context of articles in this section – I would mention ethnic, cultural, linguistic, religious and regional/territorial ones.

In order to ensure stability, peace, cooperation, inclusion and integration of all individuals and distinct groups and communities in contemporary diverse societies, those societies need to elaborate, activate and develop adequate regulation and management of all socially relevant diversities, particularly those that are long lasting and can be mobilized as potential division lines and cleavages. Simply, we could define diversity management as permanent (social and political) processes that addresses all relevant issues of diversities and asymmetries in contemporary societies. It encompasses the regulation and management of socially relevant diversities, including the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts. It requires understanding, recognition, acceptance and respect of diversities as well as effective modes of coexistence, voluntary and equal inclusion, integration and cooperation of all individuals and groups based on principles of democracy, human rights and freedoms, including the rights and protection of ethnic, national, linguistic, religious and other minorities. Considering that tensions, crises and conflicts as well as their potential escalation are normal phenomena and state of affairs in plural and diverse societies, sensitivity of individuals and all collective entities to all factors that might signal escalation of tensions, crises and/or conflicts is an important element of

successful diversity management. Successful diversity management strategies, policies and practices in diverse societies should build capacities to develop and apply activities and measures that include all relevant (individual and collective) actors and could prevent the escalation of tensions, crises and conflicts. In this context, we could consider the regulation and peaceful management of social relations and diversities, early detection of escalation of crises and conflicts, adequate warning systems as well as mechanisms, procedures and measures for (hopefully peaceful and democratic) prevention, management and/or resolution of crises/conflicts key components of successful diversity management. The introduction, activation and development of adequate diversity management policies, measures and activities require concerted short, medium and long-term strategies at all levels, from local, subnational and national to international and global ones, thereby increasing their synergetic effect; these strategies need to be coordinated, evaluated and developed continuously (Žagar 2008).

Finally, considering concepts and definitions presented in the scholarly articles on autonomy in this issue (Brezigar & Vidau 2018; Brousek 2018; Kössler 2018; Oloke et al. 2018), this paragraph tries to define the phenomenon. We could say that the broadest and most general definition of autonomy would be that it refers to different organizational and institutional arrangements, forms and models that give certain (clearly defined) segments of the system and/or distinct communities powers, competences and capacities to regulate and manage certain issues, relevant to them by themselves. In accordance with existing legal and/or political arrangements, autonomies have the right, power and capacity to decide on those issues, formulate and execute respective policies, measures, decisions and activities – more or less – independently from other authorities within the system. Traditionally, autonomous arrangements based upon and regulated by constitutions and/or legislation and/or political agreements existed within states, usually conceptualized as nation-states. Consequently, autonomies – often reflecting territorial, regional, ethnic, cultural, religious and/or other diversities and administrative organization within states – have been considered sub-national arrangements in states; autonomies could exist in unitary states, including regionalized ones as well as in federations as composed states. In any case, autonomies are the expression and reflection of decentralization of states and certain independence of their autonomous segments. However, trans-border regions, such as peace regions indicate that autonomies and autonomous arrangements might be possible also at the international level, thereby establishing their trans-border framework. In any case, so defined autonomies can be considered important legal and/or political arrangements at subnational and trans-border levels as well as a possible segment of effective diversity management at those levels that include minority autonomies. Considering the concepts and cases presented in the articles in this special thematic segment of the Journal, we could confirm the hypothesis that autonomies should be considered possible

tools for effective and peaceful regulation and management of socially relevant diversities, including ethnic relations and diverse minority-majority relations that exist in contemporary societies.

4. Conclusion

Social phenomena and concepts need to be observed, studied and interpreted in the context of the time and situation, considering contemporary social and natural realities conditioned by historic trends and developments. The present determine trends and developments, often declared negative and possibly deviant in their nature and social consequences that include the erosion of democracy in several environments, rise of populism and militarism, social and economic exclusion, increasing social and economic imbalance, inequality and injustice, nationalism and xenophobia, social and economic crises, escalation of conflicts. Interventions in and limiting of independence of judiciary in Poland and other countries, problematic appointments of officials, such as the appointment of justice Brett Kavanaugh to the US Supreme Court, erosion of free media and democratic institutions, repression against and prosecution of political opponents and dissidents in several countries further erode and threaten democracy in several environment. Ecological and climate changes and challenges are growing, while the world is unable to concert and realize the necessary measures for the limitation of global warming and other ecological and climate disasters. Consequently, it is possible to claim that that we might be entering the era of post-democracy, post-decency and ecological/climate crisis. In such situation and time, societies hope for positive alternatives, concepts, ideologies and strategies that could reverse negative trends and stimulate progress and positive trends of development. In my view, positive concepts, ideologies and strategies of development need to be based on the principles and practices of balanced, inclusive, just, equal and green economic and social development and progress that are no longer growth and profit based, but promote social, economic and political inclusion and participation, solidarity, economic and social justice, creativity, integration, autonomy and democracy. Although such concepts of sustainable development might be considered (unlikely) utopias considering the mentioned negative trends and developments, they might be even more important in sustaining human desire and in mobilizing all relevant social actors, individuals and collective entities for a better future.

In contemporary plural and diverse societies, successful diversity management might be considered a key component of social peace and stability based on the concept and strategies of balanced, green, just and inclusive sustainable development. It requires adequate regulation and management of socially relevant diversities that, among others, can ensure and guarantee rights and protection of ethnic and other minorities that promote and facilitate their volun-

tary, just and equal inclusion and integration. Autonomies, more precisely different concepts, forms, models and practices of autonomy, including minority autonomies explored in contributions to this special section of the Journal could be considered effective (democratic) approaches to as well as segments and tools of successful diversity management in this context. Hopefully, adequate, peaceful and democratic autonomy arrangements can be found and enacted also in Catalonia and other environments where currently we can detect growing tensions and conflicts.

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Notes

- ¹ This article bases on research and expert activities, funded by the ministries responsible for science, research and development of Slovenia, Slovenian Research Agency, European Commission, Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, United Nations and specialized agencies as well as other sources.
- ² Comprehensively and in more detail, I addressed these issues, particularly problems regarding the concept and myth of single nation-states and the need for successful diversity management in diverse contemporary societies in Žagar (1994, 2008).
- ³ The concept of stateless nations, its characteristics and implications as well as specific cases are presented in Guibernau (1999). For some criticisms of her views, see, e.g. Tice & Nelson 2004, 1293–1297.
- ⁴ The Catalan perspective of the history and present of Catalonia and the Catalans can be found in *Catalonia Calling: What the World has to Know* (2013). It is difficult to find accurate, in-depth and complete reporting on, information about and analysis of recent history and developments in Catalonia. Among the available internet sources that can be helpful and can provide at least a chronological overview and some insight, one could list, e.g. BBC World News; Bloomberg Politics; Reuters; etc.
- ⁵ A few decades after the publication of the famous text of Gunnar Myrdal (1969) on objectivity of and in social sciences, we could hope that scholarly and general public would recognize that – regardless of all attempts to achieve and improve objectivity – science(s) and research results are always socially conditioned and cannot be absolutely objective. If nothing else, the availability of information and data, volume and limits of knowledge as well as limits and problems of research approaches and methodology limit and condition the work and interpretations of researchers and scholars that, simultaneously, are exposed and conditioned also by value(s) and ideologies to which they are exposed.
- ⁶ Discussions on research approaches and methodology that traditionally have existed in sciences in the past have intensified in social sciences and humanities. In this context, I consider important discussions on the application and relevance of different approaches and methods in studying complex social phenomena, particularly discussions on inter-disciplinarity and methodological pluralism in social sciences (e.g. della Porta & Keating 2008).
- ⁷ The list of relevant sources and references would be several pages long. An overview (bibliography) of relevant published scholarly books, articles, materials and sources on ethnicity, protection of minorities and diversity management titled Suggested readings prepared as a draft study material for international doctoral students of Diversity Management and Governance at the University of Primorska/Littoral (2012–2013) had 40 pages.

Karl Kössler

Governing Divided Societies through Territorial Autonomy? From (too) Great Expectations to a Contextualist View

Territorial autonomy remains important for the governance of divided societies. The question is rather which understanding of it dominates the political and scholarly debate. This contribution discusses different notions of territorial autonomy that have shaped this debate. It argues that a too narrow focus on concepts of ethnic-territorial autonomy such as multinational federalism fails to recognize challenges that studies on autonomy as a prescription for governing divided societies need to face. These are the issues of secessionism, political polarization and internal minorities within the autonomous territory. The paper concludes with an assessment of the track record of autonomy and highlights the importance of taking into account for such an assessment a number of legal and non-legal context factors. Put differently, territorial autonomy itself is only one of many factors contributing to (un)successful governance of divided societies.

Keywords: territorial autonomy, ethnic autonomy, divided societies, multinational federalism, constitutional design.

Upravljanje razdeljenih družb s teritorialno avtonomijo? Od (pre)velikih pričakovanj do kontekstualističnega pogleda

Teritorialna avtonomija ostaja pomemben pristop za upravljanje razdeljenih družb. Zato je ključna razprava, katero razumevanje teritorialne avtonomije prevladuje v političnih in znanstvenih razpravah. Prispevek obravnava različne koncepte in vrste teritorialne avtonomije. Ugotavlja, da preozka usmeritev na koncepte etnično-teritorialne avtonomije, kakršen je večnacionalni federalizem, ne uspe prepoznati izzivov, ki so jih zaznale in s katerimi se soočajo študije o avtonomiji, ko obravnavajo upravljanje razdeljenih družb. Med izzivi so secesionizem, politična polarizacija in (notranje) manjšine v avtonomnih teritorijih. Razpravo sklene s kritično oceno delovanja in učinkov avtonomije ter poudarja pomen upoštevanja pravnih in nepravničnih dejavnikov pri takšnih ocenah. Drugače povedano, teritorialna avtonomija je le en od mnogih dejavnikov, ki lahko prispevajo k (ne)uspešnem upravljanju razdeljenih družb.

Ključne besede: teritorialna avtonomija, etnična avtonomija, razdeljene družbe, večetnični federalizem, ustavni dizajn (ustavna ureditev).

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1. Introduction

“Constitution-making is in large part about making bets about the future” (Simeon 2009, 2). What complicates the process of federal constitution-making in ethno-culturally divided societies¹ is that in these cases there is usually a higher likelihood than in others that the bets will be acutely controversial from the differing perspectives of different groups. The typically heightened political polarization in such societies is likely to entail a scenario in which extremist views are advanced, with one group portraying federalism as absolute good and another as absolute evil. The fact that a federal constitution is frequently seen as Pandora’s box with the ultimate consequence of state disintegration by some and as panacea by others, is also linked to questions of timing. All too often, divided societies begin serious negotiations about viable federal arrangements only at a late stage – or even too late.

Some of the most intractable conflicts of our times, such as in Syria and Ukraine, bear testimony to this. Indeed, in many cases federalism is introduced not to prevent a (violent) conflict but to end it: political polarization, not least in regard to federalism, will thus have been intensified by the experience of armed confrontation. It should not surprise us, then, that “[m]ost of the ethnic wars of the last half century have been fought over issues of group autonomy and independence” (Gurr 2000, 195). Evidence from (violent) conflicts in divided societies demonstrates that federalism, or other forms of autonomy in a broad sense,² have either been a bone of contention from the outset or became one in the course of the confrontation.

Against this backdrop, this article recognizes the continued relevance of federalism to divided societies, but argues that the debate about it, among scholars and practitioners alike, needs to be reframed. First, the article sets out to critically examine the rise since the 1990s of multinational federalism, ethnic autonomy and similar concepts and to assess the main arguments typically advanced against it (section 2). In so doing, the paper identifies and discusses pitfalls in the seemingly endless academic and political debate about the viability of multinational federalism. Some of the pitfalls pertain to the character of the debate itself, and others to the methodological approach, which has been prevalent so far (section 3). The conclusion points to the limitations of multinational federalism, ethnic autonomy and the like as prescriptions for constitutional design in divided societies, which requires appropriate consideration of at least seven crucial contextual factors to be successful.

2. The Rise of Multinational Federalism and its Critics

2.1 The Weight of History and the Conceptualization of Multinational Federalism

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Without doubt, the issue of secession hangs like a sword of Damocles over federalism in divided societies (Kössler 2015, 263–265). Indeed, a considerable number of scholars claim that a federal constitution would just be a final step on a disintegrative path towards secession. By analogy with Albert Hirschman's seminal treatise *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (1970), they have seen federalism as pushing minority groups towards the "exit" option and as providing insufficient incentives for the "voice" option, that is, for making sincere attempts to restore well-functioning relationships within the state rather than heading for the exit. Scholars have advanced this argument since the 1990s in particular, when it seemed to be confirmed by the disintegration of the three communist ethnofederations, namely the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia (Roeder 1991; Bunce 1999).

Bearing in mind the impact of path dependency, it is important to note that communism's characteristically ethnocentric view of autonomous territories as homelands for the specific groups that constitute a majority there clearly precedes the establishment of the Soviet Union. This view was already conceptualized and advanced by Lenin and other Bolsheviks in the early twentieth century, not least of all in their controversies with, and in contrast to, Austro-Marxist ideas of non-territorial autonomy (Bowring 2015, 146–52).³ It is equally important to acknowledge, however, that in practice the Soviet Union implemented the concept of ethnic federalism only to a limited extent, which also provides a significant lesson for federal systems in the twenty-first century. The reality of mixed settlement areas simply did not allow for the realization of the concept, because in subnational entities it inevitably produced what is today known as "internal minorities" (Choudhry 2008b, 158) or "intra-unit minorities" (Watts 2007, 232).

The fact that the envisaged ethnic-territorial overlap proved to be an illusion is demonstrated by simple figures. For example, in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), by far the largest of the 15 Soviet republics, no more than 41 out of 127 officially recognized nationalities constituted a majority in what was supposed to be "their" territory and thus enjoyed autonomy in Lenin's sense (Codagnone & Filippov 2000, 266). Yet in spite of the apparent lack of implementation of ethnic federalism, the idea, as illusory as it was, has lived on. It is obvious, for instance, that the notion "nationality regional autonomy" as set out in Article 4 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China formally espouses this idea. The provision first states that "[a]ll nationalities in the People's Republic of China are equal," and then goes on to stipulate that

“[r]egional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority nationalities live in compact communities.”

Precisely at the time when the collapse of the communist ethno-federations prompted the scholars mentioned above to see federalism in divided societies as a recipe for state disintegration, others started claiming the opposite. Undoubtedly, the period since the 1990s has witnessed what has been conceptualised with some variation as multinational, plurinational, ethnic and post-conflict federalism or as ethnic autonomy.⁴ As in the earlier case of Lenin’s ethnocentric view, proponents of these concepts regard federalism primarily as a tool for minority protection. To this end, according to multinational federalists, the territorial structure should reflect ethno-cultural diversity so that internal self-determination of minority groups can prevent their external self-determination, that is, their secession. Thus, multinational federalists recommend that sub-national boundaries be drawn or redrawn in such a way that nationwide minorities, at least large ones with a compact area of settlement, are transformed into regional majorities within “nationality-based units” (Kymlicka 1998, 125).⁵

Importantly but unsurprisingly, this minority-focused idea was advanced not only by federalism scholars but experts in minority rights (Henrard 2005, 134). As their argument goes, the two essential components of minorities’ effective participation in political life are autonomy regarding their own affairs and participation in decision-making concerning affairs of the polity as a whole. This closely resembles Elazar’s “self-rule and shared rule” formula, with the crucial difference, however, that everything revolves around self-rule and shared rule for a (minority) group rather than that of a territory (Elazar 1994).

2.2 Three Main Critical Arguments: State Disintegration, Political Polarization and Internal Minorities

Even if multinational federalism still enjoys considerable popularity, over time it has faced several critical arguments. One group of scholars has focused on the widespread view, not least among policy-makers, that the application of this concept would be a stepping stone to the disintegration of the state concerned. The fact that states often view secession with suspicion hardly comes as a surprise, as they are guided, of course, by an inherent interest of self-preservation. Constitution-makers therefore tend to shy away, in the spirit of Madisonian political thought, from adopting provisions that could defeat the “basic enterprise” (Sunstein 1991, 633) of any constitution, which is self-preservation. While very often they see secession clauses as such provisions, they are often also suspicious of multinational federalism in this regard.

A further concern is that, apart from the loss of state unity itself, disintegration hardly ever occurs without large-scale violence. Indeed, only few federal systems, such as the West Indies Federation (1962), the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1963), Malaysia (1965) and Czechoslovakia (1993),

were dissolved in a largely peaceful manner (Watts 2008, 185). States sometimes nevertheless go beyond legitimate concerns about state unity or preservation of peace and exhibit, mostly for historical reasons, excessive anxiety about federal arrangements. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe, for example, are characterized, owing to the legacy of Lenin's abovementioned views on the matter (see section 2.1) and the collapse of communist ethno-federations, by a particularly strong political climate of "autonomy-phobia" (Palermo 2012, 82).

Those arguing that multinational federalism would facilitate secession regard it as a concept providing nationality-based subnational units with important incentives and political resources they could act and draw upon in the event of an attempt at secession. An autonomous subnational parliament, government and public administration that wields power in significant policy fields could be transformed easily into a strong national institution of an independent state. Moreover, nationality-based subnational units could use their jurisdiction over crucial issues such as culture, language use, education and media to push a project of minority nation-building beyond the limits of the current state.⁶ Another critique is that regional and minority parties would thrive under the conditions of a multinational federation and sooner or later demand secession, either out of conviction or out of political and economic self-interest (Snyder 2000, 327).

Most proponents of multinational federalism do not deny the risk of secession. Their claim instead is that granting sufficient autonomy for nationality-based units would dissuade them from pursuing independence in the first place. In this sense, its proponents see the concept of multinational federalism as paradoxical: "while it provides national minorities with a workable alternative to secession, it also helps to make secession a more realistic alternative" (Kymlicka 1998, 142). Put differently, multinational federalism is perceived as increasing the capacity of minority groups to secede yet as intended to decrease their will to do so. Even if a failure of a federal system is not so easy to define, unless state collapse makes it self-evident,⁷ proponents of multinational federalism sometimes admit that countries adopting this concept may be more prone overall to failure than other federations. It is emphasized, though, that multinational federations do not experience difficulties because they are federal, but that they are federal because they experience difficulties that make a unitary design unfeasible (Watts 2007, 230–231).

A second group of critics of multinational federalism claims that the entrenchment of ethnicity as the basis of the territorial structure would perpetuate these differences and result in polarized political discourse. This claim is linked to some extent with the abovementioned secession argument, in that polarization between the two extremes of centralization and separatism is seen as pervading ordinary politics: in such a scenario, the scope of routine politics open to pragmatic compromise is massively reduced. The factors motivating these confrontational dynamics are identified in the official recognition that multinational federalism grants to "competing nation-state projects that pit ho-

meland governments against the common-state government” (Roeder 2009, 209). In line with what has been called “groupism” (Brubaker 2004, 2), that is, the tendency to perceive bounded groups as basic constituents of society and politics, ordinary political questions would thus tend to be seen in a polarized way through a “minority lens”.

The concern that polarization would make a culture of compromise impossible had also been voiced by Daniel Elazar, one of the founding fathers of modern federal studies, with regard to what he called “ethnic federations.” He even claimed that “ethnic nationalism is probably the strongest force against federalism,” given that

ethnic federations are among the most difficult of all to sustain and are least likely to survive because constituent units based on ethnic nationalisms normally do not want to merge into the kind of tight-knit units necessary for federation. It may be that confederations of ethnic states have a better chance of success (Elazar 1994, 167).

Apart from these considerations of viability and failure, Elazar identified a more profoundly deep-rooted contradiction in the rationale for ethnic federations, namely that “ethnic nationalism tends to subordinate all free government to its uncompromising position. Federalism is a democratic middle way requiring negotiation and compromise. All aspects of society fostering uncompromising positions make federalism more difficult, if not impossible” (Elazar 1994, 168).

In addition to the secession and polarization arguments, a third line of argumentation has advocated a nuanced view of multinational federalism cognisant of the inherent gap and contradiction between the concept’s strong ethnic-territorial link, presuming the homogeneity of nationality-based entities, and a reality in which the latter boast in many cases considerable ethno-cultural diversity. Acknowledging that the concept was and still is successful in some divided societies, certain scholars have highlighted weaknesses of multinational federalism from the perspective both of theoretical considerations and comparative empirical evidence (Palermo 2015; Kössler 2015). The point is that the more the law has reinforced the ethnic-territorial link,⁸ which is the essence of the concept, the more that adequate legal recognition of the internal diversity within a subnational entity has been compromised.

In terms of this logic, the dominant group(s) are seen as owning the autonomous territory as a homeland and, by implication, enjoying territorially based power instead of sharing it with other groups. Paradoxically, while multinational federalism legally recognises diversity on the national scale, it therefore typically fails to acknowledge diversity on the subnational scale. On the one hand, the concept entails dedication to fighting the unitary nation-state model; on the other, it often replicates precisely this model at the subnational level in what may be called “nation-regions” and merely shifts problematic majority-minority relations to a lower level of government.

This inherent problem with any constitutional design relying on the ethnic-territorial link was already identified a century ago by Karl Renner: “If you live in my territory, you are subject to my domination, my law, and my language! It is the expression of domination, not of equal rights” (2005 [1918], 27–28). Renner’s solution to the problem of minority groups in someone else’s homeland was non-territorial autonomy. The latter is, however, quite a weak instrument from the perspective of contemporary empirical evidence. All too often, it is attractive to policy-makers (of the national government) precisely for its symbolic rather than practical utility and “the chance that non-territorial arrangements will fall short of true autonomy” (Coakley 2016, 182). Besides non-territorial autonomy, there are other constitutional design options to prevent or at least mitigate the marginalization of internal minorities within subnational entities (Kössler 2018). One way to achieve this is to set external substantive limits on majoritarianism, such as through an extensive bill of rights in the national constitution or by providing national government with powers to intervene on behalf of internal minorities. Another way is to place internal procedural limits on majoritarian decision-making at the subnational level through regional power-sharing.⁹

Interestingly, the view that multinational federalism may be a double-edged sword precisely because of the problem with internal minorities has also been espoused by scholars who were initially supporters of the rationale for multinational federalism. Yash Ghai, for example, had defined forms of autonomy “as [a] device to allow minorities claiming a distinct identity to exercise control over affairs of special concern to them while allowing the larger entity to exercise those powers that cover common interest” (2005, 38). In a more recent publication, however, he appears to have reservations regarding the rationale of autonomy for a nationwide minority group and recognizes its potential negative implications for internal minorities:

Autonomy is a response to marginalisation, or oppression, but can itself all too easily become an instrument for the marginalisation of others. /.../ Starting as a response to discrimination, it sets up its own orthodoxy. Justified in the name of diversity, it tends to entrench boundaries between cultures. Instead of defining identity as a composite of different values and multiple affiliations, identity is perceived as made up of a singular and exclusive affiliation (Woodman & Ghai 2013, 485).

3. Multinational Federalism as Viable Constitutional Design? Pitfalls of an Endless Debate

Some critics of multinational federalism have claimed, based on the disintegration of the communist ethno-federations, that multinational federalism has “a terrible track record” (Snyder 2000, 327). Indeed, at first glance it seems temp-

tingly straightforward to come to this conclusion. Of all the communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, it was only federations that broke apart and all three of them did, i.e. the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

Yet it remains a matter of contention whether factors other than the federal structure were decisive in the (violent) break-up of these states. Proponents of multinational federalism claim that the three communist states are “false negatives” (McGarry & O’Leary 2009, 9) and that critics have constructed a case against the concept by relying on what were sham federations. This would be so because the constituent units of these federations were forced together without regard to self-rule or shared rule and were characterized by disregard of the rule of law, by the lack of neutral judicial umpires regarding the distribution of powers, and by the political principle of democratic centralism, which was superimposed on and offset any decentralization in constitutional terms. Moreover, those pointing to the communist ethno-federations as negative precedents are accused of using implausible counterfactuals by claiming that multinational federalism was unnecessary in view of better (unitary state) alternatives. A further claim is that they get historical causation wrong, as the break-up of these states followed, at least in the Yugoslav case, a trend of centralization. As for the Czechoslovakian velvet divorce, this was in many respects an idiosyncratic case. If it had not been for strategic political gains of the leaders of the Czech and Slovakian parts of the federation, the latter might not have been dissolved. Nevertheless, this is precisely what happened, without a referendum and hence in disregard of constitutional provisions and, quite likely, against the will of the people in both parts of the country (Stein, 1997). Thus, unless for political rather than federal-structural reasons, Czechoslovakia might well still exist today.

This early debate on the merits of multinational federalism in the 1990s, which was fueled by and focused on the dissolution of the communist ethno-federations, later gave way to a more nuanced discussion. It has involved, for example, a more careful consideration of single secession-inducing and secession-preventing factors, among which certainly is the federal design but also others such as the political will and mobilization capacity of separatists, as well as economic and sociological determinants (Erk & Anderson 2012). Yet even though the debate on multinational federalism has matured and become more differentiated, it is still highly questionable whether it could lead to any reliable results. It seems, in other words, that this confrontation – given the manner in which it has unfolded so far – might be not only endless but also pointless. This is so due to a number of problems that have beset the controversy. They fall into one of two categories: problems related to characteristics of the debate itself, and others connected to a questionable methodological approach.

