MINORITY NATIONALISM AND THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKEL	Progressive Party of the Working People (Cyprus)
BSE	bovine spongiform encephalopathy, 'mad cow disease'
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CiU	(Catalan) Convergència i Unió
CTP	Republican Turkish Party (Cyprus)
CVP	Christelijke Volkspartij (Christian People's Party) (Belgium)
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party (Northern Ireland)
EC	European Community
EFA	European Free Alliance
EU	European Union
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
Mercosur	Southern American Free Trade Area
MP	Member of Parliament
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NUTS	nomenclature of territorial units for statistics
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PR	proportional representation
RLP	Republican Labour Party (Northern Ireland)
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party (Northern Ireland)
SMP	single-member plurality (electoral system)
SNP	Scottish National Party
STV	single transferable vote
TKP	(Turkish Cypriot) Communal Liberation Party
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
Unficyp	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party (Northern Ireland)
VNP	Vlaams-Nationale Partij (Flemish National Party)
VVP	Vlaamse Volkspartij (Flemish People's Party)

CHAPTER 15

Ethnic Relations, Nationalism, and Minority Nationalism in South-Eastern Europe

MITJA ŽAGAR

Provoked by worldwide developments in the 1990s, especially the tragic events in the Balkans, ethnicity, nationalism, and ethnic conflict have attracted the attention of both scholarly and public opinion. Once again, the world has been astonished by the social and political force of ethnicity, a phenomenon that had largely been discounted since the era of decolonization. The chapter discusses the importance of ethnic relations and nationalism in multi-ethnic societies, focusing on selected countries in south-eastern Europe. After a review of the concepts of ethnicity and nationalism, it looks at contemporary questions in the Balkans. This yields some general findings about ethnic conflict and its management and shows the ways in which the international community should develop a strategy to promote democracy, human rights, and ethnic relations based on equality, tolerance, and cooperation, including the protection of national minorities.

Ethnicity, Nation-States, and Nationalism

The tragic developments in the Balkans in recent years have shown the destructive potential of ethnic conflict and reconfirmed the importance of the successful management of ethnically diverse societies. Although ethnic diversity represents only one dimension of social pluralism in modern societies, its social role and potency should not be

underestimated. Optimistic predictions by scholars and ideologists that modernization and globalization would reduce the social impact and importance of ethnicity by creating new global identities, or even do away with them altogether, have proved unfounded. Contrary to widespread expectation, modern technologies, global communication, cooperation, and the increased mobility of people appear to have contributed to increasing ethnic and cultural diversity in modern societies. Even if one rejects primordialist conceptions of ethnicity, one has to acknowledge the substantial social potency and perseverance of ethnicity in modern societies. In most environments, especially under local circumstances, it still plays a central role in political socialization and self-identification. Ethnic identities often remain the strongest collective identities in plural societies and have shown themselves able, in specific circumstances, to override individual identities or other collective identities.[1] One factor contributing to this is the prevailing perception that existing states are, or should be, ethnically based 'nation-states'.

Although the classic definition of states as persons of international law does not make reference to an ethnic basis,[2] the modern international community is still predominantly a community of nation-states.[3] According to the conception of the nation-state developed in Europe, mostly in the nineteenth century, nation-states are ethnically homogeneous states of particular 'titular nations'. This traditional concept is a product of a specific historic development in Europe that started in the sixteenth century, intensified after the Peace of Westphalia (1648), and reached fruition mostly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The formation of modern nation-states went hand in hand with the process of formation of modern European nations as specific ethnic communities. In this process states that were established as single-nation states of 'titular nations' acquired their ethnic identity.[4] This concept can be explained by a simple equation: state = nation = people.[5] The idea has persisted to the end of the twentieth century.

