Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Edited by Dennis J. D. Sandole, Sean Byrne, Ingrid Sandole-Staroste and Jessica Senehi

Foreword by Dean G. Pruitt
Contents

List of figures xi
List of tables xiii
Notes on contributors xv
Foreword by Dean G. Pruitt xix
Preface by Dennis J. D. Sandole, Sean Byrne, Ingrid Sandole-Staroste and Jessica Senehi xxv
Acknowledgments xxv

Introduction

Confict analysis and resolution as a multidiscipline:
a work in progress 1
SEAN BYRNE AND JESSICA SENEHI

PART I
Core concepts and theories 17

1 The role of identity in conflict 19
CELIA COOK-HUFFMAN

2 Encountering nationalism: the contribution of peace studies and conflict resolution 32
HARRY ANASTASIOUT

3 Gender relations and conflict transformation among refugee women 45
ANNA SNYDER

4 Causation as a core concept in conflict analysis 59
DANIEL ROTHBART AND ROSE CHERUBIN

5 The challenge of operationalizing key concepts in conflict resolution theory in international and subnational conflicts 71
FREDERIC S. PEARSON AND MARIE OLSON LOUNSBERY

6 The enemy and the innocent in violent conflicts 85
DANIEL ROTHBART AND KARINA V. KOROSTELINA
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Identity conflicts: models of dynamics and early warning</td>
<td>Karina V. Korostelina</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Generativity-based conflict: maturing microfoundations for conflict theory</td>
<td>Solon J. Simmons</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>PART II</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Core approaches: conceptual and methodological</td>
<td></td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Human agonistes: interdisciplinary inquiry into ontological agency and human conflict</td>
<td>Thomas E. Boudreau</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The ethnography of peace education: some lessons learned from Palestinian–Jewish integrated education in Israel</td>
<td>Zvi Bekerman</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Waging conflicts constructively</td>
<td>Louis Kriesberg</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>A social-psychological approach to conflict analysis and resolution</td>
<td>Herbert C. Kelman</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Building relational empathy through an interactive design process</td>
<td>Benjamin J. Broome</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Building peace: storytelling to transform conflicts constructively</td>
<td>Jessica Senehi</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>A capacity-building approach to conflict resolution</td>
<td>Allan Edward Barsky</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Gender mainstreaming: a valuable tool in building sustainable peace</td>
<td>Ingrid Sandole-Staroste</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Culture theory, culture clash, and the practice of conflict resolution</td>
<td>Kevin Avruch</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Conflict resolution: the missing link between liberal international relations theory and realistic practice</td>
<td>Nimet Beriker</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Understanding the conflict–development nexus and the contribution of development cooperation to peacebuilding</td>
<td>Thania Paffenholtz</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Evaluation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding</td>
<td>Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak, Bruce Dayton, and Thania Paffenholtz</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART III
Core practices: processes

21 Conflict transformation: reasons to be modest
   STEPHEN RYAN

22 Mediation frames/justice games
   ANDREW WOOLFORD AND R. S. RATNER

23 Interactive conflict resolution: dialogue, conflict analysis,
   and problem solving
   RONALD J. FISHER

24 Mediation and international conflict resolution: analyzing
   structure and behavior
   JACOB BERCOVITCH

25 Ethical and gendered dilemmas of moving from emergency
   response to development in “failed” states
   JANIE LEATHERMAN AND NADEZHDA GRIFFIN (FORMERLY NEGRUSTUEVA)

26 Memory retrieval and truth recovery
   PAUL ARTHUR

27 Shifting from coherent toward holistic peace processes
   SUSAN ALLEN NAN

28 Law and legal processes in resolving international conflicts
   MICHELLE GALLANT

PART IV
Alternative voices and complex intervention designs

29 Restorative processes of peace and healing within the governing
   structures of the Rotinonshonni “Longhouse People”
   BRIAN RICE

30 Critical systematic inquiry in conflict analysis and resolution:
   an essential bridge between theory and practice
   DENNIS J. D. SANDOLE

31 From diagnosis to treatment: toward new shared principles
   for Israeli–Palestinian peacebuilding
   WALID SALEM AND EDY KAUFMAN

32 Strategies for the prevention, management, and/or resolution of
   (ethnic) crisis and conflict: the case of the Balkans
   MITJA ŽAGAR
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33 The perception of economic assistance in Northern Ireland and its role in the peace process</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAN BYRNE, CYNTHIA IRVIN, AND EYOB FISSUH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 Conflict resolution in an age of empire: new challenges to an emerging field</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICHARD E. RUBENSTEIN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 Toward a conflictology: the quest for transdisciplinarity</td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOHAN GALTUNG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 Revisiting the CAR field</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAN BYRNE AND JESSICA SENEHI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epilogue: implications for theory, research, practice, and teaching</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DENNIS J. D. SANDOLE AND INGRID SANDOLE-STAROSTE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
32 Strategies for the prevention, management, and/or resolution of (ethnic) crisis and conflict

The case of the Balkans

Mitja Žagar

Acronyms and abbreviations

- BSEC: Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation
- CEI: Central European Initiative
- CoE: Council of Europe
- ECs: European Communities
- EEC: European Economic Community (until 1992)
- EU: European Union
- NGOs: non-governmental organizations
- OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
- OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
- SDCoE: Special Delegation of Council of Europe Advisors on Minorities
- SECI: Southeast European Cooperative Initiative
- SEECP: South-East European Cooperation Process
- SP: Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
- UN: United Nations
- UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- WEU: Western European Union

Introduction

The tragic wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s took the international community by surprise. They shocked the international public with their ferocity, intensity and brutality. Although the images on TV appeared distant, these wars were happening in Europe, on “our doorsteps” at a time of optimism when the “Cold War” and bipolar division of the world ended. Media coverage of the “Yugoslav crisis” not only shaped the reaction of the public, but also conditioned the reactions of the international community and its key players.