3.1 The Debate: Equation with Federalism and Overemphasis on Territorial (Re)Organization

Even if there has been, as just described, an evolution towards more nuanced analysis, much of the debate about the virtues and vices of multinational federalism continues to be highly polarized. Thus, discussion is often obstructed by an oversimplified confrontation between believers in the concept and their critics. In this light, it has appeared either as a cure or curse and, as this polarized debate has occupied so much space, multinational federalism often has come to be conflated and confused with federalism (in divided societies). But while the latter is a broader research field, the former is, as mentioned above (see section 2.1), merely a specific concept that aims to transform nationwide minorities into regional majorities within nationality-based units.

This transformation entails a second problem related to the debate on multinational federalism, as by definition the concept focuses, in terms of constitutional design, on the issue of territorial demarcation. At this point, it is important to acknowledge that questions of how to draw and redraw subnational boundaries are far from irrelevant for divided societies. The overemphasis on the issue seems problematic, though, in that a blinkered view may entail a failure to pay attention to other, equally important matters of constitutional design. Cases in point are the abovementioned limits on the majoritarianization and marginalization of internal minorities within subnational entities (see section 2.2). It is true that the issue of territorial (re)organization may have a profound impact on the viability of a federal system, even more so in view of certain further consequences in divided societies. Some subnational entities may be neutral with regard to religion, whereas others adopt one or even more official religion.¹⁰ But this zero option does not exist in the case of language. Any entity must choose one or more official languages in which to conduct legislative affairs, deliver public services, provide education and administer justice. Solving territorial questions is particularly intractable if it is attempted in the wake of violent conflict and involves decisions about the ownership of valuable economic resources. The failure to define the boundaries of the Kurdistan region clearly, in the context of the disputed territories mentioned in article 140 of the Constitution of Iraq, is testimony to these problems (Galbraith 2008).

In India, by contrast, subnational boundaries have been repeatedly redefined since 1956 according to the rationale of multinational federalism. This process of creating new states is indeed often regarded as having succeeded in accommodating territorial claims based primarily on linguistic identities (Castellino & Domínguez Redondo, 2006). Such an identity-based territorial structure was not only diametrically opposed to the claim of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Indian Prime Minister, that only heterogeneous states would protect national unity and prevent disintegration (King 1997, 138). It also goes against

the advice of scholars who seek to avoid a transformation of ethnic divisions into political cleavages. Claiming that such a transformation would hamper cooperation between groups and empower extremists over moderates, the proposed alternative is to “make moderation pay” (Horowitz 1990).

As for territorial demarcation, it is thus recommended that subnational boundaries be drawn in such a way that they produce heterogeneous entities, with Nigeria’s Second Republic usually cited as a leading example.¹¹ In practice, however, this much-debated normative question of whether subnational boundaries should follow the prescription of multinational federalism (as in India) or not (as in Nigeria’s Second Republic) is to a considerable degree subject to political feasibility. All too often, these boundaries are dictated by power relations in political (and often military) terms rather than following theoretical blueprints. This is simply a further reason for not overemphasizing territorial (re)organization and so losing sight of other important issues of constitutional design.

3.2 The Methodology: Biased Case Selection and Overbroad Categorization

Besides those within the debate itself, a second set of problems has also made it impossible to find a general, clear and reliable answer to the question of whether multinational federalism is a cure or curse. These issues pertain to research methodology. Fervent advocates of the concept as well as their equally ardent opponents have tended to be biased in their case selection by focusing on countries that confirm their assumptions (Choudhry & Hume 2011, 368). As mentioned above, opposition to multinational federalism largely originated from early analyses of the collapse of the communist ethno-federations and, albeit to a much lesser degree, of the equally failed post-colonial federations. The latter were often established in the process of decolonization by a departing imperialist power (e.g. the British in Nigeria) or even by two such powers in collaboration (e.g. the British and French in Cameroon). Thus, a series of newly imposed federal systems came into being in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, most of which proved to be short-lived.¹² Advocates of multinational federalism, by contrast, have tended to take recourse in more encouraging counterexamples, such as Canada, Belgium, Spain and sometimes India.

Another methodological problem is related to categorization, or more precisely to the dichotomy between those systems that follow the rationale of multinational federalism in order to create nationality-based units and those that do not and are variously termed mononational or territorial federations. However, this seemingly obvious dichotomy, one relying again on the criterion of territorial demarcation, obscures the fact that multinational federations do not constitute a coherent and clear-cut category. Indeed, the categorization does not account

for the enormous variety of systems fulfilling this criterion in numerous other respects. Multinational federations simply seem to vary far too much in their constitutional designs for them all to be lumped together in a single uniform category.

The crucial problem is that, in view of these considerable dissimilarities, they can hardly be expected to have similar dynamics in terms of the risk of disintegration and the other the alleged problems mentioned above (see section 2.2). Why should we expect, for example, that the constitutional designs of India, Canada and Belgium, all widely recognized as multinational federations, have the same effects, even though they differ immensely from each other, for example, concerning the degree of (de)centralization?

In the case of India, the national parliament may temporarily legislate even on subject matters that are constitutionally assigned to the states if two-thirds of the second chamber, namely the Rajya Sabha, deem this “is necessary or expedient in the national interest” (Article 249 of the Indian Constitution); even more notorious are the powers of the President of India to impose emergency rule, powers through which India can be, in the words of B. R. Ambedkar, “both unitary as well as federal according to the requirements of time and circumstances” (Sabha, Ambedkar, cited in Shiva Rao 1968, 810). These powers may be invoked in the event of a national emergency, that is, “a threat to the security of India or any part of its territory caused by war, external aggression or armed rebellion” (Article 352), a state emergency due to “the failure of the constitutional machinery in a state” (Article 356), or a financial emergency (Article 360). Even though in two seminal judgments the Indian Supreme Court established some limits to these powers,¹³ they remain a political option.

This stands in contrast to Canada, where, according to the Supreme Court (1981), the potentially centralizing power of the national government to disallow and reserve provincial legislation (section 90 of the 1867 Constitution Act), “although in law still open, [has] to all intents and purposes, fallen into disuse.”¹⁴ While Canada is in fact today one of the most decentralized (multinational) federations in the world, Belgium still surpasses it in this regard. First, in contrast to nearly all other federal systems, it has no supremacy clause. Given that the “decrees” and “ordinances” adopted by the subnational parliaments are granted the same legal force as the formal “laws” of the national parliament (Articles 127–130 and 134 of the Belgian Constitution), conflicts over material jurisdiction are decided, in the absence of legal hierarchy, through consultation in the Council of State or by the Constitutional Court (Articles 141–142), (Delpérée 1993, 133–143, 138).

Secondly, Belgium’s subnational entities have the power to regulate international cooperation, including the conclusion of treaties, for all matters that fall within their internal competences (Articles 127–128 and 167). This alignment of internal and external powers has entailed, in combination with the transfer of

extensive powers through successive state reforms, an extraordinary degree of subnational autonomy, leading some observers to describe Belgium as having a “borderline constitution” (Mancini 2008, 576) that blends federal features with confederal elements. In short, there is a tremendous disparity between India, on the one hand, and, on the other, Canada – and even more so Belgium – in the degree of (de)centralization, a disparity making it a rather unlikely supposition that these three multinational federations are animated by very similar federal dynamics.

4. Conclusion: The Potential and Limits of Constitutional Design

This article has sought to uncover some weaknesses of multinational federalism as a concept and to critically analyse its viability for constitutional design. Yet this is not to claim the concept is doomed to fail in each and every case. Individual situations are so tremendously different, with so many intervening variables – historical, political, economic and social variables – that there is no direct and straight line between the design of a constitution and its impact on the ground. Indeed, this is why “[t]he world of constitutional predictions is littered with failed predictions and unanticipated consequences” (Simeon 2009, 2).

Some proponents of multinational federalism have explicitly recognized that its impact is highly dependent on context. They have therefore taken a more nuanced approach by regarding the concept’s success as contingent on its facilitation or even enablement by certain favourable conditions.¹⁵ According to such scholars, the paradox of multinational federalism is that it “may provide cultural minorities with greater resources to engage in collective action, leading to a rise in protest events, at the same time it may erode the demand for sovereignty” (Hechter 2001, 146). As for the solution to this paradox and that of the question of what accounts for the fact that there are successful and obviously unsuccessful cases, the scholars in question point to the necessity to give appropriate consideration to contextual factors as critical exogenous determinants. Generally, more realistic approaches to and more modest expectations of the power of constitutional design seem important.

First, the degree to which the largest group is demographically preponderant is regarded as a contextual factor that makes a difference. As the argument goes, such a situation seems to make it easier for the largest group to grant concessions to minority groups without feeling threatened and to make it strong enough, in political and economic terms, to oppose secessionism successfully (O’Leary 2001). Apart from the demographical situation itself, however, a related issue concerns how territorial organization deals with this situation.

For at least three decades observers have warned against the inherent instability of dyadic (multinational) federations with merely two subnational

entities. A bipolar constellation of this kind tends to preclude the possibility of subnational entities developing a variety of alliances among themselves regarding different political issues and instead to produce a political process that accretes around, and reinforces, a single cleavage (Duchacek 1988). As a result, even bargaining on issues that are not germane to identity politics can be perceived by the demographically and politically non-dominant entity (e.g. West Pakistan before 1971 or Slovakia before 1992) as an all-or-nothing, zero-sum game, one which they are bound to lose.

While, therefore, a large group should not be concentrated in one subnational entity within a dyadic federation, also splitting up that second entity does not seem to contribute to stability. It has been claimed that any constellation in which a large group dominates, demographically and in other respects, by means of a “core ethnic region” (Hale 2004, 166)¹⁶ would be inherently unstable. The argument is that such a constellation creates a “dual power” situation, with politicians from this core region being able to challenge and profoundly influence the national government; in turn, the failure of the central government to represent the interests of the smaller subnational entities adequately would fuel secessionism as a defensive reaction.

In terms of empirical research, this argument mainly builds on the collapse of several federal countries with core ethnic regions, either dyadic ones (e.g. Czechoslovakia) or those with more than two subnational entities (e.g. the Soviet Union and the First Republic in Nigeria). Conversely, the survival of countries without such a hegemonic region (e.g. Canada, Switzerland, Spain and Nigeria’s Second and Third Republics) are typically adduced as examples in support this argument.

Secondly, there is another socio-demographic factor that impinges on the stability of multinational federations, namely the relationship between different cleavages such as ethnic, linguistic or religious differences. First, cleavages are often highly fluid because they are socially constructed at a given point in time. In South Africa, for instance, the primary cleavage was during apartheid, the one between black and white, whereas it is only in the post-apartheid era that divisions within these two categories became more apparent and politically salient (Murray & Simeon 2007, 709–710). Secondly, particular cleavages, such as language and religion, may be either reinforcing, as in Belgium as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and hence deepen the alienation between different groups, or cross-cutting, as is the case for the most part in Switzerland or India (Dardanelli & Stojanović 2011; Arora 2010, 211), and thus attenuate each other. In this context, it has also been argued that a federal system should, against the rationale of multinational federalism, deliberately avoid taking ethno-cultural diversity as the basis for its territorial structure because this would mean a reinforcement of existing cleavages with a territorial one (see section 3.1).

Thirdly, the historical dynamics at work at the founding of the federal system play a role. Systems qualifying as what has been called putting- or

forced-together federations clearly appear to be more fragile than coming- or holding-together federations.¹⁷ Coming-together federations, established by previously independent entities, and most holding-together federations, formed to accommodate demands of (certain) subnational entities, are typically characterized – from the start or belatedly – by an element of voluntary union. Putting- or forced-together federations lack this element at the beginning, and in most cases forever, with the result that a sense of local ownership of the constitution cannot take root.

Fourthly, economic prosperity has considerable impact. Even if it does not constitute a necessary condition for the success of multinational federalism, it certainly reduces the salience of conflicts over the distribution of critical and/or scarce resources. Conversely, economic failure may provide an incentive, especially for more prosperous subnational entities, to secede from a state which is seen as holding them back (McGarry & O’Leary 2009, 19). Such a crisis of legitimacy of the state concerned – economically and, as a result, politically – occurred during the collapse of the planned-economy system in the communist ethno-federations, with the relatively prosperous Baltic republics, as well as Slovenia and Croatia, taking the lead in the break-up of their respective countries. Similar processes also contributed significantly to the rise of Catalan secessionism in the context of Spain’s economic and financial crisis.

Fifthly, geopolitical dynamics and the involvement of international actors, in particular of kin-states (Palermo & Sabanadze 2011) or what we might call “kin-regions,” have a substantial and sometimes decisive impact on the prospects of multinational federations. Some groups have ethnic kin who dominate another state or a region of another state, as is commonplace, for example, in Central and Eastern Europe. This may affect multinational federations critically for better or for worse. A case in point is Bosnia and Herzegovina, where intergroup and intergovernmental relations have often been influenced for the more than two decades of the country’s existence by moderating or radicalizing political dynamics in neighboring Serbia and Croatia.

In addition to any kin-states or “kin-regions,” other states and international organizations may also have an interest in intervention. Overall, the record of such international engagement is mixed at best. It may have a positive impact where interventionism is balanced by the encouragement of local ownership. Such a role of benign intervention by facilitating a peace agreement was played, for instance, by Ireland and the United States regarding the 1998 Belfast Agreement (McGarry & O’Leary 2008). This agreement then provided the basis for the subsequent devolution of powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive.

By contrast, the balance between external intervention and local ownership has been lacking from the outset in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, it was often only the three international judges sitting on the country’s Constitutional

Court who tipped the scales in crucial cases regarding the federal system.¹⁸ Moreover, in view of internal stalemate, the High Representative, appointed by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC),¹⁹ has used his power repeatedly to issue decisions that even amended the constitutions of the country's two autonomous entities (OHR 2002a; OHR 2002b). Thus, the role of this High Representative has changed "from that of a supervisor of the peace implementation process to its main actor" (Woelk 2012, 119). Although it served to overcome continued obstructionism and disagreement between elected representatives, such interventionism is unlikely to have positive effects in the long run. It simply exempts local actors from the need to negotiate and compromise, something that cannot be permanently substituted for by international actors.

Sixthly, the political context of a stable system that cherishes democracy and the rule of law appears to enhance multinational federalism's chances of success. This is primarily because such a system is more likely to foster the political culture of pluralism, and enable the open negotiations, that are essential to federalism (see below).

Moreover, it entails, through popular elections, enhanced democratic legitimacy and accountability of the political actors involved, that is, at both the national and subnational levels of government (Nordquist 1998, 69).

In a number of cases, however, federal systems have been established not in a stable democracy but during a transition towards democracy. Cases in point are the abovementioned post-colonial federations, to which critics of multinational federalism often refer; further examples are found in the wake of the "third wave" of democratization, especially in the 1990s, e.g. Ethiopia and the Russian Federation (Huntington 1993). Whereas an "authentic multinational federation is democratic" (McGarry & O'Leary 2007, 202), with such systems mostly being successful, "non-authentic" democratizing federations have often witnessed enthusiasm and solemn declarations giving way to very weak self-rule and shared rule in practice.

Among other things, this is due to the fact that democratization favours the resurfacing of minority identities that were suppressed under authoritarian conditions. In the new context of political competition, they may be nurtured and exploited by nationalist parties. Such dynamics were evident in the violent break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and, more recently, in the Civil War in Nepal (1996–2006) where the Maoist party had championed its so-called "Ethnic Policy of Nepal" from 1995 onwards (Singh & Kukreja 2014, 405).

Finally, a seventh contextual factor which is critical to the functioning any federal constitutional design is the existence of a federal political culture (Burgess 2012). To be sure, such a culture may arguably be nurtured to some extent by constitutional design, as law certainly has, according to socio-legal studies, some capacity to influence and reconstitute people's values (Post 2003). Yet it is highly unlikely that such a political culture will take root in situations where,

particularly after a (violent) conflict, the parties to the federation are entirely averse to the spirit of federalism and the negotiation and compromise it entails. These ultimate ties that bind are therefore, to a considerable degree, something presupposed by constitutional design. While key elements of a federal culture based on federal loyalty, mutual consideration and negotiated compromise may be entrenched in constitutional provisions (e.g. Belgium) or constitutional jurisprudence (e.g. Spain),²⁰ this of course does not secure compliance with these rules in practice. For these rules to be observed rather than be dead letters, there needs to be a pre-legal political culture which is capable of sustaining them.

Some have gone as far as to claim that this culture is the only thing that keeps federalism alive. Federalism would be nothing more than a “constitutional legal fiction which can be given whatever content seems to be appropriate at the moment,” provided only that this fiction succeeds in luring politicians into accepting a national government: “Once the central government is actually in operation, however, what maintains or destroys local autonomy is not the more or less superficial feature of federalism but the more profound characteristics of the political culture” (Riker 1969, 142, 146). Though this statement on the superficiality of federalism as a feature of constitutional design may seem exaggerated, there arguably is some truth in it. Federalism may indeed be interpreted as a “constitutional bargain” (Riker 1964, 1) between future national and sub-national government leaders. A culture of negotiation in good faith remains crucial, then, for the (successful) establishment and existence of a federal system and, in some cases, as the Canadian Supreme Court (1998) has ruled, even for its dissolution.²¹

In the past, the vast literature on multinational federalism and ethnic autonomy has focused mostly on the impact of these concepts’ constitutional design imperatives on the viability of federal systems. As there is no such impact which is unidirectional and unfiltered, research on federalism and other forms of autonomy in divided societies should place more emphasis on taking due account of the crucial contextual factors outlined in this article.

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Notes

- ¹ The term divided societies refers to the many cases, in which ethno-cultural diversity is not only a pure fact, but has actual political salience because it forms the basis of political identity and mobilization (Choudhry 2008a, 4–5).
- ² On federalism and autonomy, see Palermo and Kössler (2017, 58–61).
- ³ Non-territorial autonomy in the context of Austromarxism is mostly associated with Karl Renner and his model of a *Nationalitätenbundesstaat*, i.e. a federation of nationalities. See Renner (2005, 15–47).
- ⁴ For an introduction, see McGarry and O'Leary (2007, 180–211).
- ⁵ Kymlicka contrasts them with “regional-based unity.”
- ⁶ With reference to the Soviet Union, see Brubaker (1996, 9).
- ⁷ Apart from such obvious indicators of failure as state disintegration, factors that may justify regarding a federal system as dysfunctional include circumstances such as internal instability, violence, chaos and stalemate. See Simeon and Conway (2001).
- ⁸ For three main abstract approaches to the ethnic-territorial link, see Palermo (2015, 14–19).
- ⁹ For a comparison of European examples, see Kössler (2016).
- ¹⁰ The case of Switzerland is interesting because of the variety of cantonal arrangements regarding the official position of religion. Article 72(1) of the 1999 Swiss Constitution makes the regulation of this matter a prerogative of the cantons, and these indeed use this autonomy to follow very different models. While there is, in line with the French tradition, no officially recognized cantonal church (*Landeskirche*) in Geneva and Neuchâtel, other cantons grant this special status to one or more religious communities. These are mostly the Roman Catholic Church and the Swiss Reformed Church, as well as, in some cases, the Old Catholic Church and Jewish congregations.

- ¹¹ See Horowitz (1985, 613–621). For an earlier exposition of this argument, see Lipset (1960, 91–92).
- ¹² For an early analysis of post-colonial federations, see Watts (1966).
- ¹³ After the government of Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency based on Article 352 of the Constitution (2007), the court invalidated the Thirty-Ninth Amendment, which was supposed to prevent her prosecution (Indira Nehru Gandhi vs. Raj Narain). Nearly 20 years later, the judges countered the misuse of Article 356, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, as a tool for the national government to dismiss state governments controlled by opposition parties (S. R. Bommai vs. Union of India).
- ¹⁴ Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] SCR 753, 802. None of the two powers has been invoked since 1943. See Mallory (1984, 371).
- ¹⁵ For an overview of many of these conditions, see McGarry and O’Leary (2009, 19).
- ¹⁶ Hale (2004, 166) defines a “core ethnic region” as one possessing at least 50 per cent of the entire federation’s population or 20 per cent more than the second largest region.
- ¹⁷ While Alfred Stepan’s term “putting-together” (1999, 19) was supposed to capture the unique character of federal states that were formed through coercion, Nancy Bermeo’s similar term “forced-together” (2002, 108) aims to place particular emphasis on the influence of external actors and the element of systemic frailty.
- ¹⁸ See, for example, the “constituent peoples” case, Partial Decision U 5/98 III of 1 July 2000. The Constitutional Court is composed of two Bosniak, two Croat and two Serb judges, as well as three international judges.
- ¹⁹ The PIC is an international forum of 55 states involved in the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- ²⁰ See, for instance, Article 143 of the Belgian Constitution: “In the exercise of their respective responsibilities, the federal State, the Communities, the Regions and the Joint Community Commission act with respect for federal loyalty, in order to prevent conflicts of interest.” By contrast, in Spain it was the Constitutional Court that recognized (STC 18/1982; STC 11/1986) duties of cooperation and loyalty to the constitution (*fidelidad a la constitución*). On these and similar principles, see Palermo and Kössler (2017, 249–53).
- ²¹ “The clear repudiation by the people of Quebec of the existing constitutional order would confer legitimacy on demands for secession, and place an obligation on the other provinces and the federal government to acknowledge and respect that expression of democratic will by entering into negotiations and conducting them in accordance with the underlying constitutional principles already discussed.” (Reference re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, paragraph 88).

Sara Brezigar, Zaira Vidau

Political Participation of the Slovene Community in Italy: A Critical View of its Representation and Organisational Structure

The Slovene community in Italy faces new social challenges that arise from both the Italian society in general and the Slovene community in particular. However, the current European and global context and trends, including increased internal and international mobility and migration that result in increasing diversity at all levels and in all contexts, should also be taken into account. The organisational structure of the Slovene minority seems to represent a shrinking core of the community; it is becoming inadequate, and the minority's ability to have proper representation, particularly at the political level, is becoming questionable. A preliminary qualitative study was conducted in order to examine the community's political participation and explore possible best practices that could serve as a starting point for a new model of organisational structure and representation for the Slovene community in Italy. The aim of this article is to present the results of this study and reflect upon possible options for the future.

Keywords: political participation, political representation, Slovene national community in Italy, ethnic minorities.

Politična participacija slovenske skupnosti v Italiji: kritični pogled na predstavništvo in organiziranost

Slovenska skupnost v Italiji se sooča z novimi družbenimi izzivi, ki izvirajo tako iz italijanske družbe na splošno kot iz posebnih značilnosti slovenske skupnosti. K temu je treba dodati trenutni evropski in globalni kontekst, ki se sooča s povečano interno in mednarodno mobilnostjo ter migracijami, ki vodijo v večjo raznolikost na vseh ravneh in v vseh okoljih. Organizacijska struktura slovenske manjšine tako odraža in predstavlja vedno ožje jedro skupnosti in postaja neustrezna. Tudi politično predstavništvo skupnosti postaja vprašljivo. V prispevku avtorici predstavita rezultate kvalitativne študije, s katero sta preučili politično participacijo te skupnosti in raziskali obstoječe dobre prakse, ki bi lahko služile kot izhodišče za razmislek o novem modelu organiziranosti in predstavništva slovenske skupnosti v Italiji.

Ključne besede: politična participacija, predstavništvo, slovenska narodna skupnost v Italiji, etnične manjšine.

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1. Introduction

The participation of national minorities in public life is essential for any democratic society that wants to live in peace and to provide for social stability. The *raison d'être* of participatory mechanisms, particularly of minority participation, is to foster the integration of minorities in the societies in which they live, while encouraging the preservation of their identity and delaying, if not preventing, their assimilation.

A number of social, economic, political, historical and cultural factors contribute to the divide between national and ethnic communities within the state. However, one of the most important causes of conflicts between a particular minority and the majority population stems from the minority's perception that it cannot fully participate in the political, economic and social life of the country in which it lives. The minority feels discriminated against. Frequently, the minority also perceives that the state deliberately uses its system and resources to deprive the minority of its cultural and linguistic identity. Therefore "[e]ffective participation in public affairs serves to avoid the feeling of persons belonging to minorities, that they should use other, less acceptable means for their opinions to be considered" (Palermo & Woelk 2003, 240–241). By building trust, participation in public affairs can create loyalty to the state and to the society to which the minorities belong (Palermo & Woelk 2003, 240–241). Moreover, the right of national minorities to political participation represents a limitation of the absolute rule of the majority, which prevents "a permanent monopoly of power by any social structure and enable[s] equal competition of political actors in their struggle for (political) power" (Zagar 2005, 48). It relies on the fundamental principles of "self-rule" and "power-sharing" (Schneckener 2004, 18–23).