In reality, however, nation-states have never been ethnically homogeneous and a certain level of ethnic and cultural diversity has always existed. It has existed even in France, often cited as the typical example of a homogeneous single-nation state. When the French nation-state and French nation were created in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, regional ethnic identities were much stronger than the newly invented French identity. Official French policy, based on the unity of the French nation, has never managed to do away with specific local and regional cultures, languages, and identities, although

some of them have almost disappeared. Furthermore, in recent decades, France—like many other countries—has experienced a revival of regional ethnic sentiment.[6] Developed transportation and increased population mobility, intensified global communication, and international cooperation and interdependence in the world are key factors contributing to this trend, and this can only become more important in the future.[7] Existing symmetrical constitutional and political systems built on the traditional concept of ethnically homogeneous nation-states do not correspond to this multi-ethnic reality of modern societies. Often they lack the necessary flexibility and do not reflect adequately the existing social diversity and asymmetries. Nevertheless, the traditional concept of nation-states has not been transformed substantially and there is little evidence that it will give way soon to a more adequate concept, such as that of the multi-ethnic state.[8]

Faced with this contradiction, states have sought to impose ethnic homogeneity through socialization and by creating a myth of ethnic unity. In practice, the titular nation has often sought to impose its own definition of ethnic and national homogeneity, and then use the state to build a nation around it. The state in this context becomes more than just a socially neutral way of organizing society, but an agency for building the society itself. With the existence of ethnic minorities defined out of existence and not recognized in state constitutions, it is not surprising to find regular outbreaks of dissatisfaction on the part of non-state ethnic groups. In the absence of a model of the multi-ethnic state, these groups are stimulated to seek their own ethnically based nation-state as the only way out.

Considering its historic role, potency, and social importance, it is striking how little of a scholarly nature was written on nationalism before the 1990s.[9] This situation changed after the resurgence of nationalism in the last two decades of the twentieth century with an ever increasing volume of work being published.[10] As nationalism has become one of the central topics in current scholarly debate, however, it is subject to varying interpretations. The abundance of definitions reflects the fact that the very term 'nationalism' can be used in different ways and might have different meanings. It can describe:[11]

- an accentuated individual and collective feeling of ethnic identity and belonging to an ethnic community, usually to a nation. This identity is usually exclusive and defined in a negative way against 'others' who are not members of this ethnic community or who are not recognized as such;
- strong ethnic sentiment and emotion, often exaggerated and directed against 'others';

- a political and social ideology and a specific type of political philosophy;
- a specific political and social principle, used also as a criterion for the recognition of belonging to and membership of a certain ethnic community;
- a specific, usually ethnically exclusive, policy of social movements, political parties, or nation-states;
- political or social movements;
- a political concept and strategy aimed at political mobilization of people who feel members of a certain ethnicity; and
- a doctrine of political legitimacy.[12]

What all these meanings have in common is the idea of homogeneity, monolithism, and natural or enforced ethnic unity. The main objective of nationalism is to promote and defend the 'national interest' as it is formulated by the nationalist movement, party, or government. National interests are supreme and worth any sacrifice, including death. Whoever questions this risks being branded a traitor and expelled. An individual's duty to the polity, which represents the nation, 'overrides all public obligations, and in extreme cases (such as wars) all other obligations of whatever kind'.[13] In this way, nationalism is the most demanding form of ethnic or group identification. Nationalism in this account goes hand in hand with the existence of modern nations and nation-states: 'Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent . . . Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment. A nationalist movement is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind.'[14]

Like the myth of national homogeneity, nationalist movements themselves do not always emerge well from serious historical analyses. These show a rather different and heterogeneous picture of nationalist movements:

> Nationalist movements have never been monolithic, but were always internally divided and competitive. It is only the historiography of nationalism that always attempts to impose an interpretative patina of concord, once success has been achieved. The historiography of Italian nationalism, for example, has regularly described the profound political divisions between leaders and movements during the struggle for independence, as if they were resolved by the achievement of a state and henceforth reduced to parliamentary differences. The monuments in the urban landscape of every European country remain as testimonies to the victors' unilateral consensual reinterpretation of the past.[15]

Nonetheless, the myth of homogeneity and national unity has become an important component of every national history as it is reinterpreted by the victors, who also control the official textbooks. People brought up and schooled in the myths of national unity and homogeneity are taught to fear any possible danger to stability, homogeneity, and unity within the nation-state. This form of nationalism presents clear contradictions with liberal democracy, based, as this is, on pluralism and limitations on the dominance of majorities.