Under pressure from the public, shocked by TV coverage, the international community was forced to intervene in the Yugoslav crisis when the war broke out. However, rather than studying and evaluating the situation and recent developments in the Balkans, the international community – once again – decided to use an “old stereotype” of the Balkans as a major trouble spot. Consequently, the international community and its main actors did not have a precise picture and understanding of the situation and developments that would have been necessary to develop adequate strategies and responses. Additionally, it seemed that appropriate and effective international mechanisms (including mechanisms
and measures for early detection and warning of crises and conflicts) were lacking as well. (see Sandole 1999, 2007). Although the Yugoslav crisis was recognized as an immanent threat to international peace and stability, international actions and measures were often inadequate or late in responding to unfolding developments on the ground. Often, these responses were described as “too little – too late.” Owing to the absence of a coherent strategy, international responses often lacked consistency.

Had early warning mechanisms been in place, they could have detected the role the media played in generating and shaping the Yugoslav crisis by spreading “hate speech” and nationalist rhetoric (mis)used for political mobilization along ethnic lines. TV broadcasting was instrumental in this context, especially in Serbia. Fears of such practices were expressed in different parts of Yugoslavia and appeared in some press commentaries. However, relevant decisionmakers in the country and abroad did not pay attention to these early warnings. Consequently, no adequate measures and actions were taken to prevent the ensuing tragic developments.

Furthermore, missing, indecisive, and sometimes contradictory signals and reactions by the international community were interpreted differently by various domestic actors, contributing to the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis. In a way, the situation was a side effect of dramatic developments in the international community at the time. The end of bipolarity and the process of disintegration of the Soviet Union attracted central attention, whereas Yugoslavia no longer seemed that important for the international community.

This chapter explores strategies, policies, measures, and activities aimed at the preservation and strengthening of peace, and the management and resolution of crises and conflicts. Using the Balkans and the Yugoslav crisis as a case study, special attention is paid to de-escalating conflicts that are transitioning into violence, terminating wars and hostilities, restoring and preserving peace, and post-conflict development, rebuilding of cooperation and rehabilitation of multiethnic societies, and the role of the international community in these activities.

The central hypothesis is that the lack of a coherent and elaborated strategy for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts, plus absence of adequate coordination and cooperation in the international community (including among others the UN, EEC/EU/ECs, and the great powers), played an important role in the escalation and development of the “Yugoslav crisis” (e.g. Sandole 2007).

The analysis of the Yugoslav crisis shows that the international community was caught off guard. Obviously it was not prepared to deal with such a major crisis. Although the Yugoslav crisis was evident for several years, the international community did not detect it and/or did not realize the role that international factors played in it. Indeed, the international community failed to develop and implement effective preventive measures. Furthermore, contradictory international responses and signals contributed to the escalation of the crisis. The reactions of the international community demonstrated that it had hardly any knowledge and understanding of the region and of its history, culture, and diverse societies. Additionally, adequate strategies and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts were missing at the national and almost all relevant subnational levels of the former Yugoslavia.

The international community did not adequately implement experiences and existing knowledge in peacemaking and conflict resolution. Therefore, my second hypothesis is that the systematic use of existing frameworks, models, methods, and techniques for the regulation and management of diversity and ethnic relations, and for the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts within a global international strategy
(which was also lacking), would have improved the situation and contributed to a more successful management of the crisis. Of course, these tools would have to be adequately accommodated to the specificity of the region and individual societies and to the specific nature of conflicts that were perceived as ethnic conflicts.

Analyzing the Balkans, this chapter attempts to develop a basic framework and some key elements of an integral, coherent, and elaborate strategy for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts, paying special attention to diversity management. This theoretical model was developed in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. Its aim was to create a global framework for successful coordination of relevant actors that could contribute to de-escalation of crises and conflicts and could improve the situation and outcomes in the Balkans in the long run. Actors included local communities and government, civic societies and especially NGOs, public and private institutions, regions and states, with their administrations and governments, which should work in concert with international organizations and community. The framework was designed in a hope that such a model could be useful also in other cases, but only when adequately adjusted to reflect the particular situation and environment.

The Yugoslav crisis, some international responses to it, and its aftermath

Studying the Yugoslav crisis and its aftermath, I realize that this historic process and its segments are far more complex and multidimensional than one would have guessed even from reading the most complex and interdisciplinary scholarly literature. In addition to considering different combinations of domestic and external factors that have determined individual events and historic epochs, one should examine the interplay of these events and epochs, and their interaction with other relevant contemporary and interwoven processes and events, from the local and micro to the global and universal levels. Even for a single event it might be difficult to establish all relevant factual information, the actors, and their actual sequence of influence. However, knowing some history and key characteristics, and recognizing trends of developments in countries and communities, by analyzing current processes it might be possible to establish a general picture and overall situation in a certain historic time and predict likely consequences. One would expect that this would be the approach of crisis and conflict managers and conflict resolution practitioners. However, having been involved in diverse activities and attempts, and studying the work and behavior of different organizations, institutions, and countries that were intervening in Yugoslavia, I noticed the absence of adequate knowledge and information on the country and its various parts, their histories, and current situations and processes. Even more shocking was the lack of a coherent strategy and defined common goals of what should be achieved by a concerted effort. An appropriate institutional framework, useful in facilitating effective intervention into a specific situation and/or environment, was also missing.

Speaking of the Yugoslav crisis, I always stressed that it was the result of a complex combination and interplay of numerous and various domestic and external factors (see Sandole 1999, 2007). Consequently, it might be useful to discuss the following causal factors and narratives.

Initially, the main sources and factors underlying the Yugoslav crisis were predominantly internal. Their common denominator was the inability of the regime to respond effectively to different problems and a growing economic, social, and political crisis. A certain gap between (a) the normative framework and official declarations and (b) the actual
situation exists in every society. However, a problem becomes serious when a system is no longer able to respond to indications of a growing gap, and when its interventions do not influence the actual situation and reduce or resolve detected problems. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the Yugoslav regime was able to intervene successfully when crises escalated with the introduction of reforms and transformation of the existing political system through constitutional amendments. However, in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s the system failed. Unable to build the necessary consensus and to mobilize relevant institutions and all parts of the country for the elaboration of key common interests and their realization, the system was paralyzed and its institutions blocked. Consequently, the inability of the system to cope adequately with the emerging crises and problems contributed to their escalation (e.g. Klemenčič and Zagar 2004: 199–217).