Among the different forms of participation of (national) minorities and their members,¹ the focus in this article will be the central one, i.e. political participation. One aspect of this concerns decision-making processes (representation and other forms of political participation), while the other relates mostly to the self-organisation of the community (and its self-governance) (Medda Windischer 2009, 212; Marko 1999). The aim of this article is to present the results of a study conducted on both aspects of (political) participation of one such national minority – the Slovene community in Italy.²

From a historical perspective, the Slovene community in Italy is a highly developed and well integrated community in terms of self-organisation and community structures (Bogatec & Vidau 2016; 2017). However, its internal organisation is becoming increasingly inefficient and outdated, as the community faces new challenges that arise from social changes within the Italian society in general and the Slovene community in particular. Unfavourable demographic trends (Jagodici 2017), a general lack of interest in politics (Giovannini 1988; Tuorlo 2006; Bertozzi 2015), changes in lifestyle and means of communication

particularly among young people (Vidau 2017d) that include less personal contact and less (real) community life, higher demands on parents in terms of their professional and family lives (that leave less time to devote to community issues) – these and other changes put under pressure the organisational structure that has been supporting the functioning and preservation of the Slovene community since the aftermath of the Second World War. Social and political circumstances have changed considerably in the past decades and the community's organisational structure seems to be either too slow to adapt or unable to do so.

Furthermore, from a historical point of view, the majority of the Slovene community in Italy used to elect their political representatives by voting predominantly for either the ethnic party Slovene Union (Slovenska skupnost) or the current left or centre-left parties (Vidau 2016b; 2017b; 2017c). Recently, however, this trend has weakened. Voting patterns and trends are changing and a growing number of members of the Slovene community seek their political representation among other parties that are ideologically on the right or centre-right of the political spectrum that, traditionally, have not attracted many voters from this community.

The result of these processes is that the current organisational structure of the Slovene minority seems to represent a shrinking core of the community, and that the minority's ability to have proper representation at the political level is becoming questionable. For these reasons, organisational and institutional reforms are needed within the community in order to adjust its structures and functioning to the new social reality. Similarly, a solution should be adopted within the Italian system of political representation that would enable and promote minority representation at all levels, in order to secure adequate representation of the Slovene community and foster its ability to preserve its language and culture.

To investigate how these needs for change could be best addressed, a pilot study was conducted in 2017 as a preparatory activity for the Second Regional Conference on the Protection of the Slovene Linguistic Minority³ (Brezigar & Vidau 2018). The study examined the views and opinions of 16 representatives of the Slovene national community in the region Friuli-Venezia Giulia (FVG):⁴⁵ among them were five elected political representatives, seven presidents and directors of primary Slovene organisations and institutions in the provinces of Trieste/Trst, Gorizia/Gorica and Udine/Videm/Viden, the spokesperson of the representative body of the Slovene community, and three journalists working for Slovene media in Italy.

The interviews focused on the efficacy of the current representative bodies of the Slovenes in Italy in their relations with individual governmental authorities, and local and provincial government, as well as on the internal structure and decision-making processes of Slovene organisations and institutions. The respondents were asked to assess the current system of representation by elected

Slovene-speaking political representatives. They gave their opinion on the role and effectiveness of the Slovene umbrella organisations – the Slovene Cultural and Economic Association (Slovenska kulturno gospodarska zveza – SKGZ) and the Council of Slovene Organisations (Svet slovenskih organizacij – SSO) in the contemporary socio-political context. At the same time, they expressed their views on the reforms required of the existing bodies and institutions, as well as suggesting potential new representative bodies and channels. The main aim of this article is to present the results of this study and reflect upon possible future options.

The first part of the paper will briefly touch upon some theoretical issues and models of political representation of national minorities in Europe that could be useful when considering possible changes to the organisational structure and representation of the Slovene community in Italy. A brief outline of the current status of the Slovene community will then be given and the results of the study presented. Finally, the research results will be summarised and recommendations offered for future development and reforms.

2. Political Participation of (National) Minorities

The main objective of the political participation of minorities is to ensure effective inclusion and equality among citizens of different ethnic origin. This “substantive equality” (Lantschner 2008, 60; Verstichel 2010) is the fundamental justification for approaches and mechanisms that ensure the representation and participation of national minorities.

Several mechanisms can ensure effective participation. They are easily classified on a continuum between two poles: from the individual right to vote to equal representation of the various (ethnic and national) communities that constitute the state (Marko 1999). Between these two poles lie equal participation in electoral processes, proper representation in the parliament and other elected bodies, including guaranteed seats in those bodies, the establishment of effective consultative bodies and mechanisms, the general participation of members of national minorities in cultural, social and economic life, as well as in public affairs, and the improvement of economic opportunities for members of national minorities (Marko 1999). Several countries (e.g. Slovenia, Romania, Croatia) have come up with solutions that could be placed on this continuum and lean either towards some sort of guaranteed political representation or a lower electoral threshold (or both).⁶ The experiences of these and other states suggest that under certain circumstances, some participatory mechanisms are more useful and effective than others, and thus suggest that a contextual approach is of paramount importance.

Since the Slovene community lives in Italy, its natural tendency is to look for possible solutions among other minorities in the same state. In particular, the

South Tyrol model is frequently perceived as a role model to follow. However, other solutions, used elsewhere in the EU, should also be considered.

In terms of participation, the province of Bolzano relies heavily on mechanisms that strive to ensure equal representation of the communities present on its territory (the Italian, German and Ladin communities) and prevent their marginalisation. In practice, this means, for example, that mechanisms ensure a proportional representation of different communities among employees in most of the public sector. Moreover, political representation is linked to representation of ethnic groups⁷ through a system of self-declaration of membership or affiliation to ethnic communities that is embedded in the electoral system. The result of this model is that the ethnic affiliation of the political representatives is roughly in accordance with the proportion of the respective communities on the territory. Palermo (Marko et al. 2007) explains that the South Tyrol model, (implemented in accordance with the Second Autonomy Statute) includes two dimensions: the historical-ethnic dimension that functions as a sort of defensive minority protection and results in coexistence by means of segregation; and the linguistic-territorial dimension that gives autonomy to the whole region in order to integrate through cooperation (Marko et al. 2007).

To summarise, the South Tyrol model is based on the self-declaration of citizens regarding their ethnic affiliation and *de facto* counting of the members of each community (Lantschner & Poggeschi 2008; Katics 2013). Historically, such counting has been strongly opposed by the Slovene minority in Italy. Formally, because they feared that the existing inadequate protection of the minority would undermine truthful self-declaration of minority members or that counting would result in their discomfort.

Moreover, the South Tyrol model grants minority representation through elections. However, a minority can actually elect its representatives, be adequately represented and can relevantly influence decision-making and/or authority only if it is concentrated and sufficiently numerous on the territory (particularly in electoral districts), ideally representing a local and/or regional majority. Unlike the German community in the South Tyrol, the Slovene community in Italy does not represent the local majority on the territory where it lives, and so its ability to seek its representation through general, particularly proportional elections is severely hindered. When the absolute size and its territorial dispersion (Dobos 2016, 87) hinder political representation of a distinct community through general (public) elections, special arrangements should be adopted to ensure it.

An example of such special arrangements are those in place for the Hungarian and Italian national minorities in Slovenia, where a double voting right of persons belonging to these minorities and guaranteed seats in representative bodies were introduced. Persons belonging to those minority communities vote twice. First, like all citizens, they vote according to their political or ideological

conviction or preference; second, they cast a vote to elect the representative(s) of their community in respective bodies that have guaranteed seats, as well as the same status and powers as other elected representatives. At the national level, the constitution guarantees a seat for each of two national minorities in the National Assembly (Komac 1999; Žagar 1992).

An active, often dominant and decisive role of the state in conceptualising and regulating the status of minorities and regions as well as the organisational structure and institutions of minority communities can provoke concerns and potentially cause a duplication of representational structures and institutions. For example, in Slovenia beside the state-established self-governing communities that represent the minority *vis à vis* the state and its bodies (Komac 1999, 68), the Italian community has also an umbrella organisation (Italian Union / *Unione Italiana*) that represents the community *vis à vis* the Italian state and is one of forms of this minority's self-government. In this case, the umbrella organisation that functions as a point of reference for 52 associations elects its own representatives through internal elections (among members). Still, the Slovene state regards it merely as a private cultural association.

With its double voting right, special electoral registers and a top-down organisational approach, Slovenia is, however, a rather extreme example of how a state can regulate and ensure minority representation. Other solutions involve options that do not require a double voting right or a special electoral system. On the German-Danish border, for example, two different models have been adopted to guarantee the representation of minorities – the Danish minority in Germany and the German minority in Denmark.

Since the revision of the Danish-German border in 1920, both Denmark and Germany have on a number of occasions officially recognised the national minority of the neighboring state in their territories, finally defining the status of both minorities in the Bonn-Copenhagen Declaration (1955). Since then, Denmark and Germany have developed consultative and other bodies to protect minorities in the area and ensure their representation (Becker-Christensen 2014).

Both minorities have two types of bodies and organisations. On the one hand, organisations that are managed by the minorities – the umbrella organisation *Sydslesvigsk Forening* (SSF) and *Bund Deutscher Nordschleswiger* (BdN). Each minority has also its own political party: the *Sydslesvigsk Vælgerforening* in Germany is an independent party that has a special status, as it does not need to reach the 5 per cent threshold to be represented in the State and Federal Parliament (Becker-Christensen 2014, 7), whereas the *Schleswigsche Partei* (SP) in Denmark is essentially a sub-organisation of the umbrella organisation BdN that elects both the candidates and the leader of the party.

In 2007 new electoral rules were introduced in Denmark when the Danish Structural Reform reduced the number of municipalities from 270 to 98 mostly

larger entities, in order to facilitate the political representation of the German minority. Such mechanisms included both an increase of mandates and special provisions if the minority cannot reach this threshold: 25 per cent of the votes that a full mandate requires is enough to secure a minority representative that has no voting rights, but has the right to speak in the council and to be represented in municipal committees (Becker-Christensen 2014, 14–15).

Umbrella organisations and political parties represent one aspect of the participation and representation of the two minorities. Another aspect includes bodies set up by the Danish Government, and the German Federal Government and the Schleswig-Holstein State / Land Government⁸ that are particularly interesting in the light of needs of the Slovene community in Italy and discussions of necessary reforms.

The German minority has no representative in the Danish parliament. Instead, in 1983 a special office, the Secretariat, was set up in the parliament to represent the interests of the German minority (Becker-Christensen 2014, 10). The Secretariat monitors the work of parliament and relates the political opinion and views of the minority in parliament and to the public. The head of the Secretariat is a representative of the German minority and he/she is elected by the leadership of the BdN. This constitutes an important link between the self-organisation (self-governance) of the minority (its internal structure that culminates in the leadership of its umbrella organisation BdN) and the mechanisms of representation established by the state (the Secretariat and other bodies)⁹.

In contrast, in Germany it is the Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein who appoints the Commissioner for Minorities and Culture in the Land of Schleswig Holstein. The Commissioner is therefore a civil servant whose task is to develop and maintain contacts between the State Government, the State Parliament and minorities. His work is independent of the (political) representatives of the Danish minority in Parliament. The Commissioner is a representative of the majority that deals with minority issues and defends the government's position, which could be in the most extreme cases even hostile to the minority.¹⁰

A study conducted by Schaefer-Rolffs and Schnapp (Schaefer-Rolffs 2014; Schaefer-Rolffs & Schnapp 2014a; 2014b) showed several weaknesses of the German model and pointed to the Danish one as being more effective and better accepted by the minority. The shortcomings of the German Commissioner include, for example, the paternalistic structure of the Commissioner's office that works "for" the minority and its top-down approach that regards the minority as a passive object in need of care. The Commissioner is appointed by the governing coalition, which puts him/her in a difficult position with regard to representing and gaining the trust and support of the minority population (Schaefer-Rolffs 2014), which is, as previously discussed, essential for effective political participation (Palermo & Woelk 2003, 240–241).

In contrast, the Secretariat in Denmark has a very participatory structure that is oriented towards direct minority participation (Schaefer-Rolffs 2014). A strong link in the Head of the Secretariat between the self-organisation of the minority and the structure of representation established by the state, from a formal point of view, might be missing in the case of minorities in Slovenia.

Although none of the cases discussed above represents a practical solution that could be easily transposed to serve the Slovene minority in Italy, they provide interesting starting points for a discussion on possible changes to and reforms of the organisational structure and representation of this community.

3. The System of Representation and Organisation of the Slovene Community in Italy

In terms of its political activities, the Slovene national community as a traditional national minority is integrated into the Italian political system and reflects its characteristics concerning the legislation and implementation of elections at national and local levels, as well as political parties. Traditionally, members of the Slovene national minority identify mainly with leftist or centre-left parties, as these political forces support their claims for minority rights and public use of the Slovene language. To a lesser extent, Slovene voters and elected representatives are present also in contemporary political movements as well as in some centre-right and rightist parties, which were traditionally not favourably disposed to minority protection. However, recently some of these movements and parties have shown either a neutral or positive attitude to the minority. Moreover, the analysis of the electoral results on a national and regional level in Friuli Venezia Giulia¹¹ in 2018 concerning Slovene speaking voters confirmed that they have changed their political stance (Gabrovec 2018; Majovski 2018; Verč 2018). They vote less on an ideological or ethnic basis and affiliation. They seem to put more trust in political forces that, in their opinion, will solve practical issues, such as creating job opportunities or stopping immigration.¹²

Political representatives of the Slovene national community in Italy have so far been regularly elected to provincial and municipal bodies on the territory of the 32 municipalities where the State Protection Law 38/2001 is applied¹³, the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia and to the Italian Parliament. The question of political participation remains unsettled in legislation and current legal provisions as neither the State Protection Law 38/2001 nor the Regional Protection Law 26/2007 in fact regulate the political participation of the Slovene national minority (Vidau 2016a; 2017a). However, the electoral Law of the Autonomous Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia (Regional Law 17/2007) provides for a reduced threshold in the election of a candidate from a Slovene political party (in practice, the Slovene Union). At all local or state-level elections, the Slovene ethnic party and Slovene candidates competing

within national and/or regional Italian parties and movements work closely in various groupings.¹⁴ Within individual parties, these coalitions allow for the election of political representatives who are recognised as members of the Slovene national community and who promote its interests.

For specific socially and politically important events and meetings with the authorities, a joint representation is usually formed.¹⁵ Although the composition of this body may vary according to needs, it normally consists of the already elected national, regional and local political representatives. Typically, it comprises one representative from the ranks of left-centrist and leftist parties in addition to representatives of the two umbrella organisations SKGZ and SSO.

The Slovene national community has no legally guaranteed forms of administrative or political autonomy at the provincial or municipal level. As a result of post-war historical developments, it does have its own organisations, which also operate at the political level. They include two main umbrella or representative organisations, which bring together the majority of Slovene institutions and organisations from the provinces of Trieste/Trst, Gorizia/Gorica and Udine/Videm/Viden. These are acknowledged as reference organisations for the Slovene national community in Italy by the Regional Law No. 26/2007. These two organisations are an expression of the civil society, but they also appear in the political arena as interlocutors with various European, national and local political institutions in Italy and Slovenia.

After the Second World War, demands were voiced for the recognition of the presence of Slovenes, for Slovene schools and for the public use of Slovene. Under the the fascist regime. the Slovene community suffered severe physical, cultural, economic and moral repression and damage. In fact, a new set of Slovene cultural institutions and organisations, as well as a new educational system, had to be re-established in the post-war period. Bajc and Klabjan (2008, 29) argue that the Yugoslav government and its political and ideological orientation supported the post-war reconstruction of Slovene organisations and institutions in Italy, stressing also the active participation of this community in the national liberation struggle and the Liberation Front. In 1954, the first umbrella organisation of Slovenes in Italy, the Slovene Cultural and Economic Association was established. The counterbalancing Council of Slovene Organisations was formed later on, in 1976, as the result of the activities and organisations of Catholic and liberal Slovenes in Italy established in the 1960s (Troha 2004, 146–147). According to Bajc and Klabjan (2008, 29), this ideological division based on communism and anti-communism, conditioned the socio-cultural as well as political organisation, activities and participation of the Slovene minority that was expressed also in the electoral system. The authors claim that this division meant a separation (and duplication) of minority organisations and institutions in the cultural, media, social, political and economic fields, as these organisations operated under the ideological auspices of one or the other parent organisation.¹⁶

4. Elected Political Representatives and the Umbrella Organisations: A Critical View

One of the topics of discussion in the study on the representational and organisational structure of the Slovene community in Italy from 2017 (Brezigar & Vidau 2018) concerned the Slovene political representatives and their coordination in the framework of the joint political representation. Respondents No. 1 and 4 explained that occasionally the umbrella organisations, SKGZ and SSO, acted as representatives of the Slovene community in Italy. On other occasions, this role was assumed by a joint representation consisting of either the umbrella organisations, elected political representatives and a representative of the Parity committee¹⁷, or the umbrella organisations, a Slovene councillor in the Regional Council and a Slovene Member of Parliament in Rome. In short, according to our respondents, formulas vary depending on contingent circumstances.

Respondents No. 9 and 10 assumed a critical stance towards the current form of joint political representation, stating that its members failed to function in a coordinated way, which made them ineffective. In their opinion, this body does not have established rules of operation and appointment or election of its members. Rather, it acts on a case-to-case basis.

With regard to the question of what attitude should be adopted towards the Slovene-speaking elected representatives within those parties traditionally not favourably disposed to minority issues, our respondents were generally in favour of open dialogue and cooperation. Respondent No. 11 expressed the view that, in terms of ideology and party affiliation, the present political body of Slovenes in Italy was quite diverse. The respondent added that the core of this community remained affiliated with traditional centre-left parties and the related two umbrella organisations. However, several members of this community also supported centre-right parties and contemporary political movements. He noted that this situation was a consequence of the fact that the Slovene minority no longer felt pressurised by the country's majority community. This respondent felt that today the members of the minority community were much less united by their national affiliation. His statement was similar to that of Respondent No. 3, who made the observation that the individual national affiliation no longer represents a priority (in elections). Respondent No. 7 stated that the Slovene-speaking elected representatives might also be the voice of centre-right parties and other movements, and that they should enter dialogue with the traditional minority structures. Similarly, Respondent No. 6 maintained that it was necessary to keep in contact and have a dialogue with such political representatives, and that they should be appraised pragmatically – not only on the basis of their ideology, but primarily on the results of their work. Respondent No. 1 stated that one third of the members of the Slovene community in Italy today no longer supported the traditional centre-left parties. The respondent

expressed the view that, on the one hand, this could pose a danger, as it diminished the political power of the Slovenes in Italy, but on the other, it could present an opportunity as it facilitated the development of a positive attitude towards minority issues also within centre-right parties.

We explicitly asked our interlocutors whether they felt that the SKGZ and the SSO were representative in relation to both the authorities and the Slovene national community in Italy. Respondent No. 15 stressed that the umbrella organisations were the interlocutors to the FVG Region – a scenario, which guaranteed that the Slovene community existed as a recognised entity. Respondent No. 5 found the cooperation of the umbrella organisations with the political authorities in Rome and Ljubljana positive. Respondent No. 13 also gave a positive assessment of the representativeness of the umbrella organisations due to the fact that these organisations were present on the ground and their bodies held regular meetings.

Respondent No. 10 confirmed that members of the Slovene national community in Italy were affiliated with the SKGZ and the SSO – in the extent to which members of modern society were still affiliated with any external structures. According to Respondent No. 16, the SKGZ and the SSO reflect the entire active Slovene community in Italy, considering also that many Slovenes in the country are no longer members of any organisations (while in the past most opted for one of the options). Respondent No. 10 found the problem of representativeness of the umbrella organisations a consequence of growing individualism and socio-political inactivity of members of society. Likewise, Respondents No. 3 and 11 expressed the opinion that the issue of representation was a general social problem occurring not only in the umbrella organisations, but on a wider scale concerning and within individual parties, trade unions, etc. They added that the situation in the field of political participation mirrored the general social crisis occurring within politics and within traditional forms of political representation, organisation and political parties, particularly in Italy. Respondent No. 7 observed that many Slovene-speaking individuals were not involved in the operation of Slovene organisations and institutions. He added that he had realised through personal experience that the community could attract inactive individuals only by offering high quality cultural, sports and other activities and services.

Respondent No. 9 expressed the view that the representativeness of both umbrella organisations was weak, and that a more organised political representative body was needed that would voice the clearly formulated and substantiated demands of the minority and conduct skilful negotiations with the authorities. Currently, the authorities have several interlocutors: in addition to the two umbrella organisations, there are also political parties; and the respondent felt that it would be better if only one subject was to communicate with the authorities.

Respondents No. 1, 3, and 5 explained that the SKGZ and the SSO umbrella organisations did in fact represent members of civil society, but that these were only their own members, while political representatives were backed by the voters legitimising their operation. They therefore felt it was necessary for the representative body of the Slovene national community to be composed of both the umbrella organisations and elected political representatives.

5. Proposals for New Representative and Decision-making Bodies

Our respondents proposed various new forms of representative bodies, which within the system of organisations and institutions of the Slovenes in Italy, in their opinion, would lead to more efficient processes of decision-making, governance and management. They expressed the belief that new forms of representation could help overcome some of the principal problems they perceived. Among the latter, they mentioned the lack of a programme and a short- and long-term vision for the future of this community, which prevented the achievement of any tangible results and resulted in issues being resolved only on a case-to-case basis, as pointed out by Respondent no. 12. Respondent No. 1 found that when designing such an action programme, the issue of the Slovene language¹⁸ and the associated identity question¹⁹ of who was at present considered a member of the Slovene national community in Italy should take precedence. Similarly, Respondent No. 16 highlighted the issue of current conceptions of identity of the Slovenes in Italy, which were not delineated clearly; increasingly, they contained either the Slovene or the Italian component. Thus, the question of how to identify the members of the Slovene national community in Italy remains an open one.

In the following paragraphs, respondents' views will be summarised on how, drawing on their extensive knowledge acquired through years of experience, they envisaged a new representative body of the Slovenes in Italy. Such a body could, on the one hand, formulate a programme and vision for the functioning of Slovene organisations and institutions in Italy, while on the other hand, its leadership would be elected democratically by the members of this community. Outwardly, such a representative body would have, with its clearly defined mandate, goals and demands, greater negotiating power in its relations with the authorities at the national, regional, and other levels in Italy and Slovenia.

The analysis of the interviews yielded two proposals for a representative body, which would be, as mentioned, democratically elected and would hold the power to decide on behalf of the Slovene national community in Italy: it would take the form of a parliament or assembly, or of a unified umbrella organisation.

Respondent No. 6 perceived the need for a representative body that would function as a sort of parliament with elected members, which would have

the power to make decisions on behalf of the Slovene national community. Elections would allow for higher and broader participation of the members of the Slovene minority, who would thus also take on the responsibility of electing their governing body.

Based on the responses collected in the course of the interviews, some characteristics of a potential parliament as the representative and governing body of the Slovene national community in Italy can be defined.

Respondent No. 6 suggested that the parliament, organised in specific departments, should draft a programme of activities for Slovene organisations and institutions. Explicitly mentioned were the primary departments of education, agriculture, sport, culture, welfare, legal services, relations with public administration and the media.²⁰ Other important areas could include the province of Udine, the use and promotion of the Slovene language, connecting and networking with Slovenia as the kin country, and the promotion of the minority among the majority population, i.e. its recognition within Italy (Respondents No. 1 and 3). Several respondents emphasised the importance of the economy, the related employment possibilities, and the brain drain among young Slovenes in Italy (Respondents No. 3 and 11).

Respondent No. 6 expressed a need to compile an electoral register of all the members of the Slovene community in Italy. According to this respondent, community membership could be defined on the basis of such criteria as: having attended the Slovene schools in Italy, being members of the Slovene associations and societies, or one's children attending or having attended the Slovene schools in Italy. Other respondents (No. 3 and 5) were sceptical of such an electoral system, as, in their opinion, it would involve a census/count of the members of the Slovene national community, which they opposed. Some people might not wish to register in such a census for fear of exposure. In order to avoid such counts, Respondents No. 5, 7, and 12 suggested that the electoral roll should consist of the existing members of the Slovene societies and organisations in Italy, which would be simpler than compiling an electoral roll anew. In their opinion, this is a well-defined voting pool that would allow for a wide range of people to participate in the processes of electing their representatives.

Respondents No. 1 and 6 noted that such a parliament could act on the basis of an amendment to Regional Law No. 26/2007 on the protection of the Slovene linguistic community in Italy or another relevant regional law. Respondent No. 7 perceived the idea of starting from a regional legislative basis too ambitious. He proposed that, in the first phase, the election of this body would take place internally among members of Slovene organisations and societies, while in the second phase a body would be formed in accordance with a new regional legal basis.

Respondent No. 16 proposed a similar representative body, namely a regional council of the Slovenes in Italy. It would consist of elected political repre-

sentatives of the Slovenes in Italy and representatives of their umbrella and primary organisations. Similar to the parliament structure mentioned above, the regional legislation would grant this body the jurisdiction and legitimacy for making decisions on financial matters, as well as on strategic and developmental aspects, which would then be binding for the Slovene organisations and institutions in Italy.