Yet it is too simple to conclude that all nationalism is anti-democratic. This depends on the definition of nationalism used, as well as the viewpoint of the observer. Nationalism was considered a positive phenomenon in the period of the formation of nations and nation-states during the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. The same was true in the period of decolonization, when nationalism was one of the driving forces of this process. The importance of nationalist movements in the process of nation-building and nation-state-building was reflected in the fact that some of the leaders of those movements were and are still considered 'fathers of their nation'.[16]

Some authors differentiate among types of nationalism. Valery Tishkov, among others, differentiates between 'ethnic nationalism' (or ethno-nationalism) and 'civic nationalism'. The former is ethnically defined, demands ethnic unity and homogeneity, and is usually exclusivist in its nature. The latter refers to an individual's belonging to and identification with a certain, at least theoretically, ethnically neutral state. This bond is usually based on citizenship as a predominantly legal link between an individual and a state. In this context, 'ethnic nationalism' is understood as a negative phenomenon, whilst 'civic nationalism' is a positive one.[17] Yael Tamir recognizes the important historic role of nationalism in the formation of nations and nation-states and in the process of modernization and its impact on liberalism and modern political philosophy. Her positive concept of 'liberal nationalism' is motivated by her commitment to pursue a national vision while remaining faithful to a set of liberal beliefs. This form of liberal nationalism is compatible with the concept of democratic citizenship, as advocated by the Council of Europe. Tamir explains:

> I have consequently refrained from taking a frequently offered piece of advice suggesting I renounce the concept of 'nationalism' in favour of a less emotionally loaded term, such as 'people' or the much discussed 'community.' Although resorting to a less controversial and less pejorative term might have made my position more acceptable, I thought I would be wrong to bypass the concept of nationalism. Liberals who give up this term and surrender it to the use of conservative political forces, or note the difference, to chauvinist and

racist ideologies, alienated themselves from a whole set of values that are of immense importance to a great many people, including liberals.[18]

She is aware of certain inherent tensions between liberal and national values, but nevertheless suggests:

> that the liberal tradition, with its respect for personal autonomy, reflection, and choice, and the national tradition, with its emphasis on belonging, loyalty, and solidarity, although generally seen as mutually exclusive, can accommodate one another. Liberals can acknowledge the importance of belonging, membership, and cultural affiliations, as well as the particular moral commitments that follow from them. Nationalists can appreciate the value of personal autonomy and individual rights and freedoms, as well as sustain a commitment for social justice both between and within nations.[19]

Nationalism in south-eastern Europe in the past decades, however, bears very little or no resemblance to these positive conceptions. Nationalism in the Balkans is traditional ethnic nationalism largely based on west European Christian traditions, especially on the nineteenth-century concept of the unification of nations and nation-states. As such, it is usually exclusivist and often hegemonic. In its pursuit of national unity and homogeneity it is hostile to 'others'. Its hegemonic nature is reflected in the call of nationalist movements for the unification of all members of a certain nation within the borders of its nation-state. If an ethnic nation-state already exists, nationalist movements try to use it for that goal. If a certain ethnic community does not have an independent state of its own, the establishment of such a nation-state is declared a central goal. In any case, nationalists and especially nationalist leaders see an independent single-nation state of their own as the only efficient instrument for the realization of their national interests.[20] Although nationalists, for different reasons, including their public appearance and requests of the international community, have often called for democratization, this has not been their primary interest and has been subordinated to their self-defined national interests. It was this logic that led to the escalation of social and ethnic conflicts that accompanied the dismantling of the former Yugoslav federation.[21]

While mainstream nationalism is focused on the state or the pursuit of one, the nationalities question has other dimensions. So some authors talk about 'nationalism of nations without states' (stateless nations), 'diaspora nationalism', 'regional nationalism', and 'minority nationalism' in multi-ethnic states.[22] The nature of minority nationalism depends, to a large extent, on the local or regional situation of the minority group. It usually focuses on the preservation of the minority

and its ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and historic identity. For that reason it can be described as a defensive nationalism that, although still exclusivist, does not build on the hostility to 'others'—in this case persons belonging to the majority population. Such a form of minority nationalism might be expected especially in those environments where relatively small national minorities are granted and guaranteed substantial minority rights and protection.