Social crisis was escalating in the context of an ongoing power struggle within the Yugoslav regime. Although President Josip Broz Tito had died in 1980, the true power struggle did not start until the second half of the 1980s. Previously, it was thought that through a (bureaucratic) system of collective leadership the system would be able to replace the role of its late charismatic leader. However, the system lacked adequate centripetal forces and failed to mobilize resources, population, and institutions. Consequently, it was unable to respond to challenges and meet the expectations of the people. As the crisis deepened, the holder of political power monopoly, the League of Communists, was unable to exercise its constitutionally established monopoly. By the late 1980s, the Serbian communist leader Slobodan Milošević realized that the hunting season for power in Yugoslavia was open, and decided to capture it through his populist and nationalistic politics. He wanted to reverse democratization by restoring and strengthening the monopoly of the communist party, its domination over the system and its institutions, and by responding to problems and crises through centralization of the system. The intensity of negative responses and opposition from other parts of Yugoslavia surprised him. The internal struggle, opposition, and inability to act led to the dissolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, while the system was becoming ever more paralyzed. Simultaneously, democratization was progressing – with different intensity and speed in different parts of the country.

The federal Yugoslav government of Prime Minister Ante Marković reacted by introducing reforms, including reforms of the political system that were introducing political pluralism. Such reforms were welcomed by the West, which often saw the formal introduction of democracy and a multiparty system as a "magic cure" for all problems. A lesson to be drawn from the Yugoslav experience, however, is that the formal introduction of democracy is not enough. Furthermore, it can even exacerbate problems and contribute to the escalation of crises and conflicts if the circumstances and characteristics of a specific environment are not taken into account. Democratization in each country needs to take into account the country's specific history, situation, circumstances, ethnic and social makeup of its population, current conditions of ethnic relations, different existing needs and interests, etc. However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many, including several civil society activists, believed that the formal introduction of democracy and a multiparty political system could transform the system and Yugoslavia into a truly democratic society. They did not take into account the existing differences between republics and the fact that there was no adequate social and political basis or infrastructure for multiparty democracy in most parts of the country. Historic experiences in developed democracies show that democratization is a complex social process that takes a long time, often involving several generations. A functioning democracy requires the formal existence and functioning of democratic institutions and a developed democratic political culture. In
Yugoslavia, democracy was not well established before World War II, and after the war political monism was introduced, although there were some efforts at democratization. Intense democratization in Slovenia, which was then leading the way started only in the 1980s. In this respect, Yugoslavia was not very different from other former communist countries. In environments where political monism existed for a long time, there were only a few democratic political experiences, and most politicians were politically socialized in a totalitarian system within the former ruling party. There was no tradition of support for competing political parties, which lacked traditional and stable social, political, and ideological bases of support. Most people were unfamiliar with the political ideologies traditionally found in democratic polities. Under such conditions, political leaders and parties desperately searched for a way to bring about successful political mobilization of people.

The introduction of political pluralism in an ethnically plural environment without democratic traditions can lead to divisions along ethnic lines, as politicians and parties use ethnic identification of people for their political purposes. This happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and other parts of the country. Nationalism and nationalistic policies were used to mobilize ethnic political support and to frame new national interests and politics, consequently contributing to problems in ethnic relations and to the escalation of crisis and conflicts in Yugoslavia and its different parts, especially in the ethnically more plural and diverse republics. Nationalistic policies were among the key generators of wars (e.g. Roshwald 2006: 126–34).

Democratization in multiethnic societies where a democratic culture is not developed requires transitional mechanisms that contribute to prevention of direct political confrontation along ethnic lines. The international community could help by encouraging power sharing during the transitional phase, and should insist on the introduction of such mechanisms to ensure ethnic equality and adequate protection of minorities.

The lack of adequate formal and informal mechanisms and strategies for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts at all levels (local, republic, subnational, national, and international) contributed to the escalation of crisis and disintegration of Yugoslavia. Internally, the absence of such mechanisms was a consequence of the Yugoslav communist ideology that claimed that Yugoslavia was a “non-conflict” society where the introduction of (socialist) self-management and implications of self-management for all spheres of life would resolve all major conflicts, including social, class, and ethnic conflicts. Consequently, the constitutional and legal system did not include any formal mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts. When conflicts appeared, they were resolved in an informal way – if necessary, by a direct intervention from President Tito. With Tito’s death and the dissolution of the League of Communists, however, informal mechanisms for the management and resolution disappeared as well.

The Yugoslav crisis showed the inability of the international community to manage such crises. Furthermore, the international community, especially the West, with their mixed signals, shifting position(s), and activities contributed to the confusion and the escalation of crises and conflicts in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mixed international signals were interpreted as support from the international community for their cause by all sides within Yugoslavia. The federal prime minister, Ante Marković, believed that the international community supported economic and political reforms leading to a market economy and democratization of the country. The democratic opposition and reformist political leaders in the republics (especially in Slovenia and Croatia) expected that the international community would do everything to protect and stimulate democratization and development of
a multiparty political system. Unitarists, including Slobodan Milosevic, thought that the international community would support their policy even if they chose military intervention to preserve the existing political arrangements, territorial integrity, and unity of the country.

When the crisis escalated, the international community failed to intervene and prevent its further escalation and transformation into violent conflicts that grew into tragic wars. Consequently, the lack of a coherent strategy and the inability of the international community to react in time contributed to the dreadful death toll. The international community failed to intervene in Croatia in time and waited until several thousand people were killed and hundreds of thousands had been driven from their homes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other regions. To a large extent, the same tactics were repeated in Kosovo. It seemed that the international community forgot to use the most important rule of conflict management and resolution: the earlier a conflict is detected and the lower its intensity, the easier it is to prevent or resolve it. In retrospect, we can detect several signals and warnings of the coming escalation of conflicts in Yugoslavia. The main indicators of the worsening ethnic conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia were, among others: signs of growing differences and conflicts among federal units in different spheres of life; the lack of communication between federal units, and between federal units and the federation; misperceptions and lack of information in individual environments on developments in other parts of Yugoslavia; growing intolerance and hate speech in the media; political mobilization along ethnic lines; upsurging nationalism(s) in different parts of the country and elaboration of nationalistic programs arguing for exclusion or domination; lack of communication and cooperation in economic and other fields; and absence of common interests. A specific sign of a growing crisis was claims for increasing autonomy and independence by federal units that demanded decentralized reforms of the federation because they were unhappy with Milosevic's demands for recentralization and re-establishment of the political monopoly of the communist regime. These political and ideological differences and conflicts were transformed into ethnic conflicts, when nationalism was used for the political mobilization of people along ethnic lines.