Another proposal arising from the interviews was one of a representative and executive body developed on the basis of a transformation of the two umbrella organisations' operation.²¹ Respondents No. 3, 5, 9, and 11 proposed a merger of the SKGZ and the SSO into a single organisation with a unified membership and a single steering committee, an organisation which would be an expression of various ideological views and would have a "national defence" character. Respondent No. 5 expressed the view that these two organisations are in effect duplicates as they are dealing with the same problems, also in terms of financing. Respondent No. 3 stated that this was unlikely to happen, although some members were already members of both organisations and the differences between them were becoming less and less pronounced. If both were to be preserved, they should at least have a joint body for addressing current issues and decision making, an idea supported also by Respondents No. 3 and 13.

Respondent No. 1 was also in favour of the SKGZ and the SSO merging into a single organisation whose executive offices would merge and whose members would unite by individual sectors of activity. This respondent added that the leadership of such a unified umbrella organisation should be elected by a larger number of voters instead of just its members as had been the case to date. Such elections would give this body the legitimacy to represent the entire Slovene community in Italy. This would also encourage the democratic participation of a wider circle of the Slovenes. He added that the body itself and the election system should be governed by regional legislation.

The political participation and representation of a minority and its autonomy in this field are the key segments of (minority) autonomy in diverse societies. According to Žagar's model (2017) the Slovene minority in Italy has both formal and informal ways of participation. The formal one is weak, as the legally determined forms of participation are basically declarative except for the above mentioned Regional Electoral Law 17/2007 which provides for a reduced threshold in the election of a candidate from the Slovene political party. However, the informal participation is well developed with the inclusion in mainstream political parties, a minority political party and a structure of Slovene organisations and associations in different fields of activity which is also formally recognised by the regional authority. However, many of the above-mentioned respondents agree that the umbrella organisations SKGZ and SSO, as well as the informal system of participation, lacks of a common vision which should in their opinion be defined and pursued by a new form of body or assembly with clearly defined policy formulation and decision-making processes.

Thus, having diverse political representative and consultative bodies including a minority parliament/assembly as described above would give to the Slovene community in Italy a political arena which could express in a democratic way the internal pluralism and diversity of ideological/political and other opinions within the Slovene minority in line with the advanced models of social and political participation of (national) minorities and persons belonging to them as defined by Žagar (2017, 15). The interviewed representatives clearly expressed their need to have a higher level of inclusion and internal participation in decision-making processes concerning the government and managing of the most relevant minority issues, such as language policies, financing, education, the economy etc, compared to the ones they already have and which are based on the status of a membership to an association.

The respondents agreed that a more organised minority autonomy with a new political representative body would voice the clearly formulated and substantiated demands of the minority and conduct skilful negotiations with the authorities at local, regional and national level as well as in cooperation with the ethnic kin state as one subject would communicate with the authorities instead of several interlocutors.

In such a context where formal participation is weak and the scenario of having a new model of representative and decision-making body/assembly is still on a level of internal discussion, the two umbrella minority organisations SKGZ and SSO represent the core of the Slovene minority autonomy. Together with the Slovene elected political representatives, they communicate and negotiate with the authorities at different levels of local and national decision-making centres in Italy and Slovenia and de facto lead the Slovene community.

According to the respondents, the autonomy of the Slovene minority with a self-rule and management system could be either informal, with a form of private association based on individual membership, or formal with an assembly legally based in a regional law. A two-step process could represent a possible solution since a body/assembly elected by a pool of the existing individual memberships in the various Slovene organisations and associations is more immediate as it depends on the decision of the existing political actors of the Slovene community to start this process, namely the two umbrella organisations SKGZ and SSO and the Slovene elected political representatives. It could represent a pilot version of the model that would be then upgraded in the frame of a regional law in a form of a more effective political instrument with a legally defined political role.

6. Conclusions

This analysis of the current situation and *status quo* of representation of the Slovene community in Italy can be summarised in a few concluding thoughts.

The community is well aware of the fact that the current system of representation is no longer adequate and should be improved. As the analysis suggests, this could be done through the reform of current arrangements, the introduction of additional democratic procedures in the election and appointment of its representatives, as well as the establishment of new representative frameworks and institutions. The study suggests a strong need for a representative entity (a renewed concept of umbrella organisations and/or minority assembly/parliament) that would be legitimised to make decisions on behalf of the Slovene community in Italy. What is considered particularly important in this context is the introduction of adequate institutional arrangements in a form of a body that would be effective in making the required decisions and implementing the necessary measures. However, several ideas on representative bodies have emerged which cannot be consolidated into a single vision, with most respondents agreeing that a group of experts could prepare a proposal for representative arrangements, particularly a representative body of the Slovenes in Italy in compliance with the existing state and regional legislation.

The (albeit superficial) examination of a number of experiences among different minorities in the first part of this article, suggests that the representation of the Slovene community can be guaranteed in several ways, including (but not solely) careful design and preparation of constituencies and districts, and lower electoral thresholds. There are other positive discrimination measures that allow, for example, the election of the Ladin representatives in the provincial parliament and a representative of the KJC in the Regional Parliament in the South Tyrol model. Having already been implemented in Italy, these solutions would probably be easier to implement in terms of requirements of the legal framework in place.

However, from a content point of view, the best practice that could be considered is the Copenhagen Secretariat, where a civil society representative represents the minority in parliament. The Head of the Secretariat is appointed by the body representing members of the German minority in Denmark through democratic elections. The Head of the Secretariat certainly does not have the same powers as the Members of the National Assembly in the Slovenian Parliament. However, according to a survey carried out by members of the German minority in Denmark, this way of representation is good and effective, even when the abilities of a minority to elect its political representative is modest.

Finally, different participatory mechanisms at the national, regional or local level only make sense in an environment where there is general political will of the political establishment to accept the philosophy of participation as the fundamental concept of building society (Marko et al. 1997). Although such a climate was definitely lacking in the aftermath of World War 2, the border between Yugoslavia and Italy being not only a state border, but also a political and ideological border in a global sense, in the past two decades, especially since

Slovenia's accession to the EU and the Schengen Area, the barriers have gradually been falling, creating perhaps a social climate that is open to solutions of effective political participation of the Slovene community in a way absent in the past. However, recent political turmoil in Italy threatens this window of opportunity and time is of the essence if an improvement of the political representation of the Slovene community in Italy is being considered.

The autonomy model of the Slovene community in Italy that developed in the decades after World War 2 and based on a core of informal participation instruments with inclusion in mainstream political parties, a minority political party and a structure of Slovene organisations and associations in different fields of activity has weakened and become less effective particularly in the self-management of the minority community. The members of the Slovene minority are voicing new demands of participation also because of the post-ideological socio-political framework that has changed traditional electoral patterns. Thus, how to re-organise (taking into account the above suggested solutions) this model of autonomy should be considered and used as the basis for the development of tools to strengthen the autonomy of the Slovene minority in Italy.

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- ¹ For a detailed model of such social and political participation see Žagar (2017).
- ² The Slovene national community in Italy is a border-area national minority in the traditional sense of the term, as it acquired the minority status in the process of nation-state formation in the Upper Adriatic from the second half of the 19th century onwards. Its traditional settlement area in the Friuli Venezia Giulia (FVG) region covers a total of 39 municipalities along the border with Slovenia. From a formal point of view, according to the list of municipalities drawn up on the basis of the State Protection Law 38/2001, the presence of this community is documented in a narrower territory of 32 municipalities in the provinces of Gorizia/Gorica, Trieste/Trst and Udine/Videm/Viden in the areas of Benecia/Benečija, Resia/Rezija and Val Canale/Kanalska dolina. There are various legal provisions regulating this community's minority rights deriving from the post-war international agreements and recent Italian laws. Among these, the most relevant is Law 38/2001 regarding the protection of the Slovene linguistic minority which regulates the different areas of interest related to the public use of the Slovene language and the Slovene medium and bilingual Slovene-Italian educational system in Italy. Slovenes in the provinces of Trieste/Trst, Gorizia/Gorica and Udine/Videm/Viden have established a thriving network of activities, institutions and associations which focus mainly on cultural and sports activities in the framework of professional institutions or in grassroots associations, parishes and other centres. A system of Slovene-language state schools has been set up in the provinces of Trieste/Trst and Gorizia/Gorica and a bilingual school centre in S. Pietro al Natisono/Špeter in the province of Udine/Videm/Viden. Media communication in Slovene takes place at the level of public radio and television within the regional headquarters of Italy's national public broadcasting company RAI and through various forms of print and online media.
- ³ On the basis of Article 10 of Regional Law No. 26/2007 on the protection of the Slovene national community, the Autonomous Region of FVG organises a Regional Conference on the Protection of the Slovene Linguistic Minority at least once every five years. Convened by the President of the Regional Council, the conference aims to provide a platform for the representatives of various minority organizations and provincial representatives to exchange views on the implementation of the measures stipulated by the protective Regional Law No. 26/2007. The conference was first held in October 2012. See Čok and Janežič (2014) for the topics covered at the first Regional Conference on the Protection of the Slovene Linguistic Minority.
- ⁴ To preserve confidentiality, respondents' names have been replaced with a number (e.g., Respondent No. #).
- ⁵ The aim of the study was to gather data on the minority perspective on the issue at hand for the purposes of the Second Regional Conference on the Protection of the Slovene Linguistic Minority. Therefore, interviews were conducted mainly with representatives of the minority. However, additional external respondents (such as representatives from institutions in Italy and Slovenia dealing with minority issues) would represent an added value to the study and will be considered as an additional source for future research.
- ⁶ Only a few countries have established reserved seats or communal rolls for minorities, whereas others use a lower electoral threshold for national minorities (Žagar 2017). In Slovenia, the National Assembly is composed of 90 MPs and two MPs are representatives of the so-called historical national minorities - Hungarians and Italians, through a system of double voting rights for minority members. A similar system applies to the Roma community at the local level. In Croatia, the political representation of national minorities is guaranteed by law in the parliament and in the bodies of local and territorial self-government. The Act on the Election of Representatives to the Croatian Sabor establishes that the representatives of 22 national minorities elect 8 representatives in a separate constituency: the members of national minorities that represent more than 1.5 per cent of the total population of Croatia are guaranteed at least one and not more than three seats, whereas the minorities that represent less than 1.5 per cent elect at least four representatives of all national minorities (cumulatively) (Ombudsman of the Republic

of Croatia 2005, Alionescu 2004, Jakešević et al. 2015). In Romania, minorities have been generally well represented, through both proportional representation and reserved seats, which proved to be essential in allowing minorities to secure their representation in parliament. The demographically large Hungarian minority has been consistently successful in gaining representation through proportional representation, whereas smaller minority groups have benefited from provisions on reserved seats (Protsyk 2010; Braun 2016). In some countries some members of parliament (MPs) belonging to a minority group manage to get elected as representatives of nationwide political parties (Alionescu 2004). Moreover, in countries where ethnic parties are forbidden (e.g. Turkey), this is the only form of parliamentary representation possible for minorities (Alionescu 2004).

- ⁷ The Presidency of the Province of South Tyrol has a German President for the first half of the mandate and an Italian one for the second half. Both of them can be replaced by a Ladin President. The Presidency consists of the President and two Vice-Presidents each of which belongs to another linguistic community. The composition of the provincial government must reflect the language or the ethnic composition of the provincial parliament, and only the Ladin community may be proportionally over-represented in the provincial government.
- ⁸ For a comprehensive explanation of the Danish-German model see Becker-Christensen (2014).
- ⁹ The Head of the Secretariat is also always a member of the Contact Commission that negotiates on matters concerning the German minority. It consists of the Minister of Education, the Minister of the Economy and the Minister of the Interior, a representative of each party in the Parliament and three members of minority organizations.
- ¹⁰ The German Federal Government in Berlin also appoints a Commissioner dealing with minorities – the Commissioner for Emigration and Minority Issues.
- ¹¹ Italy has a government led by the Five Stars political movement and the Lega party. The Autonomous Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia is led by a governor from the Lega party.
- ¹² There is no data on which to differentiate the votes in the provinces of Trieste/Trst, Gorizia/Gorica and Udine/Videm/Viden according to the ethnicity of voters (Janežič 2004). The mentioned trends can be extrapolated considering the electoral results in the 32 municipalities where the Slovene speaking community lives. The electoral results show that in some traditionally left or centre-left areas votes switched to contemporary political movements and right or centre-right parties, and also that there was lower participation in elections. Moreover, for the first time since 1964 the Slovene left-wing political candidate was not elected to the regional parliament in Friuli Venezia Giulia (Tence 2018). The candidate of the ethnic party Slovene Union (Slovenska skupnost) was elected, but also this party lost votes compared with regional elections in 2008 and 2013 (Gabrovec 2018; Verč 2018).
- ¹³ For more details concerning the number and allocation of elected representatives to municipalities see Vidau (2016b; 2017b). However, recent legal reforms of the Italian public administration at national and regional levels reduced the level of the participation of Slovene representatives in decision-making processes as the Provinces of Trieste/Trst and Gorizia/Gorica which had their own provincial governments with elected Slovene representatives, were abolished (Vidau 2017c).
- ¹⁴ Left-wing political representatives support political action within the framework of Italian left-wing and centre-left parties, in the form of separate sections and through Slovene candidates. On the other hand, the Slovene Union advocates a model of political participation through a single party and political autonomy on the basis of ethnicity (Valenčič 2000, 188).
- ¹⁵ This practice was introduced in the 1970s, when the adoption of the law on the protection of the Slovene national minority in Italy became a transversal policy objective among Slovene politicians, which also triggered the need for a unified political approach to the Italian authorities (Stranj 1992).

- ¹⁶ For more details see also Vidau (2016b; 2017b).
- ¹⁷ On the basis of the Protection Law No. 38/2001, the Institutional Parity Committee for the Problems of the Slovene Minority has been established, which is responsible for the implementation of the mentioned law.
- ¹⁸ For more details about the Slovene language in Italy see Brezigar (2007), Čok and Jagodic (2013), Grgič (2016a; 2016b), Kaučič-Baša (1997), Mezgec (2012; 2016), Vidau (2014; 2015),
- ¹⁹ For more details about identity among Slovenes in Italy see Brezigar (2015), Pertot (2011; 2016; 2017), Pertot and Kosic (2014), Vidau (2018) and Zuljan Kumar (2016).
- ²⁰ For a detailed analysis concerning the various sectors of activity of the Slovene community in Italy in the last 25 years see Bogatec (2004; 2015) and Bogatec and Vidau (2016; 2017).
- ²¹ The Slovene national community in Italy gives the appearance of an anachronistic community that has failed to evolve structurally and ideologically after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and Yugoslavia (Bajc 2008; Klabjan 2008). Thus, the actual effectiveness of the system of the ideological division of Slovene organisations and institutions under the aegis of the two umbrella organisations has been at the forefront of public debate in the Slovene national community in Italy particularly since the beginning of the 21st century. It seems that the minority has not completed its process of “democratisation” in terms of bridging ideological duality or searching for organisational solutions that would respond to the need to operate in the contemporary society (Vidali 2008).

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The Intersection of Critical Emancipatory Peacebuilding and Social Enterprise: A Dialogical Approach to Social Entrepreneurship

The authentic inclusion of members of ethnic minority groups in positive peacebuilding projects allows such groups to develop economic, political, and social capacities essential to their achieving autonomy at the subnational level. This article presents an approach to peacebuilding based on a dialogical theory of action that ensures that the lowest local actors are authentically represented in peacebuilding projects. We develop a dialogical approach to social entrepreneurship that allows for the authentic inclusion of local actors alongside external actors and implementation of a social entrepreneurship project that allows for cooperative involvement. Upon evaluation and in consultation with local actors, the exact form of social entrepreneurship suitable for the community is determined and implemented.

Keywords: ethnic minority autonomy, social entrepreneurship, dialogical theory, positive peacebuilding.

Presek kritičnega emancipatornega utrjevanja miru in socialnega podjetništva: dialoški pristop h socialnemu podjetništvu

Avtentično vključevanje pripadnikov manjšinskih etničnih skupnosti v pozitivne projekte utrjevanja miru tem skupnostim omogoča razvoj ekonomskih, političnih in socialnih kapacitet, ki so bistvenega pomena za njihovo doseganje avtonomije na subnacionalni ravni. Članek predstavlja pristop h krepitvi miru, temelječ na dialoški teoriji akcije, ki tudi najnižjim lokalnim akterjem zagotavlja avtentično zastopnost v mirovnihi projektih. Razvijamo dialoški pristop h socialnemu podjetništvu, ki omogoča avtentično vključevanje lokalnih akterjev skupaj z zunanjihi akterji in implementacijo projekta socialnega podjetništva, ki omogoča kooperativno delovanje. Evalvacija in posvetovanje z lokalnimi sodelavci omogočata implementacijo socialnega podjetništva, primernege za določeno skupnost.

Ključne besede: avtonomija etničnih manjšin, socialno podjetništvo, dialoška teorija, pozitivno utrjevanje miru.

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1. Introduction

This article develops a dialogical approach to social entrepreneurship that allows for the authentic inclusion of local actors alongside external actors during projects designed to create structures of positive peace (the absence of cultural, structural, and direct violence or the promotion of social justice) in multiethnic states. This initial statement brings to the fore three important concepts whose usage in this article must be clarified: local actors, authentic inclusion and dialogical approaches. The term local actors as used in this article refers to the members of minority ethnic groups who social entrepreneurship programs are targeted at. This means that external actors are usually the majority ethnic groups seeking to empower such minority ethnic groups, although external actors could also include other national or international actors willing to facilitate peaceful relations in multiethnic states. By using the phrase authentic inclusion, we mean the process in which local actors – representative of the ethnic minority group population – participate genuinely in the process of developing the context-specific social entrepreneurship approach. This is a process in which not just local elites are consulted, but concrete efforts are made to ensure that those the social entrepreneurship is targeted at are truly involved in its design. The idea of dialogical approaches mentioned throughout this study was adopted because it describes inclusive processes, in which external actors and local actors are authentically involved in the development and implementation of a project. Dialogical approaches allow external actors to provide assistance, while also empowering local actors who are typically left out of such processes to create context specific social entrepreneurship projects.

We argue in the next four sections that this dialogical approach is an important step towards ethnic minority autonomy because it allows minority ethnic groups, particularly those who constitute national minorities, to develop economic, political, and social capacities essential to their achieving autonomy at the subnational level. Ethnic minority autonomy in this study, refers to an approach carried out within a multiethnic state to promote social cohesion (improve inter-ethnic relations) by allowing minority groups to independently arrange their affairs at the subnational level (Bühlmann & Hänni 2012). The analysis of social entrepreneurship in this study is based on the assumption that the development of economic autonomy through a dialogical approach to social entrepreneurship is an important first step towards accomplishing this ethnic minority autonomy.

The article begins by outlining the dominant peacebuilding approach in the international system, namely liberal peacebuilding, and considers how its focus on economic liberalization can produce unequal economic relations that undermines peacebuilding and stimulates interethnic conflict. The second section considers how liberal peacebuilding approaches have fared in attempts to ensure local ownership of peacebuilding processes. This is contrasted with

the human security and dialogical approaches to ensuring the authentic involvement of local actors. The third section reviews the general idea of social entrepreneurship and provides examples of how social entrepreneurship projects have been carried out in the frames of potentially building positive peace or social justice. The final section applies the dialogical approach to peacebuilding to social entrepreneurship to develop a hybrid model that allows for the authentic inclusion of both local and external actors in peacebuilding projects.

2. (Neo)liberal Peacebuilding and Economic Inequality

The dominant peacebuilding approach adopted in the international system by Western states and international institutions is the liberal peace approach, which is alternatively described as the democratic peace or “neoliberal peace” (Chandler 2017). The approach is so described because it is based on the belief that the liberal democratic state with its primary features of democracy, human rights, security, individual freedom, and economic liberalization is the best way of organizing a state and is the solution to the challenges faced by post peace accord or conflict-prone states such as multi-ethnic states (Selby 2008, Pugh 2011). Hence, it is important to consider the underpinning ideals of liberal democracies, which are spread during international neoliberal peacebuilding endeavors.

There is a tense, antithetical relationship between capitalism and democracy, which are the economic and political systems that exist within liberal democracies. The contradiction between both systems is such that the political equality derived from the rights of citizens to participate in the democratic election of their leaders is virtually negated by the economic inequality that typically results from unfettered economic liberalization (Mac Ginty 2013). This condition is mostly a result of how the liberal democratic system emerged in Western states. Western liberal democracies started as liberal capitalist states, where it was the role of the government to protect the rights of the citizens, particularly the rights of the wealthy, propertied class to own their property (Louw 2010). This was a system of both economic and political inequality, and due to struggles by the working class and other external factors such as divisions within the ruling class, the right to vote was extended to non-propertied classes as nationalism was used in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to prevent a united working class revolution in Europe (Macpherson 2011; Therborn 1977).

The democratic right to vote, at least in rhetoric, took away political inequality, yet the economic inequality inherent in capitalism remained, such that workers retain only a fraction of the profit made from the goods they produced and the owners of the means of production keep the rest (Elson 2000). This form of inequality is an essential part of capitalism considered to be critical

to economic development because it encourages innovation and productivity (Richmond 2014). In the neoliberal era, there has been an increased push for the continuation and intensification of this state of affairs. Neoliberalism is a worldview embodying both a political philosophy and an economic theory, based on the assumption that market economies produce roughly efficient economic outcomes when they are without government intervention (Palley 2012). It has been the dominating worldview in most western states since the emergence of the neoliberal era in the 1980s (Evans & Smith 2015; Mair 2013; Thiessen & Byrne 2017).

A primary neoliberal policy is the push for economic liberalization and unfettered markets, which is considered the best macroeconomic strategy because it supposedly allows for the development of factors critical to economic growth; competition, entrepreneurship, and innovation (Harvey 2005). Hence, neoliberalism is promoted by international development and financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which ensure that weaker states adopt neoliberal policies like rolling back on the welfare state and privatizing public institutions before they are provided aid (Duffield 2010). These neoliberal policies are promoted within the liberal peace approach, which ignores the economic, class, and ethnic inequities that results from policies of economic neoliberalization. While the inequality produced by such policies may be mitigated in Western societies by the state's ability to provide substantial social welfare services to poorer citizens, this is not the case in poorer, multi-ethnic and/or potentially fragile states, where capitalist tensions may be inflamed by ethnic hatred (Selby 2008). When these neoliberal peace approaches ignore the inequality they produce, in which specific ethnic groups and classes benefit more than the others, this can hinder the peacebuilding process negatively, either by leading to the start of entirely new conflicts, or at the very least, resulting in citizens' apathy and disillusion with the system when they realize it only works in the favor of elites (Pugh 2011; Smith 2010; Selby 2008). Economic inequalities engendered by neoliberal ideals of unburdened economic liberalization have resulted in interethnic conflict in several states (Chua 2003). Such conflict is contrary to the claims of those organizations and institutions that support the export of neoliberal free market ideals and democracy across the world, based on the belief that the prosperity generated by this system will bring an end to all forms of intergroup conflict, including interethnic conflict (Chua 2003).

3. Authentic Inclusion of Local Actors in Peacebuilding

The previous section has considered how neoliberal peacebuilding approaches breed inequality or at the very least, ignore it. This section considers why the authentic inclusion of local actors is essential in building ethnic minority auto-

nomy; analyzes how neoliberal peacebuilding has fared in its attempts at inclusive peacebuilding; and contrast this with the human security and dialogical approaches to local ownership of peacebuilding projects. The purpose is to lay the background for the development of a dialogical model of social entrepreneurship that facilitates the authentic involvement of external and local actors. Often local resistance and resiliency is to counter the power politics of local elites that marginalize certain ethnic groups or other groups like LGBTQ2*, youth, women, and people living with disabilities as it is to resist Global North actors (Paffenholz 2015; Byrne, Mizzi & Hansen 2018).

Bühlmann and Hänni (2012) identify two distinct ways by which a multi-ethnic state can address concerns of decreasing social cohesion: (1) the inclusion of an ethnic minority into political institutions at the national level, by allowing them to gain representation in these institutions; and (2) the provision of autonomy to ethnic minorities, by encouraging them to independently arrange their affairs at the subnational level. They find the latter to be the most effective of the two approaches because it permits ethnic minorities who have gained autonomy within a given state to develop a sense of belonging within the state and be more invested in its survival. While the distinction between both approaches is important, they can also be brought together, such that the authentic inclusion of members of ethnic minorities within their societies (at the subnational level) can allow these groups to develop economic, political and social capacities essential to their achieving autonomy at the subnational level. Inclusion can be created by the way that social capital and cohesion is created within the ethnic minority groups, thereby improving their ability to independently arrange their affairs at the subnational level, that is, to gain autonomy. The combination of inclusion and autonomy is also capable of improving interethnic relations, in the same way that it improves intraethnic relations (Lijphart 1999).