The size and political organization of a national minority represent important factors in minority nationalism.[23] If a national minority represents a relatively large share of the local or regional population, we could expect proposals for territorial autonomy including federalization of the existing unitary state. If dissatisfaction reaches a certain level, and particularly if minorities feel endangered within the existing nation-state, demands for independence might also be expected. Following the principle of self-determination, minority nationalism and nationalism of stateless nations played an important role in the formation of new nation-states in post-First World War Europe and during the era of decolonization.[24] Minority nationalisms have come to the fore in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo, in a particularly virulent manner. Here nationalism has sometimes taken a pathological form, resulting in widespread violence and 'ethnic cleansing'. Yet this was not, as often thought, the inevitable result of ancient primordial hatreds suddenly released. Rather it stemmed from the specific circumstances of regime transition, compounded by failures on the part of the international community. There are important lessons here on how ethnic and nationalist conflict should be managed and on the role to be played by the international community.

Europe and the Balkans

Until quite recently, the Balkans was a forgotten, backward, and troubled region of Europe to which the international community paid attention only when it impinged upon the strategic interests of the great powers. Not much was known about the history, culture, and situation of the region, which was often portrayed in negative stereotypes. Attention was paid only when something unexpected, tragic, or spectacular happened, but the region was soon forgotten again. This changed dramatically in the 1990s. When a war broke out in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the region came to the centre of the attention of the international public and community. The intensity of

the conflict and atrocities that accompanied it astonished the world. The international community started to search for viable solutions to the problems, but only with partial success.

The Balkan Peninsula has shared a turbulent history. It is a natural bridge between Asia and Europe and has been a crossroad of different religions, cultures, and civilizations from prehistoric times. Frequent migrations of peoples constantly changed the ethnic composition of the region. When 'new historic peoples' arrived, the old population moved to remote areas and often managed to preserve their language, culture, and identity. The division of the Roman empire in the fourth century AD established a borderline, which to a considerable extent still exists, in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the schism of 1054 AD this border divided two Christian cultures: a Roman Catholic culture in the west and an Orthodox culture in the east. The invasion of the Ottoman Turks in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries brought Islamic religion and culture to the region. Although Islam dominated Eastern culture for five centuries, it did not eliminate Orthodox Christianity. Tolerance within the Ottoman Empire enabled several specific ethnic and regional Islamic and Orthodox cultures to coexist. Nevertheless, occasional conflicts existed as in every plural environment. The border between the Roman Catholic area and the Islamic–Orthodox area stabilized along the current political borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rebellions against Ottoman rule in the nineteenth century eroded the Ottoman Empire and permitted the creation of new Balkan states. The political map of the region changed after the First World War, during the Second World War and after it, and again in the 1990s.[25]

Despite its turbulent history, and contrary to general belief, severe ethnic conflicts were not a traditional characteristic of the region. Until the 1980s the former Yugoslavia was cited as a successful multinational state that had managed to establish good ethnic relations. Even its citizens did not perceive Yugoslavia as a divided society or a fractured state. It did not match the typical model of a divided or bicommunal society characterized by protracted conflicts between two distinct ethnic, linguistic, or religious communities. Ethnic relations in Yugoslavia seemed good despite substantial ethnic diversity; ethnic conflicts that escalated occasionally in some regions were resolved successfully in a peaceful way. The war in the 1990s, however, changed the situation.

Disaggregating the Balkans

There are some important lessons to be drawn from the recent experience of the Balkans—at both the national and international levels.[26] It is especially important that the international community examines its role in historical developments in the region in different epochs. Special attention should be paid to its impact on ethnic relations taking into account substantial differences between countries and the specific situation and circumstances in each country.

Although the Balkans has always been a multi-ethnic, multicultural, multilingual, and multi-religious area[27] and occasional ethnic conflicts have existed, the region also has a tradition of ethnic and religious tolerance. Unfortunately several traditional mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts, ironically considered pre-modern, have been abolished and destroyed in the process of modernization in the past 150 years. The failure to replace these with adequate new ones helps to explain the disaster of the 1990s in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, even now the ethnic situation is not uniformly bad, and besides continued conflicts there are instances of successful accommodation. So it is dangerous to make generalizations or to consign the whole region to the same category.

All countries share the history of the region, but perceptions and interpretations of this common history and many historical events differ substantially from country to country. For example, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shared certain common historical experiences during the existence of the former Yugoslavia. Yet these shared experiences are evaluated and interpreted differently and often result in very different consequences and reactions.[28] The wars that broke up Yugoslavia in the 1990s and their tragic consequences added more material for historical interpretation and memory. Especially dangerous from the perspective of ethnic relations in these multi-ethnic societies are so-called 'new' interpretations of history produced and often used in daily politics by nationalists that can provoke new conflicts and fuel the existing ones. These 'new' histories may become major obstacles for the peace and stability in the region and for the promotion and rehabilitation of multi-ethnic societies in these countries.