If mechanisms for the detection of signs and indicators of escalating crises and conflicts had been in place before the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis, the international community, especially European countries, could have undertaken preventive measures and developed adequate alternative strategies for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts. I would argue that the best preventive strategy in the late 1980s would have been an accelerated process of integration of the former Yugoslavia into the European Community.

Without a comprehensive and operational international strategy, international actions and measures were mostly (delayed) reactions to developments on the ground. However, the international community was instrumental in ending the war and in determining some post-conflict arrangements by providing a legal framework especially through the UN Security Council resolutions, Dayton Accords, and Rambouillet agreement.

When the war ended in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia retrieved its previously occupied territories, the international community faced new challenges. What should it do to help undo the tragic consequences of nationalism-driven policies, ethnic cleansing, and recent wars that had destroyed multiethnic societies? If the international community was to be credible in a post-conflict situation and in the prevention of such and similar unacceptable practices in the future, it had – at least formally – to reject any gains resulting from such practices and to establish an international tribunal to prosecute perpetrators
of such atrocities. The report of the Special Delegation of Council of Europe Advisors
on Minorities identified the rehabilitation of multiethnic society as the most important
task in environments where a traditional multiethnic society had been seriously damaged
or destroyed. It was obvious that such a difficult, costly, and long-term task would be
impossible without the engagement and assistance of the international community, which
was also expected to become instrumental in stimulating and developing the necessary
political will. Consequently, the report of the Special Delegation indicated that the pro-
motion and development of multicultural societies and democratic citizenship should be
key elements of a general strategy that would require specific country-adjusted programs
(SDCoE 2000).

In the Balkans the international community has not been very successful at executing
these tasks. It has not managed to establish and develop adequate international mechanisms
and strategies for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts, which
could be employed preventively to combat and reduce the socially destructive power of
nationalism and nationalist policies. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP) was
an attempt to address the problems of the region in a new and holistic way that was at least
partially successful.¹

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP): expectations and results

Recognizing that the existing international organizations and mechanisms had not proven
very successful in addressing the crisis in the Balkans, the EU initiated the SP to strengthen
countries in southeastern Europe in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for
human rights, and economic prosperity, in order to achieve stability in the whole region.

Three Working Tables were established to deal with (1) democratization and human
rights; (2) economic reconstruction, development, and cooperation; and (3) security issues.
The Working Tables were divided into task forces that coordinated a number of projects
and initiatives carried out by different implementing agencies (including NGOs, private
companies, and international organizations) and funded by donors that stipulated their
support at funding conferences. However, from the very beginning, insufficient funding
was one of the main problems of the SP.

The SP was an attempt to address holistically the problem of peace and stability in the
war-torn Balkans. It appeared that the international community had finally recognized
that peace and stability could only be sustainable if the region reached a certain level of
social and economic development that would offer people there the prospect of a normal
and good life. Such a prospect requires high standards of human rights, including rights
of minorities, and a functioning democracy. To realize these central goals signatory states
pledged to cooperate “towards preserving the multinational and multiethnic diversity of
countries in the region, and protecting minorities.” To achieve these goals the SP (1999)
states that

Working Table 1 on democratisation and human rights . . . will address:

i democratisation and human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to
national minorities; free and independent media; civil society building; rule of
law and law enforcement; institution building; efficient administration and good
governance; development of common rules of conduct on border related ques-
tions; other related questions of interest to the participants;
refugee issues, including protection and return of refugees and displaced persons.

I consider these issues important from the perspective of the management of diversity and for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts in the region. I was happy to see that many relevant actors — the governments of the countries of the region; other countries and international organizations; scholarly, research, and educational institutions; NGOs, private companies, etc. — decided to take part in the activities of all three Working Tables and their Task Forces. Especially important were hundreds of projects and programs that addressed specific issues in individual countries and/or in the region.

Not surprisingly, countries of the region participated in those projects and activities and invested high hopes in the SP, especially its economic and developmental programs and projects. Although the SP, its projects and programs have contributed to the improvement of the situation, the SP has not met the high expectations of the region, its states, and people. Often the countries of the region expressed their interests and needs and suggested certain policies, but other member states and international organizations did not pay adequate attention to these requests and proposals.

Although I was aware that the actual funding would not be sufficient, I did not expect that the interest of potential donors and the international community would dry up so quickly. Consequently, several important and successful projects were ended because of a lack of funding, sometimes before they were able to produce the expected results or impact the situation to the expected extent. There was successful cooperation of different international organizations and institutions within the context of several programs and activities that created new synergies. However, much of the rivalry and envy among different organizations and their staff continued to exist.

Alternative approaches and elements of the global international strategy for the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts

Living through and studying the crisis and tragic wars in Yugoslavia, I studied reasons for the failures of the regime, for the problems that the successor states encountered, and for the inability of the international community to successfully prevent, manage, and resolve the escalation of crises and conflicts. I wondered how the diversities and asymmetries that exist in almost all modern societies could be managed successfully. I searched for ideologies and practices that would be able to regulate and manage diversities and asymmetries in peaceful and democratic ways, based on the recognition, respect, and integration of diversity; promotion of tolerance, coexistence, and cooperation; equal rights; active and voluntary integration; and social equality of all individuals and distinct communities in any given society.