4. The Liberal Peacebuilding Approach to Local Ownership

Liberal approaches to peacebuilding tend to focus on building state capacity by developing economic, political, and social institutions through top-down policies and processes (Richmond & Franks 2009). Peacebuilding of this form is typically carried out through state institutions, either because the government is considered neutral or simply because it is easier to function through previously existing institutions (Duffield 2010; Burke 2012). This is problematic particularly in situations where marginalized ethnic minorities are in conflict with the state, and aid organizations and other actors can only function to the extent that the governments allow them, leaving them to continue to perpetuate the marginalization of those who have already been diminished by the state (Burke 2012). This is the political corollary of neoliberal economic approaches

that emphasize free market ideals as the path to economic development, while ignoring those who have continued to suffer high levels of poverty in spite of the purported economic growth associated with neoliberal policies. Evidently, this affects the efficiency and sustainability of the peacebuilding process, as those who feel excluded from the process may try their best to sabotage the process and ensure its failure.

The nature of neoliberal peacebuilding is such that external actors who fund these projects such as the World Bank, western states and international NGO's tend to impose their ideas of what peacebuilding entails, with little or no input from local actors (Murtagh 2016; Galtung 1996). This usually results in the development of approaches that do not address the systemic issues that gave rise to conflict in the first place. This is not to say liberal peacebuilding approaches have not tried to create local ownership of peacebuilding projects. The renewed interest in the local has been described as the "local turn" in peacebuilding, in which external actors have indicated an interest in involving local actors based on the belief that local ownership, makes for sustainable peacebuilding projects (Kappler 2015). However, interventions that have sought to maintain local ownership in Rwanda (Hasselskog & Schierenbeck 2015), Guinea Bissau (Kohl 2015), Guinea (Arandel et al. 2015) and Afghanistan (Thiessen 2013) have failed to do so, and end up being controlled by elites at the international, national and local levels, with little or no input from the locals. The situation is the same, if not worse in cases where the involvement of the local is not an explicitly stated objective of the project like in Northern Ireland (Creary & Byrne 2014; Hyde & Byrne 2015; Senehi 2002, 2009; Kahn & Byrne 2016) or in South East Asia (Burke 2012). Hence, the so-called local turn in liberal international peacebuilding is considered to be mostly rhetoric, and external actors tend to dominate such processes with aid, technology, bureaucracy, rules, and knowledge.

Even in situations where external actors have attempted to revive traditional practices of the local community for use in peacebuilding, they are transformed in such a way that they become virtual creations of external peacebuilders and can no longer be considered traditional (Mac Ginty 2008). External actors barely have contact with local actors, and the uncommitted spaces, – neutral locations like hotels, supermarkets, and restaurants – where the expatriates mingle typically do not admit local actors and/or are priced beyond their reach (Kohl 2015). Yet, when such externally controlled peacebuilding projects fail, the blame is usually placed on local recipients (Galtung 1996; Paffenholz 2015).

5. Local Ownership in Theories of Human Security and Dialogical Action

A human security approach focuses on how an equitable and inclusive peace that identifies and addresses the specific needs of individual members of a

community can be developed (Newman 2011). Instead of the state-building method employed in liberal peacebuilding approaches, where the focus is on improving state capacity through policies of economic liberalization, and a human security approach suggests that, “public policy must be directed above all at enhancing the personal security, welfare, and dignity of individuals and communities” (Newman 2011, 1749). It seeks to ensure that the needs of all community members, and not just the elite, are met by reforming structures or institutions that promote “social and political exclusion, horizontal inequalities or structural violence,” which may lead to conflict if unchecked (Newman 2011, 1750). In sum, a human security approach considers issues of inequality, typically present in multiethnic societies where minority groups are clamoring for autonomy, and ensures peacebuilding produces equitable outcomes felt even at the bottom of society. A dialogical approach ensures that the process of carrying this out is inclusive.

Paulo Freire’s (1970) seminal text, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, is a useful resource that highlights the components of an inclusive theory of dialogical action, in which external actors and local actors are jointly involved in the development and implementation of a project. A dialogical process requires the authentic involvement of both parties to succeed. To avoid the pitfalls experienced by liberal peacebuilding attempts to create local ownership, the four elements of Freire’s (1970) dialogical theory – cooperation, unity for liberation, organization, and cultural synthesis – can serve as important guiding principles. This section presents an overview of these principles, and how they apply to the model of inclusive social entrepreneurship developed in this article is explored in subsequent sections. Cooperation is the coming together of both the external and internal actors in the process of addressing structural problems, and this must be done “with, and not for” the local actors, as their authentic involvement is critical to their gaining their humanity (Freire 1970, 48). This calls for a dialogue between both groups, where external actors initiate a process of reflection on the issues under consideration alongside the local actors in authentic ways, and by so doing gain their cooperation and commitment to the success of whatever project is subsequently carried out.

The second element of Freire’s dialogical theory is unity for liberation. The reflection upon the situation and the ways transformative change can be achieved must be carried out as a cooperative endeavor, and not in an individualistic manner (Freire 1970). The process of dialogue, reflection and action helps to bring together members of the community and creates a sense of solidarity amongst them that they are all actively involved in, and work together to bring meaningful change to their community. The third element of Freire’s dialogical theory is organization, which is a natural development of unity, as the external actors cooperate with the local actors to determine the best step to take. This involves doing what it takes to make sure the lowest local voices are heard such as frequenting uncommitted spaces where they can be found (e.g. Kohl 2015).

The fourth element of Freire's dialogical theory is cultural synthesis, where the perspectives from external and internal actors merged together to produce the best course of action (see Lederach's 1995 discussion of descriptive and elicitive peacebuilding approaches and the roles of insider-partials and outsider-impartials). Such an approach allows external actors to address material inequalities by providing funding and other assistance that stimulate existing local capacities and ensure "consensus, egalitarianism and community-oriented governance" (Richmond 2014, 461). Since it is a dialogical process, meaning that both the external and local actors are involved in this process of decisionmaking, suggestions on what needs to be done brought up by the external actors is not an imposition. A more emancipatory approach to peacebuilding is one that combines "international approaches and consensus for peace /.../ (with) localized dynamics for peace" (Richmond & Franks 2009, 183).

It has been suggested that emancipatory approaches such as these are too ambitious to fit into the current liberal peacebuilding agenda because the change they require is too drastic (e.g. Newman 2011; Lederach 1995). However, the fact that an approach is emancipatory does not mean that the kind of change it wishes to create is unattainable within the current liberal peacebuilding framework. Perhaps the meaning ascribed to emancipation can make the difference; emancipation in this context can be seen as the process where the individuals and communities which peacebuilding is targeted at are involved in the peacebuilding process in authentic ways (Paffenholz 2015). Elements of this can be seen in projects like the Theatre of Witness (Sepinuck 2014), the Forgiveness project (Cantacuzino 2016), and in work done with survivors of trauma (Denborough 2008) especially when multiethnic societies continue to suffer from "transgenerational trauma" (Volkan 1998) or continuing stress disorder from the legacy of colonization like residential schools, genocide, and famine (Byrne et al. 2018; Byrne 2017; Rahman et al. 2017; Clarke & Byrne 2017). While these projects are on a relatively smaller scale and are handled by only a few external actors, they show that success is possible.

The first step in carrying out any form of dialogical peacebuilding is a form of evaluation described by Freire (1970) as thematic investigation (peace inventory, and a conflict assessment), which is carried out by external actors with local actors, to understand the specifics of the situation in the recipient communities. This investigation allows the external actors to understand the situation from the people's perspective, and to identify the community's capacities, which can be built upon (Smith 2010). This does not mean investigators go in blind and donors do not know what they are funding. Prior research by external actors may have revealed some specific concerns/themes, the thematic investigation carried out with the local actors will reveal if this is an accurate representation of their challenges, and themes can be added and/or removed as necessary (e.g. Richmond 2010). Guidelines for carrying out such an extensive evaluation

of local experiences through ethnographic research has been documented elsewhere (e.g. Millar 2014). Determining the specific people who constitute local actors is also important, and it is important to define exactly whom the local is, to ensure that the process is not coopted by national or even local elites (Hasselskog & Schierenbeck 2015; Paffenholz 2015). One-way to do this is to define the local as the “specific population to which the project itself claims to provide experiences” (Millar 2014, 82).

6. Positive Peacebuilding through Social Entrepreneurships

This section examines the concept and practice of social entrepreneurship and determines the extent to which it allows for the form of authentic inclusion of the community members discussed above. The social economy is made up of organizations engaged in business activities in order to benefit society, and includes various types of organizations such as cooperatives, social enterprises, and other such triple-bottom-line organizations (Murtagh 2016). Although the structures of these organizations that engage in business for a social purpose varies considerably, there are general principles deemed necessary for these organizations to adhere to. Besides making profit, they should seek to ensure that their activities have positive effects on people and on the environment, a concept known as the “triple-bottom-line” (Bratt 2012). In addition to this concern for people, planet, and profit, is purpose – these organizations should “care for, support and develop the people who are associated with it” including employees, volunteers, beneficiaries and the local community at large (Pearce 2009, 24). It is by doing this that they develop into quadruple-bottom-line organizations.

Social entrepreneurship is a form of organization that exists in the social economy. David Bornstein defines social entrepreneurship as,

.../ [the] process by which citizens build or transform institutions to advance solutions to social problems, such as poverty, illness, illiteracy, environmental destruction, human rights abuses and corruption, in order to make life better for many /.../ [and also provide environments] where entrepreneurs can improve the productive capacity of society and provide the ‘creative destruction’ that propels economic change (Bornstein 2010, 1).

Social entrepreneurs deploy innovative means to “address, mostly with extraordinary success, seemingly unsolvable social problems. They often trigger a bottom-up process, a sort of chain of change, involving and empowering groups or societies as a whole” (Praszkier & Nowak 2011, 503). The empowering, bottom-up feature of social entrepreneurship is one that makes it particularly

suited to the approach promoted in this study that encourages the inclusion of all local actors. Social entrepreneurship provides various opportunities for “vulnerable communities and individuals” to be involved in the process of designing approaches to address the underlying injustice and inequities in their society, such as “cooperative methods and communication, the pooling of resources and physical labor” (Bratberg 2013, 43).

In spite of this inclusive feature of social entrepreneurship, some literature on the subject tends to veer on the individualistic neoliberal side, positioning social entrepreneurs as “passionate and creative individuals” capable of “solving ‘the unsolvable’” structural problems of society (Praszkier et al. 2010, 155). This is likely because this literature is grounded in western Global North frames, and is more focused on recounting the individual experiences of handpicked social entrepreneurs, rather than focusing on the team and community required to accomplish the lauded endeavors (Battle-Anderson & Dees 2006). The problem with individualist accounts of social entrepreneurship is that they can and often do become tools of exclusion; disenfranchising those who may seem not to possess the special skills required of successful social entrepreneurs. This also raises the concern of distinguishing between social entrepreneurship and social enterprise, in which the major difference between the two forms of organization seems to be that the former regards innovation and creativity as essential to addressing social problems. Is innovation essential to creating structural changes in society? While this discussion is beyond the scope of this article, we suggest that social entrepreneurship does not have to be, and indeed should not be positioned as the individualist driven organizations as it tends to be shown as (Praszkier & Nowak 2011; Praszkier et al. 2010). This intellectual honesty is to avoid the trap of neoliberalism, where economic inequality is explained away on the premise of people earning what they morally deserve.

Alvord et al. (2004) have categorized approaches to social entrepreneurship into three groups. They include: (1) the capacity building approach, which involves identifying local actors’ capacity and building on these capacities to solve their problems, for e.g. village groups formed by BRAC; (2) the package dissemination approach, which involves distributing new products (innovations) required by marginalized groups, for e.g. the provision of microcredit loans to individuals for starting or maintaining small-business by Grameen Bank in Bangladesh; and (3) the movement approach, which involves “building a movement that mobilizes grassroots alliances to challenge abusive elites or institutions”, for e.g. the Self-Employed Women Association’s campaigns against police abuse of vendors (Alvord et al. 2004, 270).

The package delivery approach seems best suited to dialogical theory that allows for the authentic involvement of both external and local actors, given the example of microfinance, in which external actors provide small loans to local actors to engage in income generating activities. However, there are very real

concerns with microfinance that need to be explored. International financial institutions (IFIs) and development agencies have championed microfinance since the 1980s as the best way to reduce “poverty and promoting local economic and social development” in weaker countries (Bateman 2008, 246). It is not surprising that the rise of microfinance coincided with the neoliberal era in the 1980s, and was promoted by these institutions; given that its main argument was that if persons were given a little shove (like small loans) in a free market, hardworking, motivated, and gifted individual entrepreneurs would be rewarded by the market (Giroux & Giroux 2008; Palley 2012).

What this has looked like in practice, in places like Bangladesh and South Eastern Europe in the 1980s, was that small loans were given to several individuals to start similar businesses, leading to a proliferation of micro-enterprises within each sector. This happened in the dairy sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where “thousands of poor individuals were encouraged to access microfinance in order to purchase one or two cows and generate a little additional income from the sale of raw milk” (Bateman 2008, 251). Not only was this system unsustainable, in the way that it fragmented the number of available business and income between new and existing micro-enterprises, it actively prevented advancement and progress within sectors, as potentially efficient and already existing business lost a lot of their business (Bateman 2008) because the intra-sector fragmentation led to division amongst those doing the same business. It also hindered the building and development of much-needed social capital that would have been useful in strengthening the sector and creating social cohesion (Pearce 2009). Another outcome, both in Southeastern Europe and Bangladesh was that many who had taken out the loans were worse off and became indebted to microfinance banks either because their businesses failed, like in South-Eastern Europe, or they spent their loans on consumption and income generation like in Bangladesh (Davis 2007; Bateman 2008).

Given these concerns with microfinance, a capacity building approach that is focused on improving local actors’ capacity seems to be a more suitable approach that allows community members to be authentically included in the planning and implementation of economic projects (e.g. Lederach 1997). This approach very much resembles cooperatives, another form of organization in the social economy. Cooperatives possess some features that can help to mitigate the aforementioned individualism that can emerge in social entrepreneurship projects. They allow the form of authentic involvement essential to carrying out this approach and assessed in the following sections. Community based enterprises, also known as cooperatives, are a “range of organizations, which sought to tackle social issues by engaging in trade and which were owned and controlled by the community or the constituency they sought to benefit” (Pearce 2009, 29).

The integrated cooperative financial model successfully employed in regions of Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland as part of the post-World War II reconstruction period provides insights into some advantages a cooperative model of social entrepreneurship may have over a more individualistic one like micro-finance. The cooperative financial organizations in this model were focused on supporting cooperative ventures because it was believed that they possessed the best organizational structure suitable for a post-peace accord society (Bateman 2007). Not only did they allow for an equitable distribution of earnings and social benefits, they also allowed people to be authentically included in the economic process and gain a sense of participation that is “hugely important in establishing a culture of democracy, equity, tolerance, and cooperation outside of the cooperative” (Bateman 2007, 44).

Despite the advantages of cooperatives, there has been a shift away from more cooperative and community based social enterprises, towards privately run organizations in the neoliberal era (Pearce 2009). In spite of this, many community owned social entrepreneurship projects that do not involve external actors function virtually as cooperatives. One such locally owned social entrepreneurship project is Peace Basket, established soon after the Rwandan genocide of 1994, in which the Hutu majority ethnic group sought to eliminate all members of the Tutsi minority ethnic group to gain state power (Bratberg 2013). Polarization between both ethnic groups remained after the genocide, and Peace Basket was established as a poverty alleviation process where extremely poor villagers came together to make and sell traditional weaving baskets (Bratberg 2013). Peace Basket drew members from the Twa, Tutsi, and Hutu ethnic groups, who began building peaceful relationships with those previously considered enemies in the process of making baskets (Sentama 2017). Peace Baskets have not only made visible social impacts as peace symbols, they have also found economic success in domestic and international markets, although there is still room for more productivity (Shange 2015).

The concept of positive peace (social justice) is critical to this discussion because communities undergoing social entrepreneurship, or attempting to build ethnic minority autonomy, have not necessarily undergone violent conflict. Unlike negative peace, which involves bringing an end to direct violence, positive peace is constructed when underlying invisible and hidden structural problems that can create conflict are addressed through the development of stable institutions and conditions that engender peaceful relations (Galtung & Jacobsen 2000). The field of economic peace is interested in promoting positive peace through, “the economic study and design of political, economic, and cultural institutions, their interrelations, and their policies to prevent, mitigate, or resolve any type of latent or actual violence or other destructive conflict within and between societies” (Brauer & Caruso 2013, 151–152). The example of Peace Basket in Rwanda shows how social entrepreneurship can address

tangible economic issues, while also tackling problematic relationships between members of different ethnic groups, which if left unchecked, could result in a resurgence of violent ethnic conflict. By building social capital – “enhancing trust and preparedness for cooperation” – through a gradual process, social entrepreneurship aids in the creation of an environment conducive to peace (Praszkier & Nowak 2011, 502).

7. Dialogical Method of Social Entrepreneurship: A Step Towards Minority Autonomy

The foregoing discussion has suggested that the authentic inclusion of local actors (members of ethnic minorities) is a way of building the social capital and cohesiveness necessary for ethnic minority autonomy and also improving relations between minority and majority ethnic groups. A general model of dialogical action that allows for the authentic participation of both internal and external actors, with a human security approach to peacebuilding, designed to address the everyday needs of individuals and communities, was explored. A more inclusive and participatory approach to social entrepreneurship can be outlined based on this model. The intent is to create an emancipatory approach to peacebuilding that allows both external and local approaches towards peacebuilding to be represented (Richmond & Franks 2009). In the context of social entrepreneurship, the overarching social enterprise model designed to facilitate cooperative involvement would be the approach promulgated by external actors, and upon consultation with local actors, this could be adapted to the local context.

External actors could be from the national and/or international levels, because as Hasselskog & Schierenbeck (2015) show, national ownership is not necessarily the same as local ownership. These external actors hold a substantial amount of the responsibility of ensuring authentic local involvement in such a process, since they will usually control the resources required for carrying out projects. Since the purpose of this process is to achieve ethnic minority autonomy, this suggests that achieving this autonomy may require the assistance of outside donors to be accomplished. This may seem counterintuitive; even in the field of social entrepreneurship reliance on external assistance is generally considered detrimental to the entrepreneur’s autonomy and success. Instead, earned income, the profit from selling goods and services is usually considered the best form of revenue for social entrepreneurs as the end goal because it allows them to be truly independent to accomplish their social purposes (e.g. Boschee & McClurg 2003). Battle-Anderson and Dees have argued, however, that the view taken on donations as an impediment to achieving self-sufficiency may be unfounded, as even businesses surviving on earned income are never fully independent; they must depend on buyers to purchase their goods or services,

“suppliers for key inputs, on labor markets for talent, and often on bankers or investors for capital” (Battle-Anderson & Dees 2006, 147). Generally speaking, however, in order to be labeled as a social enterprise, the organization must be at least organizationally structured so as to generate financially sustainable practices (Schwab & Milligan 2015).

Funding from external actors such as banks, individual angel investors, governmental grants, and private companies can and are frequently used to stabilize the economic state of a community start-up, or a business, providing a necessary springboard for such an entity to become self-sufficient. For example, this has been realized in practice with BRAC, an organization in Bangladesh that engages in development activities, which has attained self-sufficiency in the sense that its earnings are greater than the donations it receives. While it was solely dependent on grants when it was launched, the organization’s 2016 report shows that only 17.4 per cent of BRAC’s total income was from donor grants (BRAC 2017). A similar situation was observed in the integrated cooperative system adopted as part of peacebuilding in post-war regions of Italy and Spain (Mondragon corporation), where cooperative enterprises that started out reliant on external funding became so self-sufficient that they could develop a fund to assist the development of new cooperatives (Bateman 2007). These examples suggest that even if social enterprises, and the ethnic minorities employing them as a route to achieving autonomy take donations in from development assistance at first, this will not prevent them from ultimately gaining self-sufficiency.

Having established that external assistance is not a barrier, and is often a necessary step to achieving autonomy, a dialogical approach to social entrepreneurship can represent, “a site of economic and political action to rework, restructure, and even remove the oppressive effects of neoliberalism” (Murtagh 2016, 120). This is best accomplished in a situation where local actors are able to have a say in how projects can be designed in ways that are beneficial to the community and its members, and not just in allowing the free market markets and local elites to determine economic and political processes. Battle-Anderson and Dees (2006) have noted that social enterprises should not be restricted to any specific form of organization, and each project should choose the form best suited to their social purpose. Hence, at least for the purpose of creating an inclusive process to accomplish ethnic minority autonomy, a dialogical approach to social entrepreneurship that involves the authentic involvement of internal and external actors seems useful.

The process of determining context-specific social entrepreneurship based on the interactions of local actors with external actors follows the dialogical approach. It also follows best-practices for social enterprise market research (Homan 2011). For example, interviews and focus groups conducted with local actors representing various subsets of the society can be used to elicit concrete suggestions on what programs the social entrepreneurship program should be

centred on, and surveys can be used to confirm that these views are shared by other members of the community and do not represent only the experiences of a select few. In such a dialogical approach, the general measures of social entrepreneurship are amended to address local needs and create appropriate structures or institutions in that context.

The four elements of Freire's (1970) dialogical theory – cooperation, unity for liberation, organization and cultural synthesis – highlighted earlier are also reflected in the dialogical approach to social entrepreneurship. This principle of cooperation between the external and local actors is reflected; external actors come to the local actors with a general idea of social entrepreneurship and how it can help to accomplish equitable economic development and create social capital if appropriately designed to suit their context. This cooperative endeavor creates internal unity for liberation among the members of the ethnic minority, a process that favors the goal of achieving minority autonomy. The principle of organization allows local voices to be authentically included, but is also mediated by external actors who bring the financial resources and professional understanding of how the overarching social entrepreneurship model works to the local group. As Freire puts it, “the fact that the leaders (external actors) do not have the right to arbitrarily impose their word does not mean that they must take a liberalist position, which would encourage license among the people (local actors)” (Freire 1970, 178). Cultural synthesis, which seeks to bring together the views of both external and local actors, is the essence of this model. It is a synthesis of the generally established way of doing social entrepreneurship with context and culture specific values and methods.

Organizations that seek to accomplish social purposes, like social enterprises, are already associated with the concept of subsidiarity; the idea that those at the bottom of society should be involved in making decisions that affect their communities, and that, “power is only delegated upwards when there is a clear benefit from doing so and when the community is agreed it is for the best” (Pearce 2009, 25). Following a dialogical approach may best serve as the most stable and concrete path by which social enterprises, particularly those that are externally funded, can fulfill the principle of subsidiarity. The local ownership of positive peacebuilding that emerges from this allows for a sustainable peace not only within ethnic minorities, but in their relationships with other ethnic groups at the national and international level because people are interested in seeing the success of peace processes they were part of.

One of the challenges encountered in attempts to ensure local ownership in liberal peacebuilding approaches is that because intervention by external actors is not “value-free /.../ it is difficult to propose a way forward for international peacebuilding because it will always be a form of intervention by powerful actors in weaker societies” (Newman 2011, 1747). A dialogical approach to social entrepreneurship does not call for the external actors to suspend their values or

ideas of what social entrepreneurship looks like, or of the goals it should seek to accomplish. It is unrealistic to think that donors would give economic resources to projects that they know nothing about, and which will be determined entirely by the recipients. Instead, the idea inherent in the word dialogical is that there is a general understanding or framework of what social entrepreneurship looks like, and this is combined with the local context specific intervention. For example, Praszkie et al. (2010) argue that context specific social entrepreneurship approaches should be rooted in the culture to be sustainable. However, everyday traditional practices are not inherently good and should be rigorously examined, and if they are not feasible, communities are well capable of adapting to new approaches (Mac Ginty 2008).

8. Conclusion

Liberal peacebuilding approaches that have sought to ensure local ownership of peacebuilding processes, whether in theory or in practice, have faced various challenges (Paffenholz 2015). A dialogical approach to social entrepreneurship provides a means by which social enterprise projects can allow for the authentic inclusion of local actors, while also allowing external actors to have their inputs in the development of such projects. Inclusion of members of minority ethnic groups in such projects allows for the development of economic, political, and social capacities needed to achieve autonomy at the subnational level. Such inclusion can be implemented using simple tools like surveys, interviews, and focus groups to elicit suggestions from local actors representing various subsets of the society on the specific programs the social entrepreneurship project should focus on. This can then develop into more context specific forms of inclusion.

The simplistic presentation of such a dialogical model of social entrepreneurship, nonetheless, indicates that there are potential challenges that would arise in the application of such an approach. One such challenge is that the power to allow the approach to truly involve local actors in authentic ways lies substantially with the external actors because they provide most of the financial resources and expertise. Also, given its set up, it may take a substantial amount of time and patience for the model to begin to show results, and external actors like aid organizations or national bureaucrats may not have these in abundance. Another related issue involves creating efficient strategies to ensure that local, and where applicable, national elites do not take control of the process, excluding those at the bottom of society. Nonetheless, external actors who embrace these challenges and desire to see the sustainable peace that comes with local ownership of peacebuilding projects, may be willing to give the necessary time and energies to ensure the success of a dialogical approach to social entrepreneurship, or any other form of positive peacebuilding (Özdem 2014). This is especially so for national governments in multi-ethnic states seeking to regain the loyalty of

minority ethnic groups by allowing them to independently arrange their affairs at the subnational level.