It is clear that one condition for the successful management of ethnic difference is democracy, and the development of a democratic citizenship. Such a conception of democracy must include recognition of the right of groups to their own existence. There also needs to be a culture of respect for minorities and a move away from the old

nation-state model in which the titular nationality has a monopoly of power. Mechanisms are also needed to ensure minority representation in politics and administration.[29] These mechanisms and arrangements can be successful only if they are adjusted to the specific situation, circumstances, and needs of each country. Concerted efforts to implement these general guidelines will be required not only by the countries in the region, but also by the European and international community.

A lesson to be drawn from the Yugoslav experience, however, is that formal democracy is not enough and that, if not introduced in the right way, it can even exacerbate the problem. Democratization in the former Yugoslavia started in the 1980s and progressed at different speeds in different parts of the country. Many believed that the formal introduction of democracy and the multi-party political system in the late 1980s and early 1990s would transform the country into a democratic society. They did not take into account the existing differences between republics and the fact that there was no adequate social infrastructure for democracy in most parts of the country. Historical experiences in now developed democracies show that democratization usually takes a long time, often several generations. A functioning democracy requires a democratic political culture and a certain level of political socialization. In Yugoslavia there were few democratic political traditions, and most politicians were politically socialized in a totalitarian system. There was no tradition of support for competing political parties, with stable bases of support. People were unfamiliar with the political ideologies found in democratic polities. In these conditions the political leaders and parties sought a way to mobilize the people successfully, and ethnicity and nationalism became an obvious dividing line.

To prevent this from developing into conflict, there should have been power-sharing institutions in place, as well as laws to ensure ethnic equality and protection of minorities. The international community had a role to play here. However, the Yugoslav crisis showed the lack of adequate mechanisms at the international level to manage and resolve such crises. The lack of adequate coherent international strategy contributed substantially to the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis. Mixed signals and the constantly shifting policy of individual Western countries and the European Community contributed to the confusion. All actors in the crisis interpreted these mixed signals as support from the international community for their cause. The Yugoslav president, Ante Markovic, and the federal government believed that the international community would support their economic and political

reforms leading to democratization of the country. The democratic opposition and reformist political leaders in the republics (especially in Slovenia and Croatia) believed that the international community would do everything to protect them. Unitarists, including Slobodan Milošević,[30] thought that the international community would support their policy including the use of force to preserve the existing political arrangements, territorial integrity, and unity of the country. Such misperceptions played a central role in deepening the crisis that led to conflict. Moreover, when the conflict began, the international community failed to intervene in Croatia and waited until several thousand people were killed and hundreds of thousands driven from their homes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. To a large extent, the same mistakes were repeated in Kosovo.

The earlier intervention takes place, the easier it is to prevent conflict. In retrospect, we can detect several signals and warnings of the impending chaos, all of which were ignored. They were: growing intolerance; political mobilization along ethnic lines; increasing nationalism in different nations and the presentation of nationalist programmes that argue for exclusion or domination; lack of communication and cooperation; an absence of common interests; and calls for increasing autonomy and independence. Preventive intervention and the implementation of a range of prescriptions, including an accelerated process of integration of Yugoslavia into the European Community, would have gone a long way towards preventing disaster.

Conclusion: The Role of Europe and the International Community

The international community was caught off guard in Yugoslavia. Its failure there underlines the urgent need for the development of effective international strategies and mechanisms that would prevent similar failures in future.

The first step is for the international community to ensure that there are no gains from the chauvinistic policies that ruptured Yugoslavia's multi-ethnic societies. An important part of this is the effective punishment of those who are responsible for ethnic cleansing and war crimes. It is essential that Europe, as an important actor in the international community, presses for the successful establishment of the International Criminal Court and for the successful functioning of the international tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

More is required than punitive measures, however. The international community, and Europe as an integral part of it, should recognize that the inclusion of different troubled regions in international cooperation and economic integration is the most productive way to prevent the outbreak and escalation of ethnic conflict. Such an approach has already proved very successful in central and eastern Europe. Inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the process of the eastern enlargement of the European Union (EU), and, in some cases, even the promise of future inclusion in this process have helped to stimulate salutary economic and democratic political reforms throughout central and eastern Europe (see Chapter 16).[31] Similarly, the most effective strategy for the resolution of problems in the Balkans is the inclusion of this region in the wider European order, including the EU. Admittedly, it will be very difficult for many of the Balkan countries to meet the required criteria for accession to the EU, but all of them, with the exception of Serbia, are committed to becoming EU members and are keen to do what is required.[32] The difficulties of including south-eastern Europe, moreover, have to be weighed against the costs of excluding it, and the danger of continuing political instability in the region.