I studied all available literature on conflict resolution and on conflict management in an attempt to determine which methods and techniques could have been applied to the Yugoslav crises. Doing research, some practical work, counseling, and teaching, I experimented with different approaches, methods, and techniques. Sometimes, I tried to use combinations of different approaches, methods, and techniques that, theoretically, were considered inconsistent and/or incompatible. Frequently, I was able to get some positive results that otherwise seemed impossible. Simultaneously, I was developing a theoretical
model and strategy for the regulation and management of diversity and ethnic relations in plural societies, including a model for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts. In this process, using my experiences I tried to combine theory and practice, different approaches, methods, and techniques. When I presented these attempts to my colleagues, reactions were mostly positive and their comments helped me to develop the model and strategy further. I used some elements of this model while working with the SP, CoE, and OSCE, especially as analytical tools.

Recognizing that conflicts, as consequences of the existence of different interests, are normal phenomena in a plural and diverse society and not a deviant situation, we need to develop adequate and (one hopes) democratic mechanisms for the prevention of their escalation, especially for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts. However, regimes and ruling elites fear conflicts, which they see as possible threats to social stability and their role in society, because of their potential consequences for the existence of the prevailing political systems. Consequently, educational systems and political socialization embed the fear of conflicts in our mind and conscience, ignoring their potentially positive dimensions.

The literature shows convincingly that social conflicts and their escalation could be successfully prevented, managed, and/or resolved in a democratic way within the institutions of the political system. The same is true for ethnic conflict, although they are a very specific type of social conflict. Consequently, their specific emotional energy (charge), conditioned by the nature and intensity of ethnic identification and identities, should be considered. For that reason, it would be useful to develop a new ideology and conceptual framework for multiethnic societies, based on the principles of tolerance, coexistence, and cooperation. Such a new ideology of cooperation would replace, or at least complement, the currently prevailing ideologies of competition.

Processes of international integration and evolution of the existing model of nation-states could lead to a certain erosion of sovereignty. However, these are unlikely to result in a generally accepted concept of multiethnic states. Alternative solutions must be sought. The promotion of multiculturalism/interculturalism, advocated by the CoE and EU, could prove useful. Multiculturalism/interculturalism could contribute to a more tolerant society and, in time, develop a positive perception of ethnic and cultural diversity. Rather than a problem, ethnic and cultural diversity should be seen as a comparative advantage. Consequently, new types of inclusive collective identities should develop as the basis for European integration and common European identities (Zagar 2003).

The capacity of the international community to handle crises would improve if it recognized that the most productive way to prevent escalation and to facilitate resolution of potential international crises is through the inclusion of troubled regions in international cooperation and integration. Such an approach has already proved successful. For example, inclusion in NATO, the process of the eastern enlargement of the EU, and even the promise of a possible future inclusion in these processes, have stimulated democratic reforms in the countries of central, eastern, and southeastern Europe, which contributed to stability, improved security, and peace in these regions and in Europe at large (e.g. Mayhew 1998: 185–8). This has proved true with regard to Bulgaria’s and Romania’s EU membership in 2007. Preventive activities of the international community have also proved useful in Macedonia (e.g. Gabrić 2006; Marko 2006).

In my view, the most effective strategy for the resolution of crises and conflicts in the western Balkans would be the inclusion of the countries concerned and the whole region in Euro-Atlantic and European integration processes. However, specific programs and
strategies for peace and stability in individual countries would still be necessary to address specific problems and situations. Although it might be extremely difficult for them to meet required criteria, all countries in the region aspire to become EU members (e.g. Brinar and Svetličič 1999). They are keen to meet the criteria defined by the EU as the minimal requirements for their successful accession. In this context, the very existence of proclaimed standards, the emerging EU policy on ethnic relations, the protection of national and other minorities, and multiculturalism/interculturalism are important contributions to the promotion of multiethnic societies and improvement of ethnic relations. Nevertheless, this role of the EU can be successful only if it elaborates a long-term strategy for the accession of these countries and follows it closely. This way, by enabling faster social development and a better life for people, the EU can offer a viable alternative to traditional exclusive and aggressive nationalism in the countries of southeastern Europe.

Existing international legal standards, especially the conventions of the Council of Europe, the Copenhagen criteria, and potential EU requirements for the protection of minorities, could improve national legislation on the protection of minorities in the Balkan countries. Considering the gap between the normative regulation of human rights and the actual situation, however, normative reforms and formal inclusion in integration processes might have only a limited impact, if their implementation is not monitored constantly.

Previous sections showed how the lack of a coherent global international strategy could have contributed to the generation and escalation of a crisis or conflicts or, at least, to a less successful crisis and conflict management. Although it is impossible to prove that the extensive and coordinated use of existing frameworks, models, methods, techniques, and approaches for peace restoration, peacemaking, and peacekeeping and/or for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts could have reduced the intensity of Yugoslav crises and conflicts, it seems likely that it could have reduced their tragic consequences. The literature on peacemaking and conflict resolution and the research reports that I studied while developing the theoretical model and international strategy present viable theories and many successful cases that support such a conclusion.


My theoretical model of the integral international strategy for the management of diversity, prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, schematically presented in Table 32.1 combines several approaches, levels, and measures that are organized into a continuous process (within which all phases could and should run simultaneously and as interwoven processes). This process and all measures and activities within it should be monitored and evaluated constantly and, based on the evaluation, should be updated and developed. This process is designed so that it combines, coordinates, and integrates activities and measures for diversity management; for peace promotion, peacemaking, and peacekeeping; and for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts. It is designed to manage diversities and asymmetries in a peaceful and democratic way, thereby preventing possible escalations of crises and conflicts that could endanger stability and peace. In addition to the management of diversity and prevention measures, it includes activities and measures for the management and resolution of crises and conflicts that could be activated if diversity management and preventive measures do not prevent escalation of conflicts. In this context, such radical measures as an international (military)
Table 32.1: Theoretical model of the integral global strategy for the management of diversity and for the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts ("Strategy EEIB + 4 Ps + ARIME Framework")

**INTEGRAL GLOBAL INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY** (including the necessary international infrastructure) that includes defined (1) general goals; (2) specific approaches and goals; (3) institutional and organizational framework; (4) actors and their roles – IN THE FOLLOWING FIELDS:

PERMANENT MEASURES ENSURING STABILITY AND PEACE: prevention, cure, and rehabilitation

**Phase I: PREVENTION and EARLY DETECTION**
*Activities:* visits by and employment of international observers, monitoring and early detection mechanisms, counseling, stimulation and promotion of negotiations of adversary sides, peace core activities, traditional peacekeeping activities, the ARIME Framework activities (conflict prevention, management, and resolution activities/programs), democratic institution building, “promotion of normal life and cooperation”

**Phase II: PEACEMAKING**
*Activities:* international (military) intervention to stop fighting, negotiations of adversary sides, truce, keeping apart of adversary sides, disarming of warring troops, traditional peacekeeping activities, the ARIME Framework activities, democratic institution building

**Phase III: PEACEKEEPING**
*Activities:* international troops employed as a buffer, control of terms of the truce, keeping conflicting sides apart, disarming of the warring troops, policing, traditional peacekeeping activities, the ARIME Framework activities, democratic institution building

**Phase IV: POLICING**
*Activities:* international policing activities, international advisors, the ARIME Framework activities, democratic institution building including “restoration and promotion of normal life and cooperation”


intervention could be used to stop an ongoing war or massive violations of human rights (e.g. genocide in Rwanda in April 1994). This requires clearly regulated rules for the implementation of different measures, and defined rules for decisionmaking. The model is designed in such a way that it requires its organization and coordination at all levels – from local, regional, and subnational to national, international (including supranational, e.g. the EU), and global levels.

This integral international strategy would require an international infrastructure capable of making necessary decisions, implementing adopted measures, and realizing different activities. This infrastructure would include mechanisms for diversity management, early
1. ECONOMY (economic and social development)
2. EDUCATION AND TRAINING (permanent, lifelong process)
3. INSTITUTION BUILDING, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS: development and strengthening of democratic political and social institutions, democratization

THE "ARIME" CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK

**Framing:** conflict analysis and approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adversarial (antagonism)</th>
<th>Reflexive</th>
<th>Integrative</th>
<th>Combined – process-based: monitoring and evaluation as permanent process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D 1: Blaming (THEM)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>D 4: Partnership and common interests (PARTNERS) Interactive, cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D 2:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introspection (US)</td>
<td>Relational (WE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contextual</td>
<td>Interactive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Causes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C 1: Competition/ disposition</td>
<td>D 2: Negative experiences</td>
<td>D 3: Situation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Management and (re)solving:** conflict management and resolution strategies

|--------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------------|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementation</th>
<th>I 1: Coercive</th>
<th>I 2: Buy-in (Internally)</th>
<th>I 3: Mutual aid (Preferably cooperation)</th>
<th>I 4: Inclusive, cooperative Monitoring and evaluation as permanent process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Detection and warning mechanisms, mechanisms for the prevention of crises and conflicts, mechanisms for the management and resolution of crises and conflicts, and comprehensive monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that would constantly monitor and evaluate all measures and activities and their effectiveness. To a large extent such an international infrastructure already exists, but is not being properly regulated, organized, integrated, and coordinated. Nevertheless, certain additional mechanisms are necessary and precise rules for the implementation and functioning of these mechanisms are needed, including rules for decision-making. These developments depend on the readiness, interests, and available resources of all key actors involved and would require their consensus and concerted efforts.
Regarding international structures and infrastructure, the UN, especially the Security Council, can play a central role. However, other international and regional governmental organizations (e.g. OSCE, CoE, EU, NATO, UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR) and non-governmental organizations (e.g. Amnesty International, international professional associations) should be included as well. Regional governmental and non-governmental organizations could be important for the early detection of warning signals that can indicate the possibility of the escalation of crises and conflicts. This should give the international community the necessary time to implement preventive measures and activities. Permanent monitoring, prevention, and simultaneous evaluation of the effectiveness of these measures and activities should be key components for the development of the specific strategy and necessary measures in every case.

This international infrastructure might require a new coordinating body, possibly within the UN structure or as an independent international organization with a special status with the UN and with other participating international organizations. Three main types of functions and activities of such a body could be envisaged: (1) diversity management and the prevention of crises and conflicts ("preventive functions"); (2) management and resolution of crises and conflicts ("curative functions"); and (3) measures for confidence building, reconstruction, and development after a conflict ("rehabilitation"). Among others, the preventive functions would include the coordination of early detection and warning as well as monitoring activities, their evaluation, permanent reporting to the UN Secretary General, Security Council, General Assembly and to all other participating international and regional organizations; preparation of proposals for the Security Council's decisions on necessary measures and activities; and the coordination of the implementation of adopted measures and actions. If a crisis or conflict escalates, the coordinating body would undertake and coordinate (curative) measures and activities for its management and resolution. These measures and activities could include direct international involvement for the prevention of armed conflicts and fighting, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and diverse measures, projects, and activities for the management and resolution of conflicts. "Rehabilitative functions" would include measures, programs, projects, and activities for confidence building, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development in societies devastated by the escalated crisis and/or conflict.

Such integral (international) strategies, coordinated by the coordinating body, would most likely require long-term involvement in specific cases and would be very costly given the specific nature of ethnic and other protracted conflicts that the international community is facing. However, the engagement of substantial financial and other resources for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts is far less costly than the tragic consequences of escalated crises, violent conflicts, and wars.

The international infrastructure could be designed in such a way that the UN Security Council would adopt key political and military decisions. If the Security Council could not make the necessary decisions, the coordinating body should be entitled to request the necessary political decision from the UN General Assembly according to the procedure established by the resolution "United for Peace." The coordinating body should be given the necessary authority to implement adopted decisions, and coordinate respective international activities. It should be authorized to take certain decisions on "curative activities," including dispatching international assistance to countries and regions affected by crises or/and conflicts, and to coordinate the necessary activities (e.g., economic, social, educational). In this context, it should have the right to subcontract to institutions and agencies necessary for the realization of these activities.
The existence of such an international infrastructure could have reduced many problems that the international community encountered during the Yugoslav crisis. Among other tasks, the coordinating body could have coordinated the development of an integral strategy. Although different views would still have existed, the international community would have been able to detect them and develop a compromise scenario acceptable to most of the actors involved. This could have decreased the confusion created by mixed signals sent by the international community and different countries. These signals were interpreted in different ways in different parts of Yugoslavia, which contributed to further escalation of the crisis. Additionally, such a mechanism would have resolved many problems regarding decisions on international interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo (e.g. Buckley 2000). Rules of procedure and specified criteria would mean that such a decision should always be made by the UN Security Council and be carried out under the auspices of the UN regardless of the agencies involved (e.g. NATO).