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Jan Brousek

The Concept of Peace Region as Alternative to (Traditional) Political Autonomy: Experiences from the Project Building the Peace Region Alps-Adriatic

The point of departure are experiences from a dialogue project aimed to contribute to the development of a Peace Region Alps-Adriatic (PRAA) by attempts to reveal and overcome the deep-rooted historic conflict lines between the various minority and majority populations in that specific geographical area. Such a concept of peace region can prove a strategy for the inclusion and integration of national minorities. It can reduce secessionist tendencies by establishing a framework which serves as an alternative to (traditional forms of) autonomy. The task of such a framework of a peace region is to enable the coexistence of autonomous or alternative (historical) narratives to the dominant (nation-based) mainstream narrative(s). By doing so, the concept of peace region can also act as a basis for the realization of further economic and political cross-border cooperation.

Key words: autonomy, dialogue, inclusion, integration, minorities, peace region, Alps-Adriatic.

Koncept mirovne regije kot alternativa (tradicionalni) politični avtonomiji: izkušnje projekta oblikovanja Mirovne regije Alpe Jadran

Izhodišče so izkušnje dialoškega projekta o razvoju mirovne regije Alpe-Jadran. Odkriva in poskuša presegati globoko zakoreninjene razlike, delitve, različne interpretacije in konflikte med večinskimi in manjšinskimi populacijami v tej regiji. Takšen koncept mirovne regije predstavlja strategijo za vključevanje in integracijo narodnih manjšin ter strategijo proti secesionističnim tendencam. Pri tem presega tradicionalne oblike pravno utemeljene avtonomije z vzpostavitvijo družbenega okvira, ki predstavlja možno alternativo tradicionalnim oblikam avtonomije. V tem okviru mirovna regija omogoča sobivanje avtonomnih in/ali alternativnih (zgodovinskih) naracij, ki so drugačne od prevladujočih naracij, utemeljenih na narodu oz. naciji. Na ta način koncept mirovne regije predstavlja tudi temelj za uresničevanje in razvoj prihodnjega ekonomskega in političnega čezmejnega sodelovanja.

Ključne besede: avtonomija, dialog, vključevanje, integracija, manjšine, mirovna regija, Alpe-Jadran.

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1. Introduction: The Text's Context¹

A hundred years after the end of World War I and nearly eighty years after the outbreak of World War II, we face a situation in which the project of European integration is questioned in its fundamentals. For the first time, we are confronted with the factum that a country is about to leave the EU; which is even worse regarding the fact that the imminent Brexit could still take place in the form of a hard exit – with unpredictable consequences for both sides.

Such developments are – not only but – not least due to the ideological exploitation of the so-called migration crisis of 2015 by populist and most often right wing (oriented) parties across Europe. This has led to a revitalization of old European ideologems, such as xenophobia and islamophobia or antisemitism as well as romaphobia.

Interestingly, after the end of World War I, it was also the migration flows, which led to a radicalisation and finally also escalation of the political situation in Europe. Until now, the beginning of the 21st century, we are still confronted with the cultural heritage of that time. However, so far mainstream politics and public opinion tacitly have shared the assumption that resentments and prejudices, rooted in past conflicts, will gradually disappear. At first sight, this may sound plausible. However, the experience from the Yugoslav Wars shows that simply waiting that the tensions, still present on and under the surface, disappear cannot be sufficient. The change of specific variables of the political system often lead to a breakup of (intra-)national conflicts; especially in the case of collapsing dictatorial systems. Even years after the end of the Yugoslav Wars and the establishment of democratic systems, we can still observe the eruption of unresolved historic conflict lines; e.g. protests against Cyrillic writing on signs in Vukovar, at the Croatian border with Serbia in 2013. As is known, in Austria a similar issue, the so-called Carinthian signpost-dispute, took about 56 years to be settled; without ongoing border issues, as still being the case between the countries of former Yugoslavia. Even after the settlement of the signpost dispute, there are many examples of the younger history in Carinthia which showed how easily such deep-rooted conflicts can escalate, if not properly addressed by a transformation on the level of (collective) attitudes: f.e. the publication of the so-called historian's report *Titos langer Schatten* (Elste & Wadl 2015) in 2015 (about terrorist activities in Carinthia in the 1970s), the discussion about the appointment of headteachers in Carinthia's bilingual regions in 2016, or the revision of the Carinthian state constitution in 2017. This is to say that even though in countries like Austria, which are usually regarded as peaceful and politically stable, violent attitudes regarding historic conflict lines are still present.

Although the emergence of new minorities partly overlays old conflict lines between old (autochthonous) minorities and majority populations (not least in the sense of the creation of new enemies), this does not mean that old conflict lines have been vanished.

The currently discussed independence endeavours of Catalonia are just another example for deep-rooted historic conflict lines, which easily emerge; at least if they get properly triggered by media or politics. Of course, there are also other issues, such as economic ones, which play a crucial role in Catalonia and elsewhere. However, to utterly grasp the intensity of this current conflict formation we have to adequately take into account its historical aspects. In this sense, nobody knows what the consequences of the Brexit, especially regarding the deep-rooted conflict between Ireland and Northern Ireland, will be; albeit in weakened form the same is true for Scotland. It is rather unlikely that questions about how to deal with the Irish border are not going to be mixed up with historical issues. The same applies to the Brexit-phenomenon as a whole. It would not meet the complexity of the Brexit if we did not also take into account the fact that it never really worked out to merge Great Britain with continental Europe in an ideological sense. From a continental European point of view someone could say that Britain, due to its identity as empire, never could fully become (just a) part of the European Union. That would have needed an intensive process of work at the level of collective attitudes on both sides of the English Channel – of course on equal terms.

That is why there is a vital need for new, respectively alternative strategies to cope with such deep-rooted conflicts by transforming the people's collective attitudes – in order to enable constructive ways of dealing with conflicts instead of entrenching oneself in historically ideological positions. A carefully managed, open and inclusive dialogue about the diverse experiences and interpretations of past conflicts can provide the right setting and tools to collectively make sense of the past and its recent effects – beyond exclusivist, nation-based narratives.

Crucial in this context are activities of cross-border cooperation, as Europe's borders are the tangible heritage of its wars and (armed) conflicts of the 20th century as well as older ones. We must not forget that boundaries have been administered by the political caste of the victorious powers; quasi arbitrary without paying (adequately) attention to cultural issues. The emergence of national (autochthonous) minorities has been one of the logical outcome of those new borders; as well as conflicts alongside the new internal ethnical conflict lines.

Already at the beginning of the new millennium, approximately 105 million people, or 14 per cent of the total population of the European continent, belonged to ethnic minorities (see Pan & Pfeil 2002). Past and current migration flows further add to the diversity of Europe. A united and cohesive Europe depends on the recognition of the social, cultural and ethnic diversity of its members, and an inclusive, sustainable management of its cultural heritage of wars. Thus, managing diversity and interethnic relations, as well as dealing with ethnic conflicts have increasingly become important tasks in Europe. The current situation of Europe in general and the European Union in specific can definitely be regarded as a consequence of not having adequately taken into account these tasks.

This paper argues that the endeavour of realizing the vision of Europe as a continent of peace would benefit greatly from continued strengthening of European cross-border cooperation by dialogical initiatives. In this regard, the establishment of transnational regions of peace seem to offer an appropriate means to come to terms with the past and to create conditions for the coexistence, participation and cooperation of all individuals and communities – thus promoting and developing a culture of peace.

2. Point of Departure: The Concept of Peace Region

In order to define the term peace region one could refer to the concept of zones of peace. Although zones of peace often refer to safe zones for the protection of civilians within an armed conflict, it has a multiplicity of uses and definitions:

Many of these zones of peace have aimed to achieve more than just ‘withdrawal’ or ‘mitigation’ of existing conflicts. Some of the more intensive efforts /.../ attempted to create social change, social justice, or social development and to expand the principles of positive peace (Hancock 2010, 496).

Going in the same direction, peace region in this context is understood as the institutionalization of diversity and the successful (cross-border) implementation of strategies for diversity management. The concept of managing diversity is not just about prevention, early warning, management and settlement of present or potential conflicts, but it tries, with the development of human and institutional potentials and resources, to establish an environment which reduces the probability of escalation of conflicts and in the long run stimulates a cooperation with individuals as well as with different communities.

One of the main challenges we face today in creating a region of peace through recognizing and appreciating diversity is to deconstruct the myth of ethnic homogeneity of nation-states, which is still of relevance; not least for the Alps-Adriatic region. The intended outcome of such an endeavour is that existing (ethnic) diversity is perceived as a value that “offers numerous possibilities /.../ which might also constitute comparative advantages of such an environment” (Žagar 2008, 311).

This refers to the need to address the cultural conditions of a peace region by changing the predominant attitude from a culture of war to a culture of peace. The concept of Culture of Peace was developed in the 1980s and 1990s within the context of peace movements. Later it was adopted by the UNESCO as addressing one of the guiding principles of the UNESCO Constitution: “That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed” (UNESCO Constitution 1945). As stated by Elise Boulding, a peace culture is “a culture that promotes peaceable diversity”, including “lifeways, patterns of belief, values, behavior” in order to conclude that

“peaceableness is an action concept, involving a constant shaping and reshaping of understandings, situations, and behaviors in a constantly changing lifeworld, to sustain well-being for all” (Boulding 2000, 1). In this sense, the concept of Culture of Peace refers also to a technique for detecting and analysing implicitly violent patterns of culture, often referred to as cultural (Galtung 1990), symbolic (Saner 1982; Bourdieu 2005) or epistemic (Brunner 2016) violence. However, there is quite a big difference between such concepts as cultural or epistemic violence; and, there are of course also additional aspects of violence to be addressed in the course of building a region of peace, such as structural or systemic violence, referring not least to political and economic dimensions, such as oppression and exploitation (Brousek 2017, 134–186).

In the Alps-Adriatic region, the slogan of a peace region has gained certain attention during the past decades. First propagated by the peace movements of the respective countries, the idea was quickly linked to the co-operation between the provinces, regions and *Länder*, started in a formal way in 1978, with the founding of the then so-called Alps-Adriatic Working Community (now: Alps-Adriatic Alliance).

However, this paper focuses on more recent experiences on the development of such a Peace Region Alps-Adriatic, made in the course of a dialogue project that aimed to contribute to such a region of peace, by attempts to reveal and overcome the deep-rooted historic conflict lines between the various minority and majority populations in that specific geographical region.

The project, started in 2013, was originally named Building the Peace Region Alps-Adriatic (PRAA) – Envisioning the Future by Dealing with the Past. Promoting Open and Inclusive Dialogue and Public Discourse within Austria and Slovenia and between the Countries”² Of course, PRAA focused on a cold conflict which nevertheless has the potential of coming back in some form. The current status as a cold conflict makes it relatively easier to talk about traumata, to speak openly to adversaries on both sides of the border. Furthermore, it gives the chance to work on the still contradicting narratives of the different societal groups. On the other hand, some tasks are more challenging to address, since it may seem less obvious why the past should be dealt with now, in order to bring a better future. It is more difficult to understand that the work for a culture of peace is still necessary; and especially, that there are still some open and many hidden conflicts in the Alps-Adriatic region going on that have to be addressed (see Brousek & Pirker 2016; Graf & Brousek 2014, 2015; Graf et al. 2014).

3. The Focus: The Alps-Adriatic Region as a Microcosm of Europe

In defining the AA-region, one could look to the members of the aforementioned Alps-Adriatic Alliance or back then also called ARGE Alpen Adria. The

Alps-Adriatic Alliance has facilitated more than 600 projects since its establishment in 1978. These projects have not only addressed economic and political but also social, cultural and ethnic as well as pedagogic issues. The founding members were Slovenia and Croatia as well as provinces from Italy, Austria and Germany: Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Veneto, Carinthia, Styria, Salzburg, Upper Austria and Bavaria (see Wohlmuther et al. 2014, 324). Over time, the membership of ARGE Alpen Adria, respectively the Alps-Adriatic Alliance has changed significantly: Firstly, the Italian and German provinces Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Veneto and Bavaria left the ARGE; secondly within Austria, Burgenland joined instead of Salzburg and Upper Austria, and Croatia is not any more member as a state, but in the form of seven – mostly northern – provinces, and finally the Hungarian province of Vas, located at the border with Slovenia and Austria, joined the Alps-Adriatic Alliance (2018).

Those changes within the Alps-Adriatic Alliance make it difficult to define the exact geographical dimensions of the Alps-Adriatic region. Referring to former and current members of the Alps-Adriatic Alliance, the Alps-Adriatic region extends from Croatia in the south, Austria as well as Slovenia and even parts of Hungary in the east, to parts of Italy and Austria in the west and Germany as well as Austria in the north.

In this sense, we could almost talk about an Alpine-Adriatic-Pannonian region. According to the editors of Treatises and Documents, The Journal of Ethnic Studies, an Alpine-Adriatic-Pannonian area comprises “the Alpine arc, the hinterland of the eastern Adriatic and Pannonian Basin”. The editors further specify that “this area includes the following countries: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Germany (especially the southern part), Hungary, Kosovo, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia” (Guidelines for Contributors 2018).

However, it would be nearly impossible, respectively not reasonable to address the various current and historic conflict lines between the several minority and majority groups of such a huge macro-region within one project. Further on, from a geographical point of view, it still remains unclear why to define the Alps-Adriatic-(Pannonian)-region in such a dimension. If Alps-Adriatic region means all the countries touching the Alps or the Adriatic Sea, it is not justifiable why not to include Switzerland and France or Monaco and Liechtenstein. On the other hand, it is not obvious why the Czech Republic should be included in the framework of an Alps-Adriatic-Pannonian-region, as it is neither located at the Adriatic-Sea nor part of the Alpine states and not even part of the Pannonian Basin. If we talk only about the Alps-Adriatic (and not Pannonian) area the same would be true for Hungary. We see that the definition of such areas is usually not only dependent on geographical but also – or even more – on historical aspects. In this sense, it is obvious that all these given definitions make only sense by taking into account that most of them have been part of multi-ethnic states, like the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Otherwise, talking about the Alps-Adriatic region in a strict sense, such a region would only comprise Italy and Slovenia, the only Alpine states with access to the Adriatic Sea. However, still in its smallest definition, the “core” of the Alps-Adriatic region “is located in the so-called ‘three-country corner’, which spreads to cover distances of 20–50 km from the point at which – since 1918 – the countries of Austria, Italy and Slovenia /.../ have converged” (Wohlmuther et al. 2014, 321–322; cf. Moritsch 2001, 13–16; Moritsch 2006, 12). Such a definition makes sense when we regard the historical and political characteristics of that region. Defining such areas beyond borders of nation states, we are always confronted with a mixture of geographical and historical aspects; what makes the situation quite complicated considering the fact that the countries, we are talking about, are historically quite complex and linked to each other. On the other hand, the existing and historically tangible manifoldness of cross-border transactions on different levels is at the same time a precondition for the successful establishment of regions (cf. Deutsch 1972, 102–105).

In order to relate the Alps-Adriatic region to other – geographically more or less precisely defined – regions, we could describe it as the specific and historical region at the crossroads of three European macro-regions: the Danube region, the Alpine region and the Adriatic-Ionian region. This would mainly comprise Austria and Slovenia as well as parts of Croatia and Italy – i.e. the Italian northern region Friuli Venezia Giulia, the Austrian Länder Carinthia and Styria, as well as Slovenia and Croatian Istria. The point that makes this region somehow special, and a role model for other regions at the same time, is its involvement in almost all of Europe’s wars and totalitarian regimes in the 20th century, the presence of all three major linguistic groups in Europe, and still lingering ethno-political tensions. In this sense, the region can be regarded as a microcosm of Europe (cf. Lowe 2014, 249–265).

From a historical point of view, World War I had major impacts on that region. It led to the breakdown of the multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire and therefore to the independence of many peoples. In the Alps-Adriatic and the Balkan region, a new state – the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, later renamed Yugoslavia – emerged, while Italy extended its territory to the North and the East, including German and Slavic language speaking regions. Minority issues and struggles for minority rights were the logical consequence. During the Second World War, Yugoslavia was attacked and occupied by the Nazi and Fascist regimes in 1941 and Slovenia was divided among Italy, Hungary and the former German Reich. Especially in Italy, present-day Austria and Hungary, this quartering of the Slovene people raised political, cultural, and economic questions that still resonate in Slovenia and the broader region, particularly in the neighbouring countries inhabited by Slovene minorities (see Kardelj 1951). After World War II, new frontiers were established between the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (respectively today’s Slovenia) and Italy which led to new tensions, both between the respective governments and in the Alps-Adriatic

region as a whole. The Cold War also had a strong impact on the region, with NATO state Italy, neutral but western-oriented Austria, and non-aligned but communist Yugoslavia. The historically regional conflicts were overlapped by the ideological confrontation between the Eastern and the Western block and the Grey Zone, with non-aligned Yugoslavia in between. Although the geopolitical situation has changed considerably since the end of the Cold War, we are still confronted with the consequences of the First and the Second World War, as well as the Yugoslav War: the emergence of a multiplicity of new nation-states and – as a consequence – the presence of multiple minority groups on the new states' territories. From the German- and Ladin-speakers of South Tyrol (Italy), to the Slovene minority in Carinthia and Styria (Austria) and Italy, as well as the Italian minorities in Slovenia and Croatia, large numbers of peoples not sharing the national language or culture live in the territory of the Alps-Adriatic region. From such a point of view, it becomes evident why borders are often perceived as gaping wounds, or at least as “scars of history”, as Robert Schuman refers to them (AEBR 2011, 3). Therefore, cross-border cooperation represents an important means to heal these wounds or scars of history. In this context, the aim of such a therapy is to transform the meaning of borders from barriers or exclusive symbols of identity to resources, especially in the sense of bridges (cf. O'Dowd 2002). If borders are regarded as bridges, they can even become important resources for building a region of peace and cooperation.

Today, all countries of the narrower Alps-Adriatic region are members of the European Union, and many of them are even linked by formal cross-border cooperation structures such as the European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC 2018) with state borders losing some of their dividing functions. This may facilitate attempts to overcome exclusivist and nation-based interpretations of past conflicts. However, the case-by-case eruption of cold conflicts show that putting the focus on or even reducing legal questions is not sufficient enough to deal with the multitude of conflicting experiences, interpretations, and memories of past conflicts.

4. The Problem: Contradicting Heritage, Memory and Narratives

The past and particularly historical events in the context of wars and armed conflicts are often remembered in completely different ways by different groups. That means, we are still confronted with profoundly contradicting experiences of the past not only between different countries but also within them. Although these different narratives relate to each other and influence each other, there are usually dominant narratives, silencing counter-narratives. Thus, the way we remember the past is always the outcome of negotiation processes. However, these processes are not necessarily open and inclusive. Decisions on how to

interpret and remember the past are rather taken by those in power – f.e. the state. In this sense we can speak about an “authorised heritage discourse” (Smith 2006), which means that such a discourse is coined by power relations. Power in this context means not least to have the ability to judge about the legitimacy of narratives, heritage and memory. Put this way, it becomes clear why remembrance of the past always happens from a perspective of the present. It serves as an instrument for the self-reassurance of societies and groups, and by doing so, it is needed for identity construction and determines guiding principles for the future.

Meaningful concepts for identity construction are the ones of collective and cultural memory. Because, as Eviathan Zerubavel (2003, 4) points out, a collective memory unites the remembering collective. Maurice Halbwachs (1966, 7) stated already in the early 20th century that individual memory has to refer to a certain social frame and emerges in interaction with social groups, forming the trans-individual “store of memories” called “collective memory”. However, the side effect of such a process, in which a group refers to certain memories and the memories of a group refer to each other, is that some memories remain excluded (see Halbwachs 1967; Olick 2003, 6). Aleida and Jan Assmann further developed the concept of collective memory and proposed a fundamental distinction between communicative and cultural memory: while communicative memory is transferred orally and plays a significant role in families, cultural memory is not personal, but rather connected to symbolic media like *lieux de mémoire* (Nora 1998), memorials, monuments and museums as well as language and art (see Assmann 2010, 13; cf. 1988). Such a concept of cultural memory is important in order to better understand that the question that remains part of the collective memory in a long run, is a process of constant negotiations between different stakeholders; foremost in politics, culture and media. Considering that the possibility of communicative memory of World War II gets more and more lost due to the passing away of its witnesses, this topic is currently of great interest: which parts of the communicative memory will find their way to the cultural memory, giving a society sense and coherence?

To point out the dynamic character of such a process of negotiating tangible and intangible traces of the past, it is also worthwhile to refer to the various concepts of cultural heritage. According to Laurajane Smith (2006) “heritage is not a thing” but rather an “inherently political and discordant” practice that performs the cultural ‘work’ of the present” (Dicks 2007, 58). Put this way, heritage “is a contemporary activity with far-reaching effects” (UMass Amherst 2015):

It can be an element of far-sighted urban and regional planning. It can be the platform for political recognition, a medium for intercultural dialogue, a means of ethical reflection, and the potential basis for local economic development. It is simultaneously local and particular, global and shared. /.../ Heritage is an essential part of the present we live in – and of the future we will build (UMass Amherst 2015).

The various heritage concepts, like dissonant heritage, negative heritage and undesirable heritage, further underline the dynamic aspect of heritage – that heritage undergoes constant social and political redefinitions and renegotiations. If the majority of a population, at a certain point, prefers not to have a specific cultural heritage, we can speak about “undesirable heritage” (Macdonald 2006). Lynn Meskell uses the concept of “negative heritage” in order to describe that “a conflictual site becomes the repository of negative memory in the collective imaginary” (Meskell 2011, 558). According to Meskell, negative heritage occupies a dual role: “it can be mobilised for positive didactic purposes (e.g. Auschwitz, Hiroshima, District Six) or alternatively be erased if such places cannot be culturally rehabilitated and thus resist incorporation into the national imaginary (e.g. Nazi and Soviet statues and architecture)” (Meskell 2011, 558). However, often there is no consensus about the classification of such a cultural heritage, its denial or desirableness. The term dissonant heritage points out the contesting character of heritage by referring to the original meaning of an inheritance, which implies the existence of disinheritance: “all heritage is someone’s heritage and therefore logically not someone else’s” (Tunbridge & Ashworth 1996, 21). For example, all over Austria we can still find war monuments in remembrance of the brave soldiers of both World Wars. The fact that they are not only missing commemoration of the others – the fallen enemies – and not even of the own victims – the oppressed and persecuted compatriots –, refers to the long-lasting character of such contradicting heritage. In this context, it is also worthwhile to mention the *Sacrario militare di Redipuglia*, the largest war memorial in Italy and one of the largest in the world. It was built on behalf of Benito Mussolini in remembrance (if not to say glorification) of Italy’s fallen in World War I; and got unveiled in 1938, about one year before the outbreak of World War II, respectively about two years before Italy’s entry into that war. This refers not least to the incredible symbolic importance of such heritage.

The consequence of such a manifoldness of different approaches to and dealing with cultural heritage is the presence of multiple, often contesting heritage narratives (cf. e.g. Ricoeur 1998; Cornelissen 2012; Wintersteiner 2015). The main problem about such a manifoldness of narratives is their exclusive character; that they usually claim to be the true one. Therefore, the task will be to find a proper strategy to encounter contesting interpretations, competing for the status of dominant narrative or exclusive truth. We need a methodological tool or conceptual basis which enables the coexistence of contradicting narratives – or in other words: autonomous interpretations of the past. The demand for an autonomous narrative can – at least to some extent – be regarded as the expression for the vital need for cultural identity. If this need is not adequately met within a national framework, what else can be the consequence than the claim for gaining political autonomy or even independence? Put this way, exclusivist thinking in general, like the phantasy of ethnic homogeneity, and exclusivist

narratives in specific, can be grasped as a precondition of claims for autonomy, independence and/or secession. This is not at all to say that exclusivist narratives and exclusivist (collective) attitudes are the only reason for claims for autonomy and/or secessionist tendencies. But, it is obvious that they play a crucial role, which is usually not adequately addressed within mainstream efforts of dealing with endeavours for autonomy or independence. From this point of view, in order to sustainably address these issues, someone will, of course besides other dimensions, have to deal with contradicting interpretations about the past. And this task calls for a suitable methodological approach.

5. The Approach: From Dialogue To Relationality

According to the Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace, dialogue is to be understood as a “process of direct communication whereby two or more individuals exchange information in order to more deeply understand each other’s point of view”, whereat the “power of dialogue lies in its emphasis on having participants explore the assumptions, beliefs, and philosophical worldviews at the heart of their assertions” (Dayton 2010, 581).

As Antje Herrberg points out, dialogue is a less directive approach than mediation. While mediation is a method “to discuss issues, reach an agreement and make decisions together”, dialogue is “an open-ended communication between conflict parties /.../ in order to foster mutual recognition, understanding, empathy and trust”. In this manner, the concept of dialogue (process) “takes into account that international conflict is not an intergovernmental or interstate phenomenon but an inter-societal one” (Herrberg 2009, 14–15; cf. Kelman 2007, 69).