The enlargement of the EU to include south-eastern Europe, rather than just central and eastern Europe, will have a number of positive effects on inter-ethnic relations in the region. In the short term the inclusion of Balkan countries as candidate members will require them to meet the EU's political conditions for accession, which include high standards of democracy and respect for minority rights. Membership, by enabling faster social development and a better life for people, can offer a viable alternative to traditional exclusive and aggressive nationalist ideologies.

International integration, particularly within the context of the EU, will allow for international cooperation of subnational regions and decentralization within states. Together, these may well provide new frameworks for the regulation and management of ethnic relations and conflicts.[33] They might produce mechanisms that would address specific needs and interests of different communities and environments by providing new functional frameworks beyond the nation-state. Trans-border cooperation and democratic institutions within new trans-border regions can address the specific interests of people living in a certain territory in a way that would be impossible within the borders of the existing nation-states, while the broader European context can assist the realization of other common interests. This might also change the traditional perception of majorities and minori-

ties. Within Europe even the largest nations are, in a way, minorities, so they could become more receptive to ethnic and cultural diversity, ideas of multiculturalism and interculturalism, and the need for protection of minorities.

In the longer term the construction of a common European identity, built on principles of multiculturalism and interculturalism, could become a powerful alternative to existing exclusionist nationalist concepts and politics. As a multi-layered identity based on diversity, the new European identity should ensure tolerance and coexistence of different identities that are often seen as competing. The Council of Europe and the EU could and should play key roles in building this common European identity. Awareness-raising campaigns aimed at the promotion of multicultural societies, tolerance and cooperation, multiculturalism–interculturalism, and the protection of minorities would be important elements of their strategy. These campaigns should increase awareness of the potential danger and destructive power of nationalism in multi-ethnic societies—especially in generating and escalating violent ethnic conflicts.

In the period before the various countries of south-eastern Europe are admitted into the EU, or offered candidate status, the EU should seek to stimulate cooperation in the region and promote the improvement of ethnic relations and protection of minorities in multi-ethnic societies as vital fields of cooperation based on existing international legal standards, especially the conventions of the Council of Europe and the Copenhagen standards on democracy. Help with economic reconstruction will also be essential. The EU initiative to conclude and develop the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, signed at Cologne in June 1999, is a good start in this direction. It is aimed at strengthening the countries of south-eastern Europe in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights, and economic prosperity. However, its success will depend largely on the commitment, financial and otherwise, of the various donor states.

On a broader note, to prevent similar tragic developments in other parts of the world the international community should develop precise rules and procedures for intervention in ethnic trouble-spots. They will have to determine decision-making procedures and the role that countries and international organizations should play in these activities. This process should include also international public awareness-raising campaigns that would explain the potential danger of exclusivist nationalism, xenophobia, and expansionism to the international public and mobilize the necessary support for international intervention. Considering the possibility of similar conflicts in

Europe, such mechanisms should become also a central segment of European integration processes. They should include early-warning systems that would give the international community the necessary response time for the development and implementation of measures for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises.

Intervention should encompass not simply peace-making, that is, putting an end to conflict, but also peace-building, which requires economic reconstruction and the establishment of political institutions that can serve as channels for the expression of existing pluralism and interests. Instead of nation-states that generate conflict through the promotion of nationalism and exclusionist practices, there should be an emphasis on the building of states based on the principle of multiculturalism and inter-culturalism.