Obviously, preventive measures and strategies were either missing or ineffective in the Yugoslav crisis. This led to the escalation of the crisis, which transformed into armed conflicts. As a result, the focus of the integral international strategy changed. The international community had to stop the war, but it lacked the necessary coherent long-term strategy. Most of the time, it reacted to tragic developments in the territory. When, finally, the international community acted to stop the war, there was still no integrated international strategy for the resolution of the crisis. In its continued absence, it is to be feared that the fighting would resume if the international troops withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina and/or Kosovo.

As the schematic presentation of the theoretical model of the integral international strategy in Table 32.1 indicates, such a strategy must encompass long-term activities in the following key areas:

1. **Economy** - focusing especially on economic and social development that ensures a decent and acceptable living and future perspective for people, which also includes planning and managing of migration and integration of immigrants;
2. **Education and training** - including formal and informal education and training at all levels and in all spheres; education and training should be viewed as a lifelong process and permanent activity that enables people to cope with social and technological change and development;
3. **Institution building, democracy, and human rights** - requiring the stable functioning of democratic institutions, permanent institution building, and the promotion of the highest standards of human rights, including special rights of minorities.

Given the situation in the Balkans, focusing on the economy, education, and training as key factors for capacity building and improving of social capital, and on institution building, democratization, and promotion of human rights, could be considered a necessary investment in the future and the basis for long-term peace and stability in the region and globally. Although we might expect the international community to pay special attention to the regions that are perceived as possible “trouble spots,” such a global strategy, and specific region-adjusted strategies, are useful for all parts of the world, including those that are not considered problems.

The global strategy and specific strategies, which should consider specific and common characteristics of respective environments, should define and specify:
general goals, especially long-term goals;
2 specific approaches and goals, derived from general, long-term goals and adjusted to specific circumstances and needs;
3 institutional and organizational frameworks;
4 relevant actors, their relations and cooperation, and their roles regarding general and specific goals in all relevant fields.

Table 32.1 indicates measures to ensure permanent stability and peace, and activities that can contribute to managing diversity and preventing, managing, and/or resolving crises and conflicts. Although – to use a medical analogy – these activities and measures can be defined as predominantly preventive, curative, and/or rehabilitative, they should be observed as a permanent and interwoven process in which all phases should be going on permanently and simultaneously, in combinations that are best adjusted to the specific situations, circumstances, and needs of the respective environments.

Among the predominantly preventive activities we could list those designed to prevent conflicts and their escalation. These include the development of communication channels; early detection of conflicts and their escalation through early warning mechanisms; stable and balanced economic development, welfare, equality, and justice; the development and functioning of democratic institutions; diversity management and promoting diversities as comparative advantages; measures and activities for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts, including mechanisms for consultation, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration; a permanent process for defining and developing common interests, equal cooperation, and compromise building; if necessary, employment of third parties, neutral observers, counselors, negotiators, and mediators; and the coordination of all measures and activities.

At the same time as preventive activities and measures for ensuring peace and stability are being implemented, we would expect that, among others, the following curative measures and activities are being undertaken as well: continuation of all relevant measures and activities from the previous phase; specific measures for the management, pacification, and resolution of escalating conflicts; in case of transformation of conflicts into violent ones, activities and intervention for the cessation of violence, implementation of a truce, separation of conflicting sides (enemies), disarmament, and other peacemaking activities and measures; deployment and employment of international military and police forces and other peacekeeping measures and activities; assistance in negotiations; promotion of common interests and awareness of diversities as comparative advantages; and promotion of tolerance, peaceful and equal coexistence, and cooperation.

Ideally, adequate predominantly rehabilitative measures should be implemented simultaneously with preventive and curative ones. They include, among others, the continuation of all relevant measures and activities from the previous phases; policing, especially the employment of international police forces; monitoring of cessations of violence, truces, and disarmament; promotion of tolerance, peaceful and equal coexistence, and cooperation; strategies, programs, measures, and activities for rebuilding and long-term development.

The left side of Table 32.1 indicates the possible role of the international community in stability and peace-ensuring measures (four Ps):

- prevention;
- peacemaking;
- peacekeeping;
- policing.
Ideally, preventive measures can avert the escalation of crisis and the transformation of conflicts into violent conflicts. They can include different international activities such as visits by and employment of international observers, the establishment of monitoring mechanisms, counseling, Peace Corps activities, and traditional peacekeeping activities. The use of preventive measures requires consensus and acceptance by respective national governments. If these preventive measures are successful, there is usually no need to introduce other measures and activities. Unfortunately, this was not the case during the Yugoslav crisis, although the international community had some success in using preventive measures in Macedonia (see for example Marko 2006; Sokalski 2003).

When preventive measures prove insufficient, other measures need to be introduced. In cases of escalated and violent conflicts, these measures usually involve the participation of international troops. Peacemaking is a relatively new instrument of the international community that might be necessary for stopping hostilities after an armed conflict has commenced. Ideally, international peacemaking troops are employed in a territory by invitation, or at least by consensus of the respective national government(s). The international intervention might be needed if there are gross human rights violations or humanitarian crises in a certain country and the government concerned does not agree to the employment of international peacemaking troops. According to the proposed international infrastructure, only the UN Security Council can initiate an international military intervention, if all criteria and procedures are fully observed. An international intervention was needed in Bosnia-Herzegovina to stop the war and atrocities. Additionally, the government in Sarajevo had asked for the international involvement. However, the lack of an adequate international infrastructure and of resolution by the international community caused the delay and loss in human lives. If an international infrastructure, defined criteria, and rules of procedure had existed, and a decision had been made by the UN Security Council, there would have been no doubts and disagreements about the international military intervention in Kosovo (e.g. Buckley 2000).

When the fighting stops, peacekeeping might be required to prevent future hostilities. Traditional peacekeeping was introduced upon request, or agreement, by the relevant government(s) after a truce had been put in place. In this role, usually employed in a buffer zone, peacekeepers control the terms of the truce and keep conflicting sides apart. Traditional peacekeeping has been transformed in recent years and includes several additional activities that can contribute to the actual restoration of peace after a war. These new activities include engaging international troops in different conflict resolution projects. Sometimes these activities include international policing (see phase IV in Table 32.1).

The lower right side of Table 32.1 presents the "ARIME" conflict management and resolution framework or simply the "ARIME Framework." As mentioned, it is based on the "ARI Conflict Management Framework" for ethnic and regional conflicts developed by Rothman (1992: 64–65) "as a vehicle for structuring conflict management training workshops for young Arab and Jewish leaders in Israel." The "ARIME Framework" should also be understood as an instrument that enables the analysis of conflict management policies and activities, and as a tool for planning prenegotiation and negotiation processes, and measures and actions for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts. It integrates adversarial, reflective, integrative, and combined process-based approaches to crisis and conflict management and resolution, with the aim of optimizing the outcomes. Permanent monitoring and evaluation require the participation of all sides, and often the involvement of a third party that can act in different capacities that might include acting as a channel of communication, facilitator, negotiator, or mediator. The content, goals, criteria, procedure, and processes for facilitation, negotiation, monitoring, and evaluation must
be agreed upon by all involved sides and by the third party. They establish a framework for equal cooperation of all participants that must agree which approach, or combination of approaches, will be used. All activities should be subject to permanent monitoring and evaluation. For the Balkans, diverse third parties would be involved. In some cases, especially at local and other micro levels, NGOs and other civil society actors might prove to be the most acceptable and successful, whereas at the national and international level the international community, especially international organizations and sometimes influential states, would make the most successful third parties.

Conclusion

Pluralist, diverse, and asymmetrical societies need to manage diversity and to prevent, manage, and resolve crises and conflicts if they want to be successful, peaceful, and stable in the long run. Consequently, every pluralist society has to develop adequate and effective mechanisms and procedures for diversity management and for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts, thereby preventing their destructive force and using their potentially positive, creative energy for successful development. These mechanisms and procedures have to be permanently developed and updated in order to correspond to the changing reality. On the other hand, inadequate mechanisms and procedures for the management and resolution of conflicts can be likely sources of new crises and conflicts. Crises and conflicts that are not handled properly can contribute to the escalation of conflicts that – especially if they transform into violent conflicts – could result in social instability, possibly in a war. This was what happened in the former Yugoslavia.

The international community, with its measures, activities, and interventions, can, no doubt, play a role in the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts in individual countries, but it can also contribute to the escalation of crises and conflicts – as was the case with the Yugoslav crisis.

We could confirm the central hypothesis that the lack of a coherent and elaborated international strategy for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts contributed to the escalation of the Yugoslav crisis. The absence of such a strategy resulted in several inadequate and delayed reactions by the international community. Consequently, the international community failed to implement adequate preventive measures and did not react in time to stop the fighting and prevent war crimes and crimes against humanity (including "ethnic cleansing"). Moreover, the subsequent international intervention was not followed up by activities and measures necessary for confidence building, rehabilitation of ethnic diversity, and adequate and equal integration in these divided societies. For these reasons the fear remains that, with the withdrawal of the international community and forces from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, crises and conflicts there might escalate again, in which case even the resumption of the fighting is not impossible.

On the other hand, the second hypothesis – that the systematic use of existing frameworks, models, methods, and techniques for the regulation and management of diversity and ethnic relations, and for the prevention, management, and resolution of crises and conflicts within the global international strategy could have improved the situation and contributed to a more successful management of the crisis – cannot be confirmed conclusively. However, I am still of the view that these frameworks, models, methods, and techniques, if appropriately adopted, would have improved the situation. Hence the theoretical model and integral international strategy that are presented in this chapter. If nothing else, they are useful tools for a more effective analysis of specific situations and developments in diverse environments.
From a historic perspective, we can describe the world at the turn of the millennium as a period of technological progress, transition and global transformation, integration and disintegration, globalization and regionalization. My hope is that these developments will be recorded as reflecting a period of liberation, human rights, including rights of minorities, and successful democratization. However, considering contemporary developments, this period can also be described as a period of turbulence, crises, social and ethnic conflict, revolutions, wars, and diverse armed conflicts. All these processes, developments, and events shape the international community and all modern societies. They also determine the developments in science— including peace, conflict (management and resolution), ethnic, and international relations studies. I can only hope that these developments help to lay the foundations for successful peaceful prevention, management and resolution of international and other crises and conflicts in the future. There is, therefore, a need for more research of the kind presented in this chapter.

Notes

1 See SP (1999). Initiated by the EU, this document was signed at the international conference at the closing of Germany's presidency of the EU. In attendance were: foreign ministers of the Member States of the European Union; the European Commission; the foreign ministers of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Hungary, Japan, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovenia, (the former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia, Turkey, and the United States of America; the OSCE Chairman in Office and the Representative of the Council of Europe representing the participants; representatives of the United Nations, UNHCR, NATO, OECD, WEU, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Investment Bank, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, acting within their competencies, representing the facilitating States, as well as the Representatives of the Royaumont process, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Central European Initiative (CEI), Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP).

2 For example, all countries of the region and many NGOs agreed that activities and programs regarding institutional reforms, capacity and institution building, good governance, and promotion of democratic (participatory) citizenship were some of the most important activities in the field of democracy and human rights (positively—directly and indirectly—impacting security and peace and social/economic development). However, other SP member states did not support these proposals, and, as a result, they were voted down.

3 See for example Azar and Burton (1986); Burton (1984, 1990, 1996); Burton and Dukes (1990); Gurr (2000); Mastenbroek (1995); Ross and Rothman (1999).

Bibliography