Ronald Fisher states that, “numerous interventions described as dialogue can be considered applications of interactive conflict resolution” (Fisher 1997, 121). In turn, the core idea of Interactive Conflict Resolution (ICR) is to bring “together unofficial yet influential representatives of identity groups or states engaged in destructive conflict for informal and flexible discussions in neutral setting designed and facilitated by a team of impartial social scientist-practitioners” (Fisher 2002, 61). In general, one can say ICR involves second track or citizens’ diplomacy, a field which was pioneered “from the 1960s by Herbert Kelman, Edward Azar, John Burton, Johan Galtung, Joseph Montville, Harold Saunders and others” (Davies & Kaufmann 2002, 3). Especially Herbert C. Kelman’s approach of establishing dialogue groups with influential non-officials was the methodological point of departure of the PRAA’s method of comprehensive, open and inclusive dialogue. Comprehensive refers to the content of the dialogue: whatever participants wish to be discussed should be part of the dialogue. Open refers to approaches, procedures, rules and methods that are being utilized: dialogue must not restrict itself to a specific approach but rather

should be open for the integration of different, even contradicting approaches. Inclusive refers to the parties and means that all those who wish to participate should be – somehow – included in the dialogue; by adjusting dialogue settings, be it in the form of enlarged or parallelly ongoing (intra-)dialogical initiatives. It belongs also to the self-understanding of such a dialogue that there must not be any preconditions for joining a dialogue-process, especially such as the readiness for reconciliation; even though it might be its outcome (cf. Brousek 2018; Brousek & Pirker 2016; Graf & Brousek 2014, 2015; Graf et al. 2014).

Traditionally, dialogue is understood as an approach to deepen peace efforts by focusing not least on underlying conflict-dimensions, such as attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, dialogue – as a means of conflict transformation – is usually applied when conflicts are at least partly managed, implying that such conflicts are not (any longer) highly escalated (cf. Glasl 1980). However, the central role of (collective) attitudes in conflict formations refers to the possibility or even necessity to broaden the field of the application of dialogue. This would mean to regard dialogue as a complementary therapy, also in the field of management and settlement of highly escalated conflicts, where traditionally peace through law is the dominant paradigm. Put this way, dialogical engagement in the field of tension between dealing with the past and envisioning the future can be a useful complementary tool to support endeavours for the management and resolution of even ongoing (armed) conflicts. Simply spoken, such a dialogue enables to shift the focus from superficial matters to underlying ones; however, dialogue does not necessarily mean to talk about worldviews and philosophies. It rather means to offer a framework in which different people with different points of view get the possibility to explain their respective standpoints; but without arguing why this or that should be the true perspective. According to my experience, the central task of dialogue is to enable the co-existence of narratives. Therefore, dialogue must not be grasped as a means to gain consensus. In contrast to Plato's concept of dialogue with its impetus of bridging differences, dialogue, like applied within PRAA, is to be understood as an approach situated beyond the search for truth; rather as a strategy to preserve contradiction and plurality (Perko 2003; cf. Thürmer-Rohr 2002). The only basic consensus that is necessarily intended to be achieved within a dialogue, is the consensus about dissent or in other words: agreement about disagreement. This means that the process of transformation at the level of attitudes is often achieved by merely listening to the other in the context of a framework in which there is no need for finding the ultimate true version; be it about present or past issues. To some extent this is also true for the concept of dialogue itself. Within PRAA, we experienced that there have been very different perceptions about the aim of such a dialogue-process; whether it is the creation of a common (meta-)narrative or to find a way to deal with the coexistence of narratives. It goes without saying that this is still an issue about the concept of dialogue.

Realists might criticize that the coexistence of narratives would relativize justified claims for historical truth. However, the methodological basis of such a dialogical endeavour is not at all to be seen as relativist or radical constructivist. Qualifying a position as relative implicitly refers to the possibility of an absolute – quasi extra-mundane – standpoint from which someone could justify about the absolute certainty or absolute relativity of a specific matter. As human beings simply have to live with their imperfection and without the ability for gaining ultimate truth, it is, frankly speaking, always worth to listen to other – even or especially contradicting – points of view. Methodologically spoken, the encounter with other standpoints enables us to experience a process of “strangification”, which reveals underlying – usually unconscious – presuppositions of the involved standpoints (Wallner 2002). This is not necessarily to relativize the own point of view, but rather to relate it to other points of view. Such an epistemologically “constructive-realist” (Wallner 2002) method offers a new possibility of commitment beyond the poles of universalism and relativism: relational commitment. Simply spoken, the sense of dialogue is to get to know other perspectives in order to better understand the own one. Throughout such a process we can gain degrees of freedom which helps to broaden our opportunities for action in general and the transformation of conflicts in specific (see Brousek 2017, 2019).

6. The Transformation: Peace Region – an Alternative Model for Autonomy Beyond the Contradiction of Secession and Inclusion

Regarding conflicts about claims for autonomy or independence, we are usually confronted with a contradiction within the poles of inclusion on the one hand and separation or secession on the other. Inclusion in this context refers to the most complete form of integration. Accordingly, autonomy could be described as a compromise between these two poles; since autonomy means somehow both, independence and inclusion up to a certain degree, but at the same time, neither total separation nor complete inclusion.

Against this background, the concept of a dialogically established peace region could act as an alternative model of traditional forms of autonomy, or even as alternative to autonomy. A dialogue would primarily address the cultural and symbolic aspects of claims for autonomy or independence; instead of focusing on the solution of political and legal aspects. As a kind of alternative model of traditional forms of autonomy, dialogically working towards a peace region would prove as a complementary therapy in the context of secessionist tendencies: by focussing on symbolic dimensions, such as the transformation of hostile (collective) attitudes towards the acceptance of alternative – autonomous – narratives. However, if such a dialogue process is successful in

positively transforming attitudes and establishing a culture of peace within a historically specific region, which might of course take several years, the concept of peace region could also prove as an alternative to autonomy in the long run. In case that such an endeavour of enabling the coexistence of even contradicting narratives succeeds, under specific circumstances, autonomy, independence or even secession would not necessarily be aspired. In this sense, the concept of peace region could also be seen as an idea beyond the contradiction of secession and inclusion. It can therefore be taken as a way of transforming the contradiction between secession and inclusion. Such a transformation might be better understood by referring to the dialectical sense of the German term *Aufhebung* (see Hegel 1978, 57–58; cf. Galtung 1998, 165–186). A peace region would abolish, preserve and/or transcend the contradiction of claims for secession and inclusion at the same time. Throughout the establishment of a peace region emerges a kind of subtle difference or separation to other regions not involved (so far), and/or the affected nation states, if they are not entirely involved. However, in the long run, a functioning peace region would strive for the inclusion of those other, so far excluded, regions; f.e. by the establishment of overlapping peace regions. Even sounding kind of fantastic, if such processes are adequately supported by politics and economy as well as the cultural sphere, they are of course feasible.

In the end, in a very long run, such a concept would prove as an alternative strategy to develop a union of peace regions, comprising a manifoldness of autonomous but dialogically related narratives of the past, the present and the future. Such a unity of diversity of peace regions would offer a bottom-up alternative to the currently quite wavering top-down version – the European Union.

Taking the concept of region as a geographical and historical entity for the establishment of peaceful conditions seems to have some distinct advantages, compared to start from a European or even global perspective. Human beings obviously need practicable entities as points of reference, in order to manage thinking and living in gradually larger structures. If living does not even succeed in small (provincial) structures, there is no basis for transnationality or trans-regionality. However, if human beings get overwhelmed by structures that are too complex to be understood, the problematic consequence is their escape into geographical provincialism and ideological parochialism.

In order to better understand this line of reasoning, we can refer to the topic of language acquisition. Somebody not having a perfect command of his mother tongue will probably never be able to learn foreign languages comprehensively. This means that the mother tongue serves as basis for foreign languages, like a specific province or region serves as geographical and historical basis for gradually enlarging the sphere of action as well as the conceptual space of thinking.

Peace regions are entities that enable us to epistemologically get out of the native world view, without being confronted with too complex and thus

overwhelming structures. Dialogue, in this context, is a process which enables translating, mediating and relating of different constructions of reality, and above all, better understanding our own ones. This proves as basis for the acceptance or even respect of alternative – or autonomous – constructions of reality.

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Notes

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- ¹ This article draws not only on practical experiences from the dialogue project Building the Peace Region Alps-Adriatic (PRAA) but also on accompanying research and academic reflections about that specific and similar projects. In this sense, this paper is to some extent – apart from the mentioned literature – also based on the various project descriptions and proposals, where a lot of people contributed. In this regard, I would like to mention especially Wilfried Graf, Danijel Grafenauer, Johanna Mitterhofer, Jürgen Pirker, Marjan Sturm, Werner Wintersteiner, Daniel Wutti and Mitja Žagar – amongst others – for their important contributions to the project in general and its critical reflection in specific.
- ² In the beginning, it was a dialogical initiative between representatives of the Slovenian and Austrian (mainly Carinthian) civil societies, particularly majority populations and national minorities. From 2016 onwards also representatives of Italy and Croatia have been partly involved. In sum, there have been eight international (one- to two-day) dialogue-workshops in the time span from 2013 to 2017, which took place in Graz/Gradec, Klagenfurt/Celovec, Ljubljana/Laibach/Lubiana, Maribor/Marburg and Piran/Pirano; accompanied by many bi-, tri- and of course multi-lateral meetings of various members in order to prepare for or reflect upon specific issues of the international dialogue workshops. In 2018 the project PRAA entered a phase of reflection and documentation as well as dissemination; firstly, to inform a wider public about the project's steps forward towards such a peace region and secondly, to critically reflect its shortcomings and development potentials for the future. For the publication of the two common declarations of the dialogue-group see Feldner et al. 2018; for the latest initiative following on PRAA see Wintersteiner (2018). Next year a thorough documentation and reflection will be published in form of a book (see Brousek et al. 2019).

Adam Rozgonyi-Horvath

Treatment Options for the Post-Socialist Poverty Culture – The Case of a Roma Settlement in Hungary

After the change of regime in Hungary from socialism to capitalism, due to the restructured labour market, the demand for underqualified labour force decreased massively. Therefore, the second generation of post-socialist society of undereducated Roma people is growing up with parents who cannot find a job in the primary labour market and in a social environment which is based on surviving conditions of extreme poverty. The culture of poverty significantly reduces their opportunities. The study, based on interviews with residents in a Roma settlement, community workers and social workers, focused on three potential ways to manage the culture of poverty in a segregated area in a city in an East- and Central European post-socialist country.

Keywords: culture of poverty, Roma settlement, underprivileged people, extreme poverty, segregated area.

Možnosti zdravljenja post-socialistične kulture revščine – primer romskega naselja na Madžarskem

Po spremembi režima na Madžarskem iz socialističnega v kapitalističnega se je zaradi prestrukturiranja trga delovne sile potreba po manj kvalificiranih delavcih močno zmanjšala. Tako zdaj odraščajo druga postsocialistična generacija slabše izobraženih Romov s starši, ki si ne morejo najti dela na primarnem trgu delovne sile, in je zato obsojena na družbeno okolje skrajne revščine. Kultura revščine znatno zmanjšuje njihove možnosti za preživetje. Študija, ki temelji na intervjujih s prebivalci romskega naselja in socialnimi delavci v skupnosti, se osredotoča na tri potencialne načine premagovanja kulture revščine v segregiranem okolju mesta v vzhodno oziroma srednjeevropski postsocialistični državi.

Ključne besede: kultura revščine, romsko naselje, družbeno zapostavljeni ljudje, skrajna revščina, segregirano območje.

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1. Introduction

Poverty in developed countries means much more than poor financial conditions or ageing without things. It has specific structure, nature and attributions. The lifestyle of poor people is handed down from father to son, helping them to cope with everyday life.

The concept of poverty culture was created by Oscar Lewis, who discussed the situation and lifestyle of poor families living in slums in Mexico City in 1950's. According to his experiences (Lewis 2000, 142), poverty and a low level of income, as well as difficult living conditions, creates a particular culture which differs completely from the culture of the middle-class. This is the culture of poverty which can help poor people survive everyday life, but simultaneously hinder them from escaping from the circumstances of poverty. Thus those who become poor are after a certain time most likely stuck in this situation and will transmit it through family socialisation down the generations (Spéder 2002). As an effect of this transmission, a culture of poverty¹ develops when the poor conditions persist for a long time and not even the children of next generation can escape from this situation, thus generational poverty develops (Lewis 2000, 143; Stenning 2005, 984). Due to their conditions, people living in poverty do not perceive their acts as norm violation but interpret them as a way of survival. They are almost fully excluded from the money-centred world and their disadvantages make escape impossible. Those who acquire a culture of poverty have no property consciousness; this is why they cannot form personal ties to items and thus do not insist on having personal valuables and cannot accumulate, hence money has no true value among them. On the other hand, they have community awareness, but because of this their culture is contrary to the values of the culture accepted by the majority of society (Gecková et al. 2014, 58); it excludes them out from the greater part of the population.

The culture of poverty recognises the relationship between minority existence and poor financial conditions (Jones 1999; Fainstein 1995; Stewart 2002), which are primarily connected to the Roma as the biggest ethnic minority in Hungary. Their integration into the majority society can be very difficult, hampered by the facts that the Roma often live segregated, in difficult social and economic circumstances that perpetuate poverty culture. The level of their employment in the primary labour market, as well as in many cases the level of their presence in the state supported secondary labour market, is very low.

The purpose of the paper is to introduce the set of values, habits of everyday life, hierarchy and community structure of a Roma community living in a segregated settlement in a Hungarian city, based on my empirical research. I exemplify the disadvantages of the people living in Roma settlements originating from the socialisation of poverty culture. Their social and labour market integration opportunities are very narrow since they are almost completely excluded from

the primary labour market and their low amount of work experience and the lack of professional qualification make their chances even more difficult, they thus largely subsist on the social welfare system (Warzywoda-Kruszynska 2000; Emigh et al. 2001).

The paper also presents the experiences of social integration development projects connected to the investigated community, the aim of which was to increase the social and labour market integration level of these people, who were socialised on the basis of the values of poverty culture. Those projects tried to change their socialized value system with community programmes, social welfare labour programmes and primary labour market workplace programmes. The further goal of the study was to draw recommendations for similar programmes based on the experiences of the above-mentioned projects.

2. Post-Socialist Characteristics of the Poverty Culture

Before the regime change in the socialist countries, underqualified people were compelled to get jobs at agricultural or industrial state companies (Sen 1981; Tarkowska 1997). With the new political and economic system, these companies were privatised or ceased to exist. Unskilled people with low educational achievement (Kolarčík et al. 2009; Vašečka-Radičová 2000) were the first to be excluded from the labour market (Kligman 2001) with the emergence of the market economy; thus their income decreased considerably (Bradbury & Jantti 1999). Therefore, poverty increased among the underqualified segment of population (Magyari et al. 2001; Ladányi 2001; Mitev et al. 2001) and its impact still affects all areas of their life, such as education, income, job opportunities, and safety and health (Samman & Santos 2013; Raphael 2002). Nevertheless, without higher education (UNICEF 2007), the children of this population only inherit and reproduce (Emigh et al. 2001) the poverty and social situation of their parents (Liskó 2001).

The labour market integration of underprivileged people is made even more difficult due to their completely different values, norm structure and particular lifestyle. They have no vision of the future and so they do not plan their life, living on a day-by-day basis. The value of knowledge that is obtainable through schooling is very low for Roma people (Harsányi & Radó 1997, 4). They do not participate in the organisation of society, going to school has no importance and a general distrust characterises them, which closes the door for children to move forward in their life and step out of their current situation. These children living in poverty generally acquire the perspective of this subculture and they know the values of the middle-class; however, they do not follow these norms (Lewis 1959).

Their houses lack public utilities such as electricity, running water, piped gas (Kósa et al. 2007, 859) or a bathroom. They are also overcrowded (Evans 2004,

77; Moser 1998, 11; Brooks & Duncan 1997, 67) and are usually located at the end of villages or in segregated areas. Among youngsters, as early as at the age of 10 (Lewis 2000, 145), the early beginning of sexual life with frequent change of partners, violence, aggressive handling of stress and alcohol abuse are typical (Babinská et al. 2014, 25). These families' attitude to time and their flexible schedule make it hard to adapt the timeframe of work for adults and of school for adolescents and children. Thus, their cultural specifics a priori condemns them to inadequate performance in the workplace and school (Forray & Hegedűs 1985). At the level of residential communities, there is a lack of privacy (Moser 1998, 11) caused by overcrowded apartments (Evans 2004, 77). Childhood – as a period requiring protection – is completely absent from family life, that is characterised by neglect of children, competition for love and early onset of sexual interest. The members of these communities get married and have children among themselves (Lewis 2000, 145; Szuhay 1999, 31).

The habits, attitudes and behaviours resulting from the culture of poverty are difficult to change, and even an exit from the situation of poverty does not imply value change. This is the major controversy of poverty culture, since people cannot live without it, but it is precisely this culture that becomes the biggest barrier to escaping poverty. Poverty and social exclusion (Janevic et al. 2010; Kósa et al. 2007; Ladányi & Szelényi, 2001) creates rules, norms and practices which are entirely different from the values of the majority (Virág 2009). The feeling of common fate can characterise the subculture of Roma settlements, but the solidarity felt for each other plays only a minimal role in the lives of the people living there (Solt 2009, 110). Underprivileged people do not perceive some of their acts as a violation of the law, because of their particular socio-cultural background which makes the improvement of their situation much more difficult (HAOS 2004).

The role of family socialization exerts a major effect on personality, which in a natural way spontaneously but significantly influences the social success of children. The norms and habits of children evolve as an outcome of the social and cultural characteristics of family communities. This process is a part of socialisation among people living in segregated areas, whose survival strategy is inherited through reproduction of their social circumstances (Warzywoda-Krisztyńska 2000).

The Roma minority comprises 6-7 per cent of the population of Hungary, and is the poorest and the most vulnerable group of that society (Bernát 2014, 246); in everyday discourse the word Roma is mainly used in the context of crime and poverty (Simonovits-Kézdi 2014, 28). The difference between the Roma and the majority society has been constantly growing since the introduction of capitalism, which is the outcome of the residence segregation and educational separation of the Roma (Bernát 2014, 246). In 2013, 95 per cent of working age Roma people (15-64 ages) were without secondary education, which shows the

Roma deficit in the field of education. The result of underqualification appears in the low presence on the labour market, because just less than the half (42 per cent) of the active age Roma have a job (TÁRKI 2014), thus the risk of poverty is two or three times higher among Roma. This can be seen in their territorial circumstances and residential environment. In sum, in 2010 in Hungary 1,633 Roma settlements were counted where around 300,000 people or 3 per cent of the population of Hungary live (Domokos & Herczeg 2010).

To summarise, in the continuation of the subculture of people living in peripheral areas, the inherited traits during socialisation take a significant part. The norms of underprivileged families living in Roma sites that are formed by poverty culture are completely contrary to the values of the major part of the society. In consequence, those who live in these kind of poor areas have very little chance of integration into the majority.

3. Aims and Methodology

The paper deals with the rules and behavioural and socialisation norms of under-privileged people living in a Roma part of a Hungarian town located in Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county, Szolnok. The research also focused on the components which influence their job-keeping skills and how these factors are connected to the culture of poverty. Of course, in order for the specified people or groups to keep jobs, they first have to find them, which is mostly affected by educational level. Because the school level of people living in the researched site at most is primary education or less, their employment would require jobs which do not need qualification.

The study's purpose is to consider the specific effects of the new economic system on the poor and the impact of the post-socialist poverty culture in practice. Additionally, it indicates the drawbacks and barriers of people living in peripheral urban areas in getting and keeping jobs. The situation is particularly difficult for the Roma that live in territorially segregated areas (settlements) and experience discrimination. Regardless of different policies, measures, programs and activities designed to stimulate their integration and help them find employment in the job market, due their specific situation they often decide (or are forced) to move away.

The main questions of the research:

- Q1. What kind of living and environmental conditions characterise the researched Roma settlement?
- Q2. What kind of values, behavioural norms and rules have emerged in connection with the culture of poverty among the Roma people living in the examined segregated area?
- Q3. What is the social and community structure among the residents of the Roma settlement?

- Q4. What kind of labour market disadvantages do the people living in the segregated settlement have because they were socialised by the values and norm system of the poverty culture and their residence is in a segregated area?
- Q5. What kind of project could be effective in changing the norms and value system of the people living in the investigated Roma settlement?

The research steps of the survey:

1. Direct observation
2. Semi-structured interviews
3. Unstructured interviews
4. Secondary analysis

The research lasted for three months between August and October 2016 and it was self-financed in connection with my PhD research at the Doctoral School of Earth Science at the University of Szeged. The research primarily used empirical data collecting techniques, such as direct observation of the people living in the Roma site, interviews with all heads of households (16 persons), as well as with people connected with the Roma, who provide social and other assistance. During the direct observation, the predetermined viewpoints were the housing and living conditions of the site, and the behaviour patterns of the people living there in relation to the poverty culture. The observation also included the interaction processes between each other and with people from outside of the site.

At the compilation of information sources, the most important aim was to gather data from those people and organisations who are in contact with the people of the site from the administrative, council and social side. Thus, seven semi-structured interviews were conducted, including the head of family support services of the city, social workers and support workers dealing with addiction. Moreover, an interview was conducted with the home guard² serving in this area, two semi-structured interviews with community workers, and two with a social worker and a project coordinator. During the semi-structured interviews, the research focused on the behavioural norms in connection with the culture of poverty, the rules and structure of hierarchy of the community living in the Roma settlement and the legal and illegal money-making and livelihood opportunities of the residents. These interviews were also extended to the relationships inside the community and the links with the residents of the adjacent streets. Additionally, the research examined the socialisation of the children growing up at this location and the diversity of the relationship between children and parents, but also investigated addiction, particularly the presence of drug use in the Roma site. With the help of professionals and based on accomplished practices and programmes, the research considered training

opportunities, labour market barriers and possibilities for work. This information was complemented with data from conversations and unstructured interviews with resident heads of households during the direct observation.


Apart from the interviews, the secondary analyses of former research results provided for the information sources about the past and history of the segregated area, so the residential and social composition of the population formed in the last 31 years since the construction of the site could be shown and the connection with its environment in detail.

4. Results – The Situation of the Investigated Area and the Possible Ways out from the Marginal Living Conditions

4.1 The Case Study Area

4.1.1 Region of Northern Great Plain

Figure 1: Number of Hungarians living in disadvantaged subregions, 2014



Source: Magyarország Kormányának 2014, 74–81.

After the end of the socialist system in Hungary, the depreciation of real estate located in peripheral settlements made it impossible for underprivileged people – most of them worked in mines, factories and collective farms in the socialist

period which were eliminated and these employees became unemployed – to move away to more prosperous areas (Valuch 2014, 112). In the periphery, distance from cities determines social status of individuals (Sykora 2009) and their chances of social promotion (Virág 2010, 71). In 2014, 15 per cent of the Hungarian population (1,476,307 persons) lived in the most disadvantaged subregions, of which 42,5 per cent (627,463 persons) lived in the region of Northern Great Plain, while at county level, 8.9 per cent of them (131,597 persons) lived in Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county (Magyarország Kormányának 2014). This is the highest proportion in Hungary and it is among the twenty poorest regions in Europe within Northern Hungary, the South Great Plain and South Transdanubium (Eurostat 2011, 2). These areas have the worst economic and employment indicators in Hungary, and people's educational level is significantly lower, which means that the residents of this region need higher social allowances than anywhere else in Hungary (MOPA 2011, 33).

4.1.2 Szolnok and the District of Southern Industrial Area – the Living and Environmental Conditions of the Researched Roma Settlement's Residents (Q1)

Szolnok is one of the biggest settlement in the Northern Great Plain region; it is also an economic, vehicular, military, cultural, educational and health centre. In the region, the Roma represent the majority of underprivileged in some districts. The reasons are geographic, economic and social factors from the past; communist party state decisions also influenced this process. In the period of erasing of Roma sites in peripheral areas of the city, the Roma were resettled into poor social housing on the outskirts of Szolnok. These apartments were called reduced value homes. The territorial rearrangement caused by forced industrialisation in the 1950's and the creation of industrial areas launched a significant migration process towards the peripheral and industrial areas of Szolnok which offered workplaces required unqualified labour. This process had a positive impact on residents of these areas and their ethnic and social relations (COSZCC 2014). The most significant wave of moving to the city started in the early 1970's and lasted until the late 1980's (Szarvák 2007, 8; COSZCC 2013, 5; Thékes 2016, 26). The Southern Industrial Area is bound by railway lines on three sides and to the east the River Tisza. This district's occupancy and capacity utilisations are at a low level, but the internal infrastructure of its industrial park has been built up which strengthens its appeal to enterprises. The demographical condition and social status of the Southern Industrial Area are the least favourable in Szolnok, its residents' age structure is characterised by youth, but the educational level is the lowest here compared to other districts. The proportion of people with at most primary education is twice the average and the rate of

locals with a tertiary degree is just one third of the city's average (Szarvák 2007). The residents of this area have the highest proportion of demand for change of residence, which shows the dissatisfaction with the living environment (Szarvák 2007; COSZCC 2013).