NOTES

1. R. Jenkins, *Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations* (London: Sage, 1997), 44–8; A. D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
2. This generally accepted definition in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933 reads: 'The State as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) permanent population; b) defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.' See also J. G. Starke, *Introduction to International Law*, 10th ed. (London: Butterworth, 1989).
3. K. W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement* (New York: Archon Books, 1970).
4. C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), 192–211; H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (London: Methuen, 1977); Smith, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*.
5. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1789: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 23.
6. P. Fougeyrollas, *Pour une France fédérale—vers l'unité européenne par la révolution régionale* (Paris: Médiations, Éditions Denoel, 1968). Intensified (international) migrations and the existing (substantial) immigrant population contribute to additional ethnic and cultural diversity in France in the 20th century that is likely to increase in the future.
7. G. Ambrosius and W. H. Hubbard, *A Social and Economic History of Twentieth-Century Europe*, trans. F. Tribe and W. H. Hubbard (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 28–42, 84–6.
8. A series of interesting articles that discuss the adequacy of the traditional concept and model of (single) nation-states in multi-ethnic societies was published in recent years also in the journal *Treatises and Documents* published by the Institute for Ethnic Studies. See B. Bučar, 'The Emergence of New States, Borders and Minorities', *Razpave in gradivo/Treatises and Documents*, 32 (1997), 15–29; H. Gärntner, 'State, Nation and Security in Central Europe: Democratic States

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13. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1789*, 9.
14. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1.
15. S. Woolf, 'Introduction', in Woolf (ed.), *Nationalism in Europe*, 31.
16. The term 'nation' in this context usually refers to both—a nation and a state. It describes the role of these leaders in the transformation of an ethnic community into a modern nation, and in the formation of a single-nation state of this 'titular nation'.

17. Žagar, 'A Contribution to an "Ethnic Glossary"', 164.
18. Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism*, 5.
19. Ibid. 6.
20. J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith, 'Introduction', in Hutchinson and Smith (eds.), *Nationalism*, 5–13.
21. Since a sufficient number of recent and relevant titles on this topic exist in many languages, it will not be discussed in this contribution.
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23. M. Keating, 'Northern Ireland and the Basque Country', in J. McGarry (ed.), *Northern Ireland in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); G. Smith, 'Russia, Multiculturalism and Federal Justice', *Europe–Asia Studies*, 50/8 (1998), 1393–1411.
24. See Macartney, *National States and National Minorities*, 179–211.
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26. This section is based on the work of the Special Delegation of Council of Europe Advisers on Minorities, of which the author was a member in 1999, author's research, and field trips to the region.
27. See *World Directory of Minorities* (London: Minority Rights Group International, 1997), 155–8 (Greece), 196–201 and 256–8 (central and eastern Europe—general), 201–5 (Albania), 205–8 (Bosnia-Herzegovina), 209–13 (Bulgaria), 213–16 (Croatia), 233–6 (Macedonia), 240–4 (Romania), 250–8 (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—Serbia and Montenegro), and 378–84 (Turkey).
28. Such as the resistance during the Second World War, ethnic policy at different historic stages of the former Yugoslavia, evolution of its constitutional system, social and economic crisis in the 1980s, handling of this crisis by the federal authorities and authorities in individual federal units, reforms and process of democratization that started in the 1980s, disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. All mentioned historic events and experiences, and their specific interpretations and evaluations continue to have an impact also on ethnic relations in individual countries.
29. See *Promotion of Multi-Ethnic Society and Democratic Citizenship: Report of the Special Delegation of Council of Europe Advisers*, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Working Table I on Democratisation and Human Rights (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 6 Mar. 2000).

30. The Serbian communist leader Slobodan Milošević advocated a strong and centralized federation based on the monopoly of power of the (recentralized) League of Communists of Yugoslavia, hoping that this would ensure his power.
31. M. Wohlfeld, 'Sicherheit', in Bartelsmann Stiftung Forschungsgruppe Europa (ed.), *Kosten, Nutzen und Chancen der Osterweiterung für die Europäische Union* (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1998). See also A. Mayhew, *Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 185–8; C. P. Wood, 'European Political Cooperation: Lessons from the Gulf War and Yugoslavia', in A. W. Cafruny and G. Rosenthal (eds.), *The Maastricht Debates and Beyond* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993).
32. See e.g. I. Brinar and M. Svetličič, 'Enlargement of the European Union: The Case of Slovenia', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6/5 (Dec. 1999), 802–21.
33. See e.g. B. Bučar, 'International Cooperation of European Subnational Regions', *Journal of International Relations*, 2/1 (1995), 4–17.