The houses of the segregated area were built after the restoration of this site in autumn of 1986 without utilities (internal toilet, running water and piped gas) precisely for underprivileged people, where the tenants were appointed by the council. The settlers migrated from – at that time – even more devastated parts of the city. The houses of this site were constructed on a marshland, so they are steadily sinking. At the beginning, the external latrines were used improperly by many of the residents – for instance, some of them kept animals inside (HAOS 2004, 6).

Generally, two families formed by different generations dwell in a single house and 8-10 persons live together in two rooms with an average 45-52 square meters. Nevertheless, grandparents and their children are often quite close in age: for instance, a 27-year old grandmother with a 14-year old daughter, who is also a mother – because of childbirth at a young age. This segregated area has the lowest average house size in the city (Szarvák 2007; COSZCC 2013). Electricity was installed in these uncared-for houses but the power company turned the services off in some houses because of unpaid bills. The houses cannot be connected to the public utility infrastructure – piped water, gas supply and sewers – even though it is available in this area. The water supply is provided by drinking fountain which means, in the absence of running water, that the people are unable to satisfy the basic hygiene conditions and norms of housekeeping (TITRI 2011, 3). The outdoor lavatories are dilapidated and there are houses without toilets. Instead of latrines, they use the uninhabited, semi-destroyed houses or public land. Doors and windows are missing in several houses, and leaking and soaked walls are common problems after rainy weather. Fifty-nine percent of the people living in this area reported soaked walls and poor insulation, because these houses were built from adobe (Szarvák 2007, 11; HAOS 2004, 7). Due to the lack of regular maintenance, every second roof is leaking (COSZCC 2013).

This segregated area is neglected and it has an environment contaminated by the residents. The rainwater ditches are full of rubbish, so they do not drain away water. Rodents and insects have also proliferated, posing a serious health risk. Stray dogs are also common, which poses a threat to the people living this area (HAOS 2004, 7). The solution to these problems is currently unclear, because neither the residents nor the council have money for utility grid connection and the utility companies do not wish to connect these houses to the services, because the locals cannot afford to have them.

4.2 Introduction of the Values, Norms and Rules of People Living in the Segregated Settlement Related to Culture of Poverty and the Structure of their Social and Community Relations (Q2, Q3)

There are continuous tensions among people in the neighbourhood who originate from the different Roma ethnicities. Most are the Hungarian Roma (romungrók, magyar cigányok); however, some are Vlach Roma (oláh cigányok). This means there are differences in their values and cultures. Diversity can be observed between them based on sub-ethnicity too. The subgroups thus show differences in their languages, specific ways of life and cultures (Kádár 1993, 66).

The internal hierarchy of the site's community is determined by wealth and degree of physical strength. Single men who have no roots there, formerly imprisoned, and those who accumulated a significant debt are at the lowest level of the hierarchy (HAOS 2004, 8). These people are received by a prominent family of this site in exchange for housing, so they are forced to do humiliating work. According to the slang of the site, they are the dogsbodies.

The Roma settlement is under two families' control; one is a usurious lender to residents, and the other one provides security duties. These families cooperate with each other and their criminal activities extend outside of the segregated area. If the debtors cannot pay back the loans taken with interest rates of 200 to 300 per cent, they kidnap or force into prostitution the family members of the debtors. The social benefits are taken by the usurers immediately, and in case of eviction, these families negotiate with the authorities (HAOS 2004, 8). According to the interviewees, the relationship between Roma and their children living in this area is characterised by two extremes: they control and dominate the children completely, or they do not care about them at all and let them act freely. They are unable to establish an optimal middle ground for children during their upbringing. Thus in one case, the children grow up enclosed in families that do everything together. For instance the parents go to the pub with their children when the family allowance is paid.

The children are stuck to the window, because they are not allowed to go the playground but when the family support arrives, the whole family are in the pub /.../ so or they go somewhere together or they do not go anywhere (Interviewee 1).

The other extreme is a very weak bond among parents and children, as a result of which the children adopt the attributes of poverty culture; hence they cruise the streets at a young age, consume drugs and avoid school.

The fundamental problem can be found in education; the school has to deal with their upbringing /.../. But they are not socialized for that /.../ the children see that their mother does nothing at home, and everybody around them does nothing, and it is

better than going to school /.../ so the children go to school as they can, and when they arrive home, they do not know what is at home /.../ their mother just left to get some money somehow, because their credit card was taken due to usury or drugs or something else (Interviewee 2).

However, children can influence their parents and become carriers of change in the long-term. Upbringing and education of children are key factors in this process. If the youngsters can be kept in school, then the adults are more likely to go back to study, finish their primary education or obtain a profession.

4.3 The Labour Market Disadvantages of the Roma Settlement's Residents Caused by the Value and Norm System of Poverty Culture and the Segregated Circumstances (Q4)

The people living in this segregated area clearly understand that the lack of job opportunities and qualifications is caused by their low educational level. Usually, courses and trainings offered to unemployed require completed primary school. "Nobody asks them how many primary school classes they did, or what kind of qualifications they have /.../ anybody can sweep the street" (Interviewee 3).

Some local companies discriminate against these people based on their residence; this is shown by Examples of people living there, who are different in appearance from other Roma people who were rejected when they divulged their address confirm that there is a territorial stigma for people living in the site. "If they tell the employer that they live in the site, it is an extra stigma /.../ so they can only generally participate in social welfare labour employment" (Interviewee 3).

These people do not want to move away from the site because there are well accustomed rules and conditions. All of them are related to each other by family ties, which also play a role in their stay. On the other hand, families that live in the neighbourhood and rule over them also impede their movement to outside of the settlement. Under these circumstances, the mentioned families can sell them drugs, loan money at usury rates and control their finances because of their debts³. There are some districts in the city, for instance the Chemical Works Housing, which is called Chicago by the citizens, where it is well known in which houses these drug dealers and usurers live. There are fewer men living in the site than women. As consequences of business with drugs and usury, the debt of some amounted to 200,000–300,000 HUF (650–970 Euros). The sanctions for drug dealers and usurers are 2-3 years prison sentences. Following the end of their sentence, they reappear for similar causes after a few weeks. There are no preventive activities by the police. "There is nothing here that the police do not know about" (Interviewee 4).

However, the biggest problem is that the people living in this segregated area do not want to change their situation and take responsibility for these cir-

cumstances. “But the essential problem is that they do not want to change, thus there is no responsibility on them, therefore it is much easier for them” (Interviewee 5).

The opportunities on the labour market for these residents are scarce, so they are basically stuck with social welfare system allowances. Their poverty and poor living conditions hamper also their capacity to self-organize for the improvement of their condition and better employability.

According to a case-control study of this area,

the majority of people living on this site represent a deviant subculture, their lifestyles adapted to social circumstances of extreme poverty. The minors growing up here live in a moral and ethical hazard zone, which favours the handing down of poverty and supports the forming of a criminal new generation (TITRI 2011, 4).

Since the end of socialism, only a few working-age people from the site could find a job for more than six months, which means that the people living here are excluded from the primary labour market. Their employment opportunities are further reduced due to the lack of professional qualifications and experiences. Some occasional employers in the black market offer the Roma seasonal black labour or casual work for salaries higher than minimal wages in social welfare labour programmes and, thereby, increase the problem and make it more complex. The Roma are tempted to take these illegal offers, although they do not ensure social and health security. Those who could get a job were working in factories as production line workers, but since they could not fit in their contracts were terminated usually within 1-3 months. Consequently, the Roma remain dependent on social and unemployment benefits.

The social and economic problems of the Roma site are the results of the low educational level, unemployment, poverty and poor living conditions. The Roma are often inactive and give up job seeking. Trapped in poverty cycle and lacking income, families living in extreme poverty have no vision of the future. Addiction, family conflicts and abuse are frequent among the residents of the site. These circumstances almost completely match with the culture of poverty defined above, which form the full part of everyday life of people living in this segregated area.

4.4 Alternatives to the Current Marginal Situation of the Population in Roma Settlements in Hungary – the Projects that Could be Effective Among People Who Were Socialised Based on the Norms and Values (Q5)

Programmes offering possibilities for altering the culture of the poverty-related set of values of the people living in the researched Roma site are important

for the better inclusion and integration of the Roma. The interviews with the community workers, the coordinator of a development project of this site and the social workers working on this area presented experiences of the programmes and their effects on the people there.

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4.4.1 Altering the Set of Values of People Living in Roma Site with Community Programmes

Based on the experiences of a house renovation programme undertaken on this site, these kinds of activities teach residents solidarity with each other. If neighbours help renovate your house, you are obliged to help them renovating their houses. This programme required people letting each other into their homes, which was not general practice. Prior to this, principally just children were let into the houses to play with each other, but adults at most met in yards or most often at the drinking fountain or on the street. “We started to educate them and they began to trust us /.../ in a few months they were socialized to do something /.../ at the beginning of this programme there was a chance of a very positive change” (Interviewee 6).

In order to achieve change, instructors and professionals have to offer an example. This requires continuous and complementary long-term settlement-based projects. However, the current EU tender system that plans the programmes for a shorter period – around 2 years – and usually excludes underprivileged who were participants in earlier similar projects ignores this reality and needs. The residents of this site primarily live on welfare benefits and it is really hard to activate them for these programmes. In four years only three people from the Roma site have been involved in the free personal development training organised by community workers of the development office working near to the site. These people need help to adapt to a working environment because of their completely different socialisation values, but after a period of adjustment, they can achieve an appropriate level and they will be able for work in accordance with expectations. However, firstly they need to learn how to think in the world of work and understand the obligations of workplaces. They could get support and help from community and social workers, which cover housing, child protection, school representation and more complex assistance. Where there is a demand, these services can actively appear in the life of people living in poverty.

They reach a certain level here, we try to make them suitable for work in order to be able to think in the system of work, for example they have to get here at eight o'clock /.../ if they can understand the things around them and they can keep the rules, we have to motivate them that it is time to complete high-school because they have to understand that it is the next level and they have to forget the social welfare labour programme (Interviewee 7).

Those kinds of programmes can change the learnt values of poverty culture, such as the youth club organised by community workers where the parents also actively participated. These handcrafts and musical workshops and activities were held in a room on the site without heating and its fixtures were voluntarily brought there every time. This project was successful for a long time but the room was burgled and the clothes – brought by the community workers and stored there – were stolen, which meant the end of the programme. “As a community worker I can highlight the opportunity, then they can take it or not” (Interviewee 3).

4.4.2 Altering the Set of Values of People Living at a Roma Site through Social Welfare Labour Programme

The community development office employs social welfare workers, among them two persons from the segregated area. Social welfare workers can learn and experience that they can achieve more than their current circumstances, so a kind of demand to move away begins to evolve after a time. “They nicely develop here and they understand that they are no longer at the same level as the others in the site, and then they demand an apartment elsewhere” (Interviewee 3).

The community workers support these people’s move but unfortunately, because of their learnt rules and norms of socialisation and as a result of their habitual lifestyle, most of those who move wish to get back to the segregated settlement, which proves the deep roots of poverty culture in their lives. The improvement of their financial situation does not appear to change their set of values, so this culture becomes the greatest barrier to escape from conditions of poverty. “They may be physically living there – at the new place – but in spirit they are still in the site /.../ and they cannot or do not want to get rid of it /.../ they cannot fit into the new environment” (Interviewee 5).

There are positive examples of working people with better living standards because of their higher income in this Roma settlement who decide to stay in their settlement. Many of those that moved away, adults and even children, often look for reasons and excuses to revisit the site. For instance, a relocated family who did not register their new apartment so they could visit their former residence every month to collect social benefits.

4.4.3 Altering the Set of Values through a Primary Labour Market Workplace Programme

The community workers could get jobs for three people in the city foundry but they soon left this workplace because they were frightened at the sight of unknown machines and the responsibilities of the job. “We sent three people there but they were not there even for a week because there were machines which frightened them /.../ they had not seen such things and they did not know what they were” (Interviewee 5).

Another example similarly demonstrates their situation: a training institute held a professional course for them which was linked with employment after the training. The training was held in a sewing factory which produces seat covers. The arrangement was that the company would have employed them, because they struggle with labour shortages. The residents of the site would have got full time contracts. During the course, the institute provided the theoretical education and the company the practical training and knowledge of the machines with which the future employees would have worked. There were three training groups with many of the residents but only two persons stayed there for work. According to the training participants, firstly they could not reconcile their children's education with the workplace schedule and secondly, transport difficulties hindered them from going to work in time. Lacking public transport, they had to walk to the company. A third reason was a prohibition by husbands who did not allow their wives to work because of their cultural traditions, which said that wives must not be unattended. The fourth and fifth causes were the lack of taking responsibility and inability to improve their performance. They got the living allowance as social welfare benefit during the training, while the requirements and expectations of the workplace were not too high. However, once employed infractions were sanctioned. If they were late or did not go to work, they were fired or got less money, which caused them to lose their motivation for work.

5. Summary and Discussion

The post-socialist countries' poverty rate drastically increased after the transition to a capitalist market economy, but the countries involved were not sufficiently prepared. The social inheritance has a key role for the survival of the subculture among the people living in a segregated settlement. Another major reason for its persistence is that the social welfare system and social projects usually do not manage the situation in the complex framework in Hungary. Thus the social welfare systems and integration projects partly contributed to the transmission of poverty culture through the generations and the staying in place of underprivileged. The learned norms and values of the researched Roma community are clearly connected to the culture of poverty, which play a significant role in their wish to break out of their marginal situation.

The social welfare labour programme is only meant to provide a job for them, but it does not address those circumstances which conserve the situations of the people at the Roma site. In the long run, only those programmes can succeed – that address, in addition to labour market difficulties, the children and education, socialisation difficulties, housing and health condition. However, the first, the most important is to establish trust and include the Roma in those programmes and projects. The people living in the Roma settlement have a demand for work,

but without training do not satisfy the conditions expected by employers. These kind of programmes need to be uninterrupted and long-term, because the trust of underprivileged people is hard to gain and between two parts of a programme a loss of trust may occur, which reduces the chance of success.

Some people living in the segregated area would like to work and because of the labour shortage, the employers would give them jobs but their skills are not appropriate. For this reason, training is indispensable for their social and labour market integration. One solution is training in stages that manages to stimulate and include the Roma, increases their expectations and improves their performance. Additionally, public transport or company busses should enable the commuting from the Roma site to the workplace. However, even in such cases, results can only be expected in the long-term, because the required time for attitude change can be measured in generations. A suitable tool to support these people to get into the primary labour market would be the common communication and search for solutions with large companies in the city's industrial park. This is what community workers try to accomplish. During the negotiation between community workers and employers, it is revealed that the underprivileged people living in the Roma settlement, even if they already have primary education certificate, usually cannot complete the competency test required for getting a job. That is why it would be best to start job skills training for those who would like work for companies which decided to employ underprivileged people. In this case, it must be taken into consideration that they are less used to thinking in line with the most widespread systems, so it is more difficult to solve this problem as it is among the population which learned the culture of majority and were socialised based on its norms.

The culture of poverty formed by the residents of the Roma settlement and the related problems are well illustrated by the reaction of husbands to their wives working. Husbands prohibit their women to work, not because of jealousy, but because they do not want their wives to learn new values which could awaken desires in them. As well as cleaning, cooking and feeding the children, other abilities become acknowledged as the effects of the new experiences and the feeling of success, their life opens and they can learn new lifestyles, so they would like to live their life based on new patterns. This is why men do not support women who want to go to school or work; the culture of poverty can protect and maintain itself in this way.

So, in both the short and the long term, the solution could originate from education. Planning for different periods requires distinct and diverse training approaches and methods. In the short term, the preparatory courses for trained work and competency tests of underqualified people lead to partial results, but in long term, we must think of the next generation. Education, as the primary solution is very complex because we cannot expect the most disadvantaged children to perform at the same level as their middle class peers in the first few years of primary school. These underprivileged children encounter tasks, rules,

tools and even more importantly a language that they never know before in their family, or community environment, so they are not prepared to receive them. Unfortunately, the Hungarian teacher training system is not prepared and not equipped with proper tools for the education of these children. Thus, they experience continuous failure and the school becomes a disliked place, while the negative feeling is strengthened by family members based on their former school experiences. The teacher training system thus needs to be improved in a way that helps prepare the primary school teachers to receive and teach children who were socialised by the rules of poverty culture, basic norms, values and a language that are completely different from the patterns of the majority society.

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Interviews

- Interviewee 1 – female social worker 1
- Interviewee 2 – head of family support services
- Interviewee 3 – female community worker 1
- Interviewee 4 – male home guard
- Interviewee 5 – female community worker 2
- Interviewee 6 – male project coordinator
- Interviewee 7 – female social worker 2

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Notes

- ¹ The culture of poverty can be described by the following characteristics: a constant struggle for subsistence; unemployment; odd jobs not requiring any qualification or education; child labour; complete lack of savings; food shortage; money lending at usury rates; crowded homes; alcoholism; frequent violence; wife beating; early sex life; temporary partnership relations; concubines; life without plans (Townsend 1979, 66).
- ² Home guard is a member of a social organization, whose aim is the maintenance of public order and safety, and the enhancement of the role of the residents in crime prevention.
- ³ Before the social benefits and allowances were given by bank transfers, on specified days the users waited in front of the post office while the recipients got the subsidies and could thus take it from them immediately.

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Ireoluwatomi Oloke je doktorski študent programa za mirovne in konfliktne študije na Univerzi Manitoba. Je magistrica političnih ved in diplomantka mednarodnih odnosov in diplomacije.

Sean Byrne

Sean Byrne is cofounding director with Jessica Senehi of the PACS Ph.D. program, and the Arthur V. Mauro Centre for Peace and Justice at the University of Manitoba. He cofounded the joint PACS MA program with Jessica Senehi, Brian Rice, Anna Snyder and Dean Peachey of the University of Winnipeg. In 2017, he received a University of Manitoba outreach award as well as the Faculty of Graduate Studies award for excellence in graduate student mentoring. In 2008, he received the St. Paul's College memorial endowment fund award. His research has been funded by SSHRC, USIP, and HRSDC. He has authored, co-authored and coedited ten books and over 100 articles and book chapters. He was Chair of the Peace Studies Section of the International Studies Association for the term 2004–2006.

He was Vice-Chair for the International Section, 1997–1999, of the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution.

Sean Byrne je skupaj z Jessico Senehi soustanovni direktor doktorskega programa PACS, kakor tudi Centra za mir in pravičnost Arthur V. Mauro v okviru univerze Manitoba. Skupaj z Jessico Senehi, Brianom Ricem, Anno Snyder in Deanom Peacheyjem iz Univerze Winnipeg je ustanovil PACS magistrski program. Leta 2017 je prejel nagrado za izjemne dosežke Univerze Manitoba, kakor tudi nagrado za odličnost pri mentorstvu dodiplomskih študentov. Leta 2008 je dobil nagrado memorialnega sklada kolidža St. Paul's. Njegovo raziskovalno delo financirajo SSHRC, USIP in HRSDC. Je avtor, soavtor in sourednik desetih knjig in več kot 100 člankov ter poglavij v knjigah. V obdobju 2004-2006 je bil tudi vodja sekcije za mirovne študije v okviru Mednarodne študijske asociacije. Med 1997 in 1999 je bil podpredsednik mednarodne sekcije Združenja profesionalcev za razreševanje konfliktov.

Jan Brousek

Dr. Jan Brousek (born in Vienna in 1979) studied philosophy, sociology and religious studies at the universities of Vienna (Austria), Macerata (Italy) and Calgary (Canada). After a few years of editorial assistance activities in the field of documentary films, he was employed from 2007 to 2017 in various positions in the NPO/NGO area. In this context, he worked from 2013 to 2017 as a project coordinator and program manager at the Herbert C. Kelman Institute for Interactive Conflict Transformation (Vienna), emphasizing on the development and implementation of the institute's activities with a focus on the Alps-Adriatic region. Since 2011 he has had various engagements as a scientist and lecturer in the field of peace and conflict studies at the Universities of Vienna, Graz and Klagenfurt. Recently, he co-founded the company DIALOG which offers consultancy, trainings and coaching with a focus on (intercultural) communication and conflict transformation, de-escalation as well as diversity management.

Dr. Jan Brousek (rojen na Dunaju l. 1979) je študiral filozofijo, sociologijo in verske študije na univerzah na Dunaju (Avstrija), Macerati (Italija) in v Calgaryju (Kanada). Po nekaj letih dela kot pomočnik montaže pri dokumentarnem filmu je od leta 2007 do 2017 opravljal različna dela za nevladne organizacije. V tem kontekstu je od leta 2013 do 2017 delal kot projektni koordinator in programski menedžer na Inštitutu Herbert C. Kelman za Interaktivno Transformacijo Konfliktov (Dunaj) s poudarkom na regiji Alpe-Jadran. Od 2011 je bil angažiran kot znanstvenik in predavatelj na področju mirovni in konfliktnih študij na Univerzah Dunaj, Graz in Celovec. Pred kratkim je sodeloval pri ustanovitvi družbe DIALOG, ki nudi konzultacije, šolanje in osebni trening s poudarkom na (interkulturni) komunikaciji ter transformaciji in deeskalaciji konfliktov kot tudi upravljanju raznolikosti.

Adam Rozgonyi-Horvath

Adam Rozgonyi-Horvath is a sociologist and social worker lecturer at the Faculty of Education and Psychology at Eötvös Lóránd University in Budapest, Hungary. His PhD and articles are focused on the skills of the underprivileged people living in peripheral areas to keep their job. He investigates territorial, economic and socializing features that make labour market and social integration more difficult for these people, just because they live in a territorially and economically underdeveloped area.

Adam Rozgonyi-Horvath je sociolog in predavatelj socialnega dela na Fakulteti za psihologijo Univerze Eötvös Lóránd v Budimpešti na Madžarskem. Tema njegovega doktorata in člankov so večine, ki jih morajo obvladati ljudje z družbenega dna na odročnih območjih, da obdržijo službe. Raziskuje teritorialne, ekonomske in socializacijske lastnosti, zaradi katerih sta trg dela in socialna integracija za te ljudi težja, in to samo zato, ker živijo na teritorialno in ekonomsko nerazvitih območjih.

Guidelines for Contributors

General — The editorial board of **Treatises and Documents, The Journal of Ethnic Studies** welcomes the submission of scholarly articles in the field of ethnic and minority studies, especially on racial and ethnic relations, ethnic identity, nationalism, xenophobia, the protection of (ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, and other) minorities, migration, multiculturalism and related subjects. The journal is particularly interested in discussions regarding ethnic and minority issues in the so-called Alpine-Adriatic-Pannonian area and all comparative studies, which include – only partially or as a whole - this geographic area. This area comprises the Alpine arc, the hinterland of the eastern Adriatic and Pannonian Basin. More technically, this area includes the following countries: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Germany (especially the southern part), Hungary, Kosovo, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Also Macedonia and Bulgaria may be interesting cases.

Two issues of the journal are published every year, usually in June and December.

Articles that are submitted must be original, unpublished material and should not be simultaneously under consideration - either in whole or in part - for publication elsewhere.

The journal encourages the submission of articles in English, since this enables authors to present their ideas and work to a broader public. However, articles in other languages – with a special emphasis on the Slovenian language – are also welcome. The abstracts of the articles are always published in the language of the article and in English.

Authors who do not have native or equivalent proficiency in English must prior to submission have the article read by someone with this proficiency. This step ensures that the academic content of your paper is fully understood by journal editors and reviewers. Articles which do not meet these requirements will most likely not be considered for publication.

Manuscripts should be submitted in electronic form and must include:

- the submitted article, with the title in the language of the article and in English;
- an abstract of the article in the language of the article and in English; this should include a brief presentation of the issues discussed, the methodology used, the main findings and the conclusions;
- 3 – 7 key words in the language of the article and in English.

The length of the title, the abstract and the key words in one language should not exceed 1,100 characters (including spaces). More detailed information about the form of submitted manuscripts is presented in the prescribed template, available at the journal's website (<http://www.inv.si>).

In a separate document please submit: the title of the article, the author(s) name and a brief biographical note on each author with full contact information (for publication in the journal). Please refer to the template (at the journal's website) for further detailed information.

All submitted manuscripts are subjected to peer-review procedure by at least two reviewers. The review procedure is double blind. Authors may be asked to revise their articles bearing in mind suggestions made by the editors or reviewers. The final decision on publication rests with the editorial board.

Manuscripts should be sent by e-mail, in Word (.doc), to editor-in-chief: editorTD@guest.arnes.si.

Format and Style — The preferred **length for articles** is between 30,000 and 45,000 characters, including spaces (between approx. 4,500 and 6,500 words). Longer articles may be accepted at the discretion of the editorial board. A limited number of endnotes are permitted, if they are used for explanatory purposes only. They should be indicated serially within the article.

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Referencing Style — The **Harvard author-date system** of referencing must be used for bibliographical references in the text and in the alphabetical list of references at the end of the article. Authors should ensure that all and only those references cited in the text appear in the list of references. General bibliographies should not be provided. Authors must also follow the requirements regarding referencing style and format as presented in the table of examples, available at the journal's website (<http://www.inv.si>